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Abstract 
In advanced industrial democracies, including Canada, elections act as important 
mechanisms of democratic accountability. However, the migration of public decision-making 
responsibility away from elected representatives and toward new governance models may 
alter accountability relationships. As authority is dispersed horizontally to new governance 
actors that exist beyond the reach of the ballot box, questions of public input and 
accountability within the democratic governance process arise.  
The objectives of the dissertation are: 1) to evaluate the extent to which Canadian provinces 
have opted to migrate decision-making authority horizontally in response to policy issues and 
why; and 2) to evaluate the existence and relative strength of the accountability relationships 
that emerge between new governance actors and both government and society once authority 
has migrated. It is hypothesized that period in time, political ideology, and government fiscal 
capacity are predictors of authority migration as a policy tool. Like wise, it is hypothesized 
that period in time, political ideology, and the geographic scale of the new governance 
jurisdictions, are predictors of the strength of both government and societal accountability 
relationships.  
 To test the hypotheses, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are utilized. First, the 
incidence of decision-making authority migration and strength of accountability relationships 
are evaluated using regression analysis. This analysis considers these relationships using an 
original dataset of cases of horizontal authority migration in the provinces of Alberta, British 
Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario, between the years of 1946 and 2005. Second, case 
studies and qualitative interviews are leveraged to gain greater contextual understanding of 
the causes and implications of migration of decision-making authority to regional healthcare 
bodies in the provinces selected.  
While horizontal governance arrangements may raise questions over public input and 
accountability, findings support the hypothesis that their use is not new having existed for the 
entire post-war period. Furthermore, while the accountability relationship between 
government and new governance actors has remained dominant, the accountability 
relationship with society is strengthening as predicted. Perception of accountability 
 iii 
 
relationships by interviewees, however, suggests that a lack of clarity in decision-making 
responsibility has weakened the ability for citizens to hold decision-makers accountable. 
Keywords 
Accountability, Multilevel Governance, Type II Multilevel Governance, Authority 
Migration, Democratic Accountability, Public Accountability, Democracy. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction: The Migration of Authority 
On December 27th 2009 Reilly Anzovino died as the ambulance carrying her reached the 
Welland hospital. Anzovino was taken to the Welland hospital, approximately twenty 
kilometers from the scene of the car accident that caused her injuries. The Fort Erie 
Douglas Memorial hospital, which was only five kilometers from the accident scene, had 
recently had its emergency room closed (Hamilton Spectator, 2010).  
The decision to close the emergency room in Fort Erie was made by the Haldimand Brant 
Local Health Integration Network (HNHM LHIN). The HNHB HLIN is one of fourteen 
not-for-profit corporations in Ontario that work with local health providers and 
community members to determine the health service priorities for their regions. The 
Local Health Integration Networks were created in 2006 with the stated purpose of 
planning, integrating, and funding local health services, including: Hospitals, Community 
Care Access Centres, Community Support Services, Long-term Care, Mental Health and 
Addictions Services and Community Health Centres (Ontario Local Health Integration 
Network, 2006). At its January 27th 2009 meeting the HNHB LHIN passed a motion 
requiring the Niagara Health System to make changes at its hospital site in Fort Erie. 
Among the changes was the order to close the emergency room at the Fort Erie Douglas 
Memorial hospital (Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant LHIN, 2009). 
Like many public policy decisions, the decision to close the emergency room at the Fort 
Erie Douglas Memorial hospital was made neither by an elected representative nor by a 
member of the public service for whom our elective representatives are accountable. 
Instead a not-for-profit corporation to which the Ontario government migrated decision-
making authority over fundamental aspects of the Ontario public healthcare system made 
the decision. Using the language of multilevel governance, decision-making 
responsibility had shifted horizontally from a general-purpose jurisdiction, the province 
of Ontario, to a task-specific jurisdiction, the HNHB LHIN. It is in this environment, 
where actors from outside of traditional government are engaged in the act of public 
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governance, that this research is focused. As public decision-making authority migrates 
beyond the traditional confines of government, questions must be asked as to the 
resulting implications for public input and democratic accountability. How are such 
decision-makers held accountable for their actions?  
In assessing the implication of authority migration for democratic accountability the 
proceeding chapters focus on the following: 1) the extent to which Canadian provinces 
have opted to migrate decision-making authority horizontally in response to policy issues 
and what factors explain the migration of authority; and 2) the existence and relative 
strength of the accountability relationships that emerge once authority has been migrated, 
especially the accountability relationship between the new governance actors and both 
government and society. In other words, how often is decision-making authority migrated 
and why? When authority is migrated, who are the new decision-makers accountable to? 
And, how strong are the new accountability relationships? Expressed in terms of the 
decision to close of the emergency room at the Fort Erie Douglas Memorial hospital, the 
questions being asked would be: 1) What factors explain the migration of healthcare 
decision-making authority? And 2) How can citizens hold LHINs accountable for the 
decisions made that shape public healthcare within their community?  
1.1 Authority Migration and the Changing Face of 
Governance 
As stated by David Adamany in his introduction to 1975 edition of Schattschneier’s The 
Semisovereign People, the most legitimate question for political scientists in a democracy 
is how can the people control government (Adamany, 1975: xiii). In the case of authority 
migration, the question can be expanded to how can the people control the range of actors 
engaged in the governance process. As the governance structure has changed, what is the 
effect on the ability of citizens to hold decision-makers accountable?  
While the word governance has become omnipresent, it remains a contested term with 
people ascribing varied meanings to the concept of governance based upon their own 
theories and values (Bevir, 2010: 1-2; Pierre and Peters, 2005: 1; Torfing, et al., 2012: 2). 
The interest in governance reflects concerns over how to understand the changing role of 
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public leadership and the changing institutional and social patterns in society (Torfing, et 
al., 2012: 2). As a concept, governance is not constant, but shifts in step with changes in 
the needs and values of society (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 49). At one time governance 
simply referred to statecraft, or the exercise of governmental responsibility (Stivers, 
2008: 5), however, as societal needs and values changed, the meaning of governance has 
changed to include a broader range of actors in the governance process. The current use 
of government and governance now convey different meanings and can no longer be used 
interchangeably (Hughs, 2010: 89; Rhodes, 1997: 46). The modern conceptualization of 
governance can be broadly defined as collective problem solving in the public realm 
(Caporaso, 1996: 32). Another account suggests that governance is the pursuit of 
collective interests and the steering and coordination of society (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 
209). Bell and Hindmoor provide a more fleshed out definition, defining governance as 
shaping, regulating, or attempting to control human behaviour in order to achieve 
collective ends (2009: 2). 
While for the majority of the past three centuries we have associated the act of 
governance with the state and a dominant pattern of hierarchical governing in which 
governments decide the laws and policies to be adopted, this traditional view of 
governance is being challenged as networks and other social actors seek greater 
autonomy (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209-210). Challenges to the traditional structure of 
governance have also emerged in the form of high demand for governance. The demand 
for governance has expanded beyond the capacity of the state to the point where 
governance requirements cannot be fulfilled without widespread delegation (Flinders, 
2006: 223). The result is an increased interest in partnerships between government and 
societal actors and the dispersal of political authority across multiple layers (Peters and 
Pierre, 2006: 209). The state is no longer seen to monopolize the governance process, and 
governments are now subject to negotiations with a wide range of public, semi-public, 
and private actors when engaged in policy formation (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007: 3-4). 
This dispersal of authority has reshaped the governance landscape and brought about 
questions of democratic input and accountability within the governance process (Peters 
and Pierre, 2006: 209).  
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At the heart of the question over public input and democratic accountability is the 
movement of decision-making out of the hands of elected representatives. A central 
premise of democracy is that decision-makers are legitimate and accountable. In the 
democratic tradition the election process has fulfilled these roles at it provides a 
mechanism by which to identify the legitimate representatives of the people and a means 
through which to hold the same representatives accountable. As stated by James Fearon, 
in elections have been seen as an important mechanism of accountability through which 
the policy preferences of the citizens can induce government action (1999: 57). However, 
the new forms of governance that have emerged as decision-making authority has been 
migrated rarely call for the popular election of board members and decision-makers. In 
the absence of elections, it is essential to examine whether mechanisms are being put in 
place to ensure the continued legitimacy and accountability of decision-makers.  
When authority migrates beyond the boundaries of elected government, the nature of the 
ensuing accountability relationships must be considered. In the chapters that follow two 
potential accountability relationships are investigated: 1) the relationship with 
government through which government holds decision-makers directly accountable and 
citizens hold decision-makers indirectly accountable through government; and 2) the 
relationship with society in which citizens hold decision-makers directly accountable. In 
addition to the two possible accountability relationships, a third outcome exists where 
decision-makers are neither accountable to government nor citizens. Through the 
evaluation of both potential accountability relationships a better understanding can be 
gained of if and how decision-makers that exist outside of traditional government are 
held accountable. 
Up until now, the goal of this chapter has been to provide context and to instill a sense of 
importance in studying the migration of decision-making authority away from elected our 
elected representatives. In the next section the focus shifts to outlining each of the 
following chapters and how each of the two accountability relationships discussed above 
are evaluated using both qualitative and quantitative means. 
  
5 
1.2 Assessing the Migration of Authority and Accountability: 
A Chapter Outline 
In investigating the changes in the governance environment and the implications for 
democratic accountability, this research project assesses both the extent to which 
governments have opted to migrate authority and the subsequent accountability relations 
that emerge. To accomplish these ends instances of authority migration in the provinces 
of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario between the years of 1946 and 
2005 are considered. Provincial politics was selected as it provides a larger sample sizes 
than using national level data alone. The specific provinces were selected based on 
regional diversity and political ideology. The sixty-year timeframe was selected as it 
provided an observation window that began with the emergence of Keynesianism after 
World War II and continuing through the shift to neoliberalism.  
The necessary theoretical constructs that underpin this research endeavour are put 
forward in Chapter 2. Using the construct of multilevel governance, authority migration 
and the potential accountability relationships are discussed. The concept of accountability 
is then elaborated upon, followed by the challenges to accountability that authority 
migration is seen to cause. Chapter 2 concludes with a preview of the hypotheses to be 
discussed and evaluated in subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the methodology and the data used 
throughout the research project, including the rational for the timeframe, provinces, and 
specific case studies selected for study. Moreover, as the project realizes upon datasets 
compiled specifically for the purpose of this study, Chapter 3 provides a detailed account 
of the compilation criteria and process. The methodology used to conduct both large-n 
quantitative analysis and the ensuing case studies is also discussed in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 4 the ‘newness’ of authority migration and the ensuing governance 
arrangements are first evaluated. Taking a historical perspective, the rate at which the 
provincial government of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario migrate 
authority is evaluated across time. If authority migration is a recent trend, then the rate of 
authority migration should increase over time. If authority migration is nothing new, 
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however, and what is being witnessed is the accumulation of decisions to migrate 
authority then the rate of authority migration should remain relatively stable, while the 
number of decision-making bodies that exist beyond the confines of the traditional state 
should increase. 
Beyond the newness of authority migration, Chapter 4 explores two hypotheses regarding 
the rate of authority migration. First, that as the capacity of government to respond to 
policy demands decreases the rate at which authority is migrated increases. Second, that 
governments further to the left on the political spectrum will be less likely to migrate 
authority than governments on the right. In Chapter 4 a quantitative approach is 
employed, which uses both descriptive statistics and regression analysis.  
While Chapter 4 assesses the extent to which authority has migrated, Chapter 5 assesses 
the strength of the subsequent accountability relationships. To do so a quantitative 
approach is again used. A dataset containing all cases of authority migration in the 
provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario between the years of 
1946 and 2005 is again used. For all cases, the accountability relationship with both 
government and society is coded based upon Mark Bovens’s definition of accountability, 
which states that “accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which 
the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (2007: 450). 
In Chapter 5 the effect of time, political ideology and the geographic scale on the strength 
of the accountability relationship between both Type II bodies and government and 
society are tested. In evaluating the effect of political ideology it is expected that 
governments further to the left will build stronger accountability relationships with 
government than governments further to the right. When considering accountability 
relationships over time, Chapter 5 assesses whether the accountability relationships, both 
with government, and society, have been strengthening or weakening over time. Lastly, 
Chapter 5 explorers the effect of geographic size as the strength of each accountability 
relationships is compared across jurisdictions that are municipal, regional, provincial, or 
interprovincial in size. 
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Having looked at the universe of cases of authority migrating in the provinces of Alberta, 
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario between the years of 1946-2005, attention in 
Chapter 6 is turned to the migration of authority in a specific policy area – healthcare. 
Building on the results of previous chapters, Chapter 6 explores the process by which 
each of the four provinces legislated the migration of authority and the creation of health 
authorities in their health care systems. To continue to develop an understanding of why 
authority migrates, both the fiscal capacity and political ideology hypotheses put forward 
in Chapter 4 are evaluated against the migration of authority in the four health care 
systems. Moreover, additional factors that influenced the decision to migrate authority in 
each of the four cases are sought, such as increased capacity for citizen participation, 
through the exploration of how the changes in the healthcare system were framed. 
Beyond examining the factors that led to the migration of authority, Chapter 6 looks at 
the consistency of the framing of the policy problem and solution with the eventual 
policy outcomes. In doing so both the initial migration of authority and the subsequent 
changes to the governance structure are considered. 
Chapter 7 investigates the existence and functioning of the accountability relationships 
that emerged with creation of health authorities. An initial overview of the formal 
accountability mechanisms put in place by government through legislation and regulation 
as well as the accountability initiatives put in place by the health authorities are provided. 
Moving from how the accountability relationships appear on paper to how they are 
perceived in practice, interview responses from members of the health authorities, 
provincial public service employees, elected representatives, and members of interest 
groups active in the health care field are then assessed. In evaluating the accountability 
relationship between the provincial health authorities and both government and society, 
Chapter 7 considers the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 5. However, the main focus is 
on how the accountability of the health authorities is perceived. Interviews are used to 
gain greater understanding of whom regional health authorities are seen to be accountable 
to and whether the existing accountability structures are believed to be effective. 
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1.3 Implications 
Through the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches this research responds to 
concerns that the migration of authority outside of traditional government weakens the 
accountability relationships between the people and those who make decisions on their 
behalf. Significant academic literature exists on the vertical migration of authority to 
different levels of elected government and the migration of authority upward to the 
international sphere as a result of globalization. This project instead focuses on the 
understudied horizontal migration of authority outward from government toward special 
purpose bodies. The key contributions of this research are the illumination of the 
accountability relationships that emerge once decision-making authority shifts beyond the 
immediate responsibility of our elected representatives, and the relative effectiveness of 
these relationships.  
In Democratic theory, elections have been an important mechanism of accountability 
through which the policy preferences of the citizens can induce government action 
(Fearon, 1999: 57). The migration of decision-making responsibility outside the 
boundaries of elected governments, however, necessitates a different conceptualization of 
accountability relationships. When decision-making authority is granted to an unelected 
body, what are the channels and processes available to citizens to hold decision-makers 
accountable? Through the evaluation of the existence and strength of accountability 
relationships between decision-makers, such as the HNHB LHIN, and both government 
and society, an understanding of if and how these decision-makers are held accountable 
can be gained. 
Linked to concerns over accountability is the extent to which authority is migrated. The 
greater the tendency of government to resolve public policy issues through authority 
migration, the greater the implications for any associated loss of accountability. Through 
studying both the propensity for governments to migrate authority and the viability of 
resulting accountability relationships, both the validity of accountability concerns and 
risk to democratic accountability presented by the volume of instances of authority 
migration can be addressed.  
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Overall, in assessing both the frequency and the effect on democratic accountability of 
having decision-making authority migrated horizontally to special purpose bodies this 
research fills significant gaps in the academic literature on two levels. First, by focusing 
on the horizontal migration of authority at the provincial level, the research explores an 
area of authority migration that while common in practice is understudied in the 
academic literature. Second, backed by empirical findings, this research contributes to 
our broader understanding of roles and abilities that both government and citizens play in 
holding decision-makers accountable.   
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Chapter 2  
2 Theoretical Background: Migration of Authority, 
Multilevel Governance, and Accountability 
At its core, democracy can be described as self-governance though collective decision 
and action (Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 317; Warren, 2011: 687). The structure of 
representative democracy has remained relatively constant during the last two centuries: 
rulers are elected by citizens, citizens are free to discuss and demand at all times, but can 
give no legally binding instructions, and rulers are subject to periodic reelection (Manin, 
Przeworski and Stokes, 1999: 3). Within the structure of representative democracy, the 
dominant pattern of governance has been hierarchical, where government decides the 
laws and policies to be adopted (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209). 
While the structure of representative democracy has remained relatively constant, the 
traditional pattern of governance has been challenged (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209). An 
increasing number of public and private actors now have an effect on how society is 
governed (Sørensen, 2006: 98). Government has become just one of many actors, 
resulting in policy areas becoming more crowded and contested and the boundary 
between public and private less precise (Kennett, 2010: 20). New governance 
arrangements have emerged that do not align with conventional government hierarchy 
and new actors in public governance may operate autonomously from the dictates of 
legislatures and public agencies (Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 316). As stated in the 
November 1999 report by the Auditor General of Canada, changes have occurred in how 
we are governed with some policy initiatives moving beyond traditional forms of 
governance as responsibility is shifted to entities outside of government (1999: 23-27).  
The transformation in public governance has been met with both optimism and concern. 
From a positive perspective, the migration of authority to special purpose bodies holds 
the potential for more responsive governance than a single area-wide political monopoly 
(Bollens, 1986: 119; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 633). The migration of authority to task 
specific bodies may allow greater efforts and resources to be effectively concentrated on 
specific problems than would otherwise be the case (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 107). 
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Moreover, expanding the number of decision-making bodies in the public realm may also 
increase the opportunity for public participation in the decision-making process 
(Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 633; Sørensen, 2006: 104). Government may even find that 
the use of nongovernmental actors in certain circumstances is better suited to achieving 
the state’s goals than government itself (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 226; Bell and 
Hindmoor, 2009: 99). 
From a critical perspective, the transformation of the role of government in governance 
has been seen to undermine representative democracy. The legitimacy of representative 
democracy is threatened as elected governments struggle to direct the policy process 
(Bevir, 2010: 2). The dispersal of authority away from government can limit the ability of 
politicians to translate the public’s demands into effective political action (Andrew and 
Goldsmith, 1998: 104; Peters, 2004: 132) as well as weaken legitimacy and create 
disillusionment with the political process (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104). The 
potential also exists that public accountability will be lost as decision-making is removed 
from the political arena (Bollens, 1986: 118-119; Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209; Skelcher, 
2007: 63). Even if the state maintains a preeminent position in the governance process, 
the involvement of nongovernment actors runs the risk of separating elected politicians 
from decisions (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 50). As the role of government in the 
governance structure is transformed there is the possibility that policy processes and 
decisions will become closed to public influence, while at the same time open to 
corruption (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104; Peters, 2004: 133).  
The changing role of government in governance and the increased inclusion of new 
actors in the governance process have given rise to multiple concerns over democratic 
input and accountability (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 5; Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209; 
Flinders, 2011: 2; Gotham, 2012: 644). Taking into account both state-centric and 
society-centric perspectives on modern governance arrangements, the remainder of this 
chapter will provide a theoretical background for authority migration, state vs. society 
control of the governance process, and the prognosis for accountability. The concept of 
accountability will be explored as well as the possible accountability relationships that 
may emerge as authority is migrated outside the boundaries of traditional government 
  12 
institutions. The chapter will conclude with an overview of the hypotheses that will be 
explored and tested in the following chapters. 
2.1 Authority Migration and Multilevel Governance 
One dimension along which governance can vary is centralization of authority. Authority 
can be highly concentrated in a single hierarchical entity that claims exclusive 
jurisdiction or dispersed among various nodes, each exercising only limited jurisdiction 
(Kahler and Lake, 2004: 409). Furthermore, the dispersal of authority may result in broad 
authority over a limited geographic jurisdiction, or concentrated authority in specific 
policy areas (Richardson, 2011: 671). The migration of authority can then be thought of 
as occurring along both a vertical and horizontal axis. Along the vertical axis authority 
can be distributed to successively more local levels of government in which the more 
limited jurisdictions are nested within larger jurisdictions. Along the horizontal axis the 
authority can be dispersed to actors outside of government.  
One conceptualization of authority migration has been captured in the term “multilevel 
governance”. The term multilevel governance emerged out of Gary Marks’s attempt to 
better characterize the governance structure of the European Union. Marks argued that 
what was being witnessed in the European Union was the “emergence of multilevel 
governance, a system of continuous negotiation among nested levels of governments at 
several territorial tiers - supranational, national, regional and local - as the result of a 
broad process of institutional creation and decision reallocation that has pulled some 
previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down 
to local/regional level” (1993: 392). The basis for Marks’s argument was that EU 
Structural policy did not fit within either a national or supranational conception of 
governance. Instead, what Marks witnessed was a two-sided process that involved the 
decentralization of decision making to subnational governments while at the same time 
powers were centralized at the supranational level. The result of this process was 
decision-making power being spun away from the national state in both subnational and 
supranational directions (Marks, 1993: 401-402). In addressing authority migration, 
multilevel governance does not reject the importance of the state, but instead asserts that 
the state no longer monopolizes policy-making authority. According to multilevel 
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governance, decision-making authority is shared among actors at different levels, rather 
than monopolized by state executives (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 346). As stated 
by Bache and Flinders, the analytical focus of multilevel governance can be seen as the 
increasingly contested jurisdictional and territorial boundaries both within and beyond the 
state, the fundamental concern being how to explain the dispersal of central government 
authority both vertically to actors at other territorial levels and horizontally to non-state 
actors (2005: 4).  
Building upon Marks’ work, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks developed two contrasting 
visions of how to conceptualize multi-jurisdictional governance labeled Type I and Type 
II multilevel governance. Marks and Hooghe’s Type I and Type II multilevel governance 
typology provides an effective tool for identifying and conceptualizing different forms of 
multi-jurisdictional governance. Type I multilevel governance has its intellectual 
foundation in federalism, which is concerned with power sharing among governments 
operating at different levels (Marks and Hooghe, 2005: 17). Type I multilevel governance 
is described as the dispersion of authority to a minimal number of jurisdictional levels 
into which a wide array of policy areas are bundled, with smaller jurisdictions nested 
within larger ones and only one relevant jurisdiction existing at each territorial scale. Like 
federalism, Type I multilevel governance is characterized by general-purpose 
jurisdictions, rather than task specific jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe, 2003: 236-237; 
2005: 17-19). Unlike federalism; however, Type I multilevel governance is not confined 
by the geographic boundaries of nation states (Marks and Hooghe 2005: 19). As such, 
Type I jurisdictions include both federal states such as Canada as well as supranational 
entities such as the European Union.  
In contrast with Type I multilevel governance, Type II multilevel governance denotes 
independent jurisdictions that fulfill specific functions as the unit of analysis. Type II 
multilevel governance is defined as having intersecting memberships in the sense that 
borders will be crossed and jurisdictions may overlap; as being organized across a large 
number of levels in which authority is not neatly layered but diverse in scale; and being 
flexible in design, allowing it to respond to changing citizen preferences and functional 
requirements (Marks and Hooghe, 2005: 20-21). According to Marks and Hooghe, Type 
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II multilevel governance can be conceptualized as a system where citizens are not served 
by ‘the’ government, but by several public service industries (2003: 237). The flexibility 
and territorial diversity means that Type II jurisdictions are located across multiple levels 
of government ranging from the transnational to the local level. At the international level, 
Type II jurisdictions can be seen to include organizations such as the Basel Committee 
for Banking Supervision, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision oversees the regulation of international 
banking, while the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are charged with the 
formation of codes of good practice for regulatory and macroeconomic matters (Baker, 
Hudson and Woodward, 2005: 10). At the local level, Type II jurisdictions may be 
created to deal with concerns regarding natural resources, fire protection, water supply, 
housing, sewage, parks and recreation, or any other single function issue area (Marks and 
Hooghe, 2005: 26). 
The construction of both territorial and functional dispersions of power characterized by 
Type I and Type II multilevel governance are not unlike the Althusian compound state. 
Michael Burgess describes the Althusian compound state as an “amalgam of political 
associations based upon consent and built up from below, in which power is distributed 
both territorially and functionally” (2000: 8). Althusius conceptualized institutional 
structure made up of a plurality of smaller and larger consociations, or self-governing 
authorities (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 92) where the small consociations determine what 
authority was delegated to larger consociations, meaning that decisions were apt to 
remain at the lowest practical level (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 96). 
In keeping decisions at the lowest practical level, Althusius foreshadowed the modern 
principal of subsidiarity (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 96). The principal of subsidiarity is 
the normative position that decision-making authority should be placed at the level of 
government that is closest to the citizen and best positioned to carry out a particular task 
(Leuprecht and Lazar, 2007: 5). From the perspective of fiscal federalism, which 
primarily distributes authority along the vertical axis, the most appropriate level of 
government is the lowest level of government that encompasses the relevant benefits and 
costs (Oates 2004: 15). In cases where externalities are inter-jurisdictional, regional 
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organizations may emerge which are capable of addressing the problem through 
negotiations and coordinated decision making (Oates 2004: 23), thus pushing authority 
upwards. While such approaches may result in optimal governance structures, 
determining the appropriate level at which responsibility rests encompasses political as 
well as economic factors. Political participation by both citizens and governments 
interacts with economic efficiency in determining the governance system (Oates 2004: 
30-31).  
While fiscal federalism typically looks at the division of powers vertically at the 
territorial level, multilevel governance, like the Althusian compound state, divides 
powers along both territorial and functional lines. As the principal of subsidiarity is 
premised upon regulatory tasks being undertaken as close as possible to those being 
regulated (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 888), the principal is equally suited to both Type I and 
Type II multilevel governance. The challenge is to build effective processes for collective 
action that recognize the principle of subsidiarity, without weakening democracy 
(Skelcher, 2005: 106-107).  
While Althusius envisioned the smaller political groupings deciding which decisions 
should be migrated upward to larger consociations (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 96), Marks 
and Hooghe argue that in contemporary multilevel governance arrangements it is 
common for Type II multilevel governance structures to be embedded in the legal 
frameworks determined by Type I jurisdictions (2003: 238; 2005: 24). Accordingly, Type 
I and Type II multilevel governance should not be viewed as competing approaches, but 
as complementary approaches where the selected model is a function of the problem 
which needs to be addressed (Marks and Hooghe 2005: 29). Type II multilevel 
governance bodies can be employed as a tool of government through the delegation of 
authority in response to a specific policy circumstance. Alternatively, Type II multilevel 
governance may occur when private actors play a dominant role in the policy making 
process, causing public actors to adopt the privately negotiated regimes (Marks and 
Hooghe 2005: 25).  
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While Type I jurisdictions may involve private actors, Type II jurisdictions have higher 
rates of private involvement that may result in the opening up of public decision making 
to private actors to various degrees (Marks and Hooghe, 2005: 24). The potential for 
either government or non-government actors to be dominant in the policy process 
suggests that multiple paths with varied degrees of government control can be taken 
when formulating Type II governance jurisdictions. In essence, the steering of regulatory 
decision-making for Type II jurisdictions can be conceptualized along two axes, society-
centric in which society steers or state-centric in which government steers, as presented in 
Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Society and Government Steering in Regulatory Decision Making 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, multilevel governance, unlike traditional models of 
intergovernmental relationships, includes both public and private actors in the 
governance process of exchange and collaboration. At the same time, however, the 
institutional dimension of multilevel governance remains important. Institutions define 
the linkages between different levels of government as well as shape and constrain the 
larger web of political actions (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 83). As the linkages, both 
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vertically and horizontally, have become more complex the role of the traditional 
political centre has become redefined (Torfing et al., 2012: 97-98). 
While Marks and Hooghe’s typology is useful for distinguishing between a traditional 
government approach to governance (Type I) and a special purpose governance 
jurisdiction that can exist outside of government (Type II), there is no agreement on how 
governance that spans multiple jurisdictions should be organized. Multiple concepts, 
including multi-tiered governance and polycentric governance, deal with the same 
questions of authority dispersal that multilevel governance attempts to answer (Bache and 
Flinders, 2005: 4). As discussed below, alternative definitions can be found in the works 
of Blatter, Rosenau, and Frey and Eichenberger. 
Joachim Blatter states that common to debates over the institutional transformations that 
are occurring within the traditional Westphalian state are de-territorialization and 
unbundling of politics. While the Westphalian system bundles political responsibility on 
a territorial basis and subordinates all other identities to national identity, it is possible 
through the unbundling of politics for territorial communities to be supplemented by non-
territorial communities (Blatter 2003: 185-186). While the underlying themes may be 
consistent, in looking at broader regions within both North America and Europe, Blatter 
distinguishes between the emerging governance structures. The European case, which 
features institutions with a clear-cut geographic basis and multi-sectoral goals and tasks, 
is labeled by Blatter as a ‘multi-level system’ which is described as ‘multilevel 
governance’ complemented by an additional layer of institutions of governance and 
identity formation. The North American case, which features institutions with fluid 
geographic bases, is described as a ‘multi-polity system’ where non-territorial polities 
complement traditional governance structures along single policy dimensions (Blatter, 
2003: 203-204). Blatter’s identification of ‘multi-level’ and ‘multi-polity’ as contrasting 
systems of governance is not dissimilar to Marks and Hooghe’s multilevel governance 
typology in which Type I is categorized as being multi-level with a minimal number of 
clearly defined geographically jurisdictions, while Type II multilevel governance is 
policy focuses and cuts across traditional geographic boundaries. 
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Rosenau has used the term ‘fragmegration’ to describe the link between fragmentation 
and integration as the location of jurisdictional authority is shaped simultaneously by 
globalization, centralization and integration on one hand and localization, 
decentralization, and fragmentation on the other (2000: 177-178; 2005: 35). To 
conceptualize who has the right to exercise authority, Rosenau uses ‘spheres of authority’ 
that define the range and capacity of actors to generate compliance on the part of those to 
whom the directives are issued (2005: 32; 2007: 89). Constructed by formal and informal 
rules (Rosenau, 2005: 32), Rosenau argues that ‘spheres of authority’, in comparison to 
multilevel governance, allow for the study of the full complexity observed in the political 
world.  
Frey and Eichenberger have developed the concept of Functional, Overlapping, and 
Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ), which is similar to Marks and Hooghe’s 
conceptualization of non-territorial communities under their label of Type II multilevel 
governance. According to Frey and Eichenberger, FOCJ allow the emergence of political 
bodies whose size corresponds with the tasks to be fulfilled. Instead of being based upon 
historical territories, the geographic extension of a FOCUS1 is driven by the physical 
extension of the problem (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999: 3). FOCJ are characterized by 
four properties: FOCJ are determined by the function to be fulfilled and the jurisdictional 
size must match accordingly; FOCJ are overlapping in their geographical extensions; 
FOCJ are competitive and are forced to cater to the preferences of citizens due to the 
threat of exit and political competition through democratic institutions; and FOCJ are 
formal political units with powers to regulate and tax (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999: 4-7). 
As such, FOCJ align with Type II multilevel governance in regard to the emphasis on 
functionalism, overlapping non-territorial geographic extensions, and competition 
between jurisdictions, however, the guarantee of political competition through 
democratic institutions in Frey and Eichenberger’s FOCJ limits the number of potential 
cases in comparison to Marks and Hooghe’s Type II multilevel governance.  
                                                
1  FOCUS is the term Frey and Eichenberger use for the singular of FOCJ.  
  
19 
While there is a lack of agreement on how governance that spans multiple jurisdictions 
should be organized, Marks and Hooghe’s contrasting, yet complementary, forms of 
multilevel governance are appropriate for understanding the migration of authority at the 
federal and provincial level within Canada. Using multilevel governance to study politics 
in Canada is not new. Multilevel governance has been used to study specific policy areas, 
such Leo and August’s look at immigration (2009); the study of voting behaviour in the 
case of Anderson’s exploration of economic voting (2006; 2008); and the creation of the 
Canada Research Chair in Multilevel Governance in 2003 to promote research into 
governance and public policies in Canada aimed at identifying the intergovernmental 
relations and processes that produce the best public policies (Canada. Canada Research 
Chairs, 2003). 
Conceptually, multilevel governance aligns well with Canadian governance. The 
traditional federal dynamics of Canadian governance is captured under Type I multilevel 
governance, while the emergence of special purpose jurisdictions, which is the central 
focus of this research, is incorporated under Type II. Furthermore, Marks and Hooghe’s 
framing of Type I and Type II bodies as complementary, in which the selected 
governance model is a function of the problem that needs to be addressed (Marks and 
Hooghe 2005: 29) and that Type II multilevel governance structures can be embedded in 
legal frameworks determined by Type I jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe 2003: 238; 
Marks and Hooghe 2005: 24) aligns with the migration of authority by government actors 
to external decision-making bodies that has given rise to concerns over public 
accountability. Lastly, unlike Frey and Eichenberger’s FOJC, the definition of Type II 
multilevel governance lacks the requirement for political competition through democratic 
institutions. In omitting the need for political competition, Type II multilevel governance 
more adequately captures the range of institutional arrangements that occur as a result of 
authority migration in Canada. While there exists bodies, such as the Vancouver Board of 
Parks and Recreation, that have elected commissioners (Vancouver. Board of Parks and 
Recreation, 2012), there are many more that fail to incorporate political competition into 
the institutional design. 
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While multilevel governance may be useful in terms of both the act and the 
understanding of governance arrangements, it is not without critique. Peters and Pierre 
have described multilevel governance as a Faustian bargain (Peters and Pierre, 2005; 
Pierre and Peters, 2005). In Christopher Marlowe’s play The Tragic History of Doctor 
Faustus, Dr. Faustus gives his soul to Lucifer in exchange for Mephistopheles as his 
servant. As the play draws to a close, however, Dr. Faustus realizes that for the vain 
pleasure of twenty-four years he has lost eternal joy (Marlowe, 1604). Peters and Pierre 
argue that multilevel governance may be a Faustian bargain as the capacity to govern has 
been sold in an attempt to achieve a more inclusive bargaining process (2005, 94). While 
multilevel governance has the potential for high problem solving capacity and to generate 
efficient outcomes it also has features that call its democratic nature in to question (Pierre 
and Peters, 2005: 99). 
2.2 State-Centric Multilevel Governance: Government 
Steering 
Decision-making in the public sphere by non-government actors is not new. Voluntary, or 
third sector, actors have involved in the provision of public services longer than that of 
the state (Pestoff and Brandsen, 2010: 223). Today, however, the increasing inclusion of 
new actors in public governance has changed how the role of government is perceived. 
Two opposing views on the role of government have emerged in the literature: state-
centric and society-centric. The society-centric position argues that changes in 
governance structures represent a shift away from government dominance toward the 
increasing reliance on non-state actors, while state-centric view claims that government 
has remained the principal actor in governance (Robihau, 2011: 116-117). From the state-
centric perspective, while actors external to government have long been involved in 
governance, modern governance has been transformed by becoming increasingly 
formally organized, legally bound and state controlled. When approached from the 
society-centric perspective, governance is seen as a multidirectional process between 
multiple actors within and between complex systems (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 887).  
In attempting to understand the changing role of the state, Jon Pierre (2000) identifies 
three aspects of state governance that can be seen as particularly relevant to multilevel 
  
21 
governance discourse and the understanding of how to attribute responsibility. First, 
Pierre points to a linkage between the relaxation of regulatory steering within the state 
and the emergence of public-private exchange. This suggests the emergence of a model in 
which the state seeks to increase its points of contact with its external environment as a 
means of conveying its objectives to society. Secondly, Pierre suggests that state power 
and institutional capacity are becoming increasingly contingent upon both public and 
private resources and the ability to direct both toward a common set of objectives. Lastly, 
Pierre states that the model of governance has, to a greater or lesser extent, emerged as a 
steering model that can be witnessed in the growing interest in public-private partnerships 
and the migration of functions that are not critical to the state (2000: 242-243). Overall, 
what Pierre is suggesting is not the weakening of the state, but a shift in state function. 
Likewise, Wallington, Lawrence, and Loechel claim that new governance arrangements 
are not the hollowing out of the state, but the result of the state wanting to govern well 
rather than govern less (2008: 3). In evaluating the role of government in the economy, 
Crouch argues that while the role of the state changes in response to changes in the 
governance environment, the state has not withdrawn from the scene, but has remained 
an active form of governance. While networks and markets have grown in importance, 
the need for close and constant adjustment of the regulatory regime leaves the question of 
whether there is more or less state control open to debate (Crouch, 2004: 113). As stated 
by Skelcher et al., the inclusion of new governance actors does not mean a relationship of 
equals (2005: 578), the role of new actors may be more modest than society-centred 
arguments presumes (Leuprecht and Lazar, 2007: 2).  
In assessing the changing role of the state, Bob Jessop argues that we are seeing the 
emergence of a metagoverning state. The state, in response to the re-articulation of 
different levels of territorial organization of power within the global political system, has 
enhanced its role in managing inter-scalar relations, thus seeking to control how and 
where authority is migrated to minimize effects upon the overall power of the state. In 
response to the shift from government to governance, the state has increased its role in 
metagovernance, thus getting involved in redesigning markets, constitutional change, 
jurisdictional reregulation, setting the conditions of self-organization and organizing the 
overall process for collaboration. As such, the state can be seen as setting the overall 
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ground rules for governance and regulatory order (Jessop, 2004: 19 and Jessop, 2005: 64-
65, Sørensen, 2006: 101). As argued by Chevallier, the government remains central to the 
governance process, “mais à la manière d'un «stratège» et non plus d'un «pilote»” (2003: 
212). It is important to acknowledge, however, that embedded within the idea of 
metagovernace is the recognition that a number of organizations or processes have 
attained sufficient autonomy to warrant some degree of control be imposed overtop of the 
existing governance process (Peters, 2010a: 37). 
Regardless of the level of autonomy, governance can be seen to occur in what Scharpf 
identified as the “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf, 1994: 38-39). In the modern state, both 
public and private actors operate under the shadow of hierarchy where public actors set 
the legal rules of the game and intervene to correct distortions or outcomes that violate 
public interests (Börzel, 2010: 196-197). So while the underlying assumption of 
multilevel governance is that centralization has given way to new forms of governance, 
resulting in decision-making authority being dispersed across multiple jurisdictions, it 
can be argued that the state continues to play a fundamental role within the process. If 
this is indeed the case, and as Jessop argues we are seeing the emergence of 
metagovernance, we can expect Type II jurisdictions to be accountable to government 
through its central role in shaping the structure of governance. Furthermore, we can 
expect accountability mechanisms to be built into the institutional environment created 
by government in the conception of Type II jurisdictions, as institutionalizing an 
accountability relationship between government and Type II decision-makers will serve 
to maintain government control of public policy. The absence of accountability 
mechanisms within the institutional design does not necessarily mean the absence of state 
steering as the state may engage in other informal mechanisms of control, however, it can 
be expected that governments will utilize the institutional design process to preserve their 
steering capacity. 
From this state-centric perspective, while governance structures may have been altered as 
governments adopted a wider range of governance strategies to address policy issues, 
government has remained at the centre. According to Bell and Hindmoor regardless of 
the governance approach put into place, the state has remained the preeminent actor in 
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the governance process (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 10; 2009a: 153-154). Government 
occupies a privileged position as it alone has the legislative capacity to set the rules of 
governance (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 895; Rhodes, 2007: 1244; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 
13). As argued by Bell and Hindmoor, only governments have the legitimate authority to 
select, alter, and replace governance mechanisms. This power serves to keep other 
governance actors in line and preserves government dominance in the policy process 
(Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 13). According to Elke Löffler, the key question for 
government is which governance approach to use to deal with a specific problem. There 
are policy issues that lend themselves to delegation to community groups, those that lend 
themselves to market mechanisms and those that are best addressed through hierarchy 
(2009: 230). Consistent with Bell and Hindmoor, Löffler places government at the centre 
of governance as the result of government’s power to select which governance approach 
is paired with a policy problem. 
While government may be the sole holder of legislative authority, this does not mean that 
government action will result in the desired consequences. As stated by Rhodes, it is 
important to distinguish between intervention and control. Governments can and often do 
intervene in the governance process, but such interventions do not always have the 
intended effects, raising questions of control (Rhodes, 2007: 1248). Matthews argues that 
intra-governmental capacity shapes government response and a lack of intra-government 
capacity can result in actions that while intended to shore up government capacity have 
unintended consequences such as the emergence of new veto points (2012: 185). Through 
the act of metagovernance, politicians may grant considerable autonomy to stakeholders 
to govern themselves, while at the same time reducing government’s ability to direct and 
control outcomes (Sørensen, 2006: 99). 
The belief that the state has maintained its position at the centre of governance is not 
universal. There are those who believe that the power of the state has been weakened by 
the changes in governance. Michael Mann identifies two meanings of state power; 
despotic power where actions can be taken without negotiations with civil society groups, 
and infrastructural power which is the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society 
groups. According to Mann, in Western democracies there has been loss of despotic 
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power but growing infrastructural power within the state. The growth in infrastructural 
power has allowed the state, through its powers of taxation and regulation, to penetrate 
everyday life (Mann, 2003: 54-55). The shift in state function identified by Pierre is 
taking place within the realm of infrastructural power. According to Giandomenica 
Majone, two types of infrastructural power are evident: the power to tax and spend, 
which are constrained by budgetary means and rule-making power where budget 
constraints have little impact (1997: 148-149). Majone argues that the absence of 
budgetary constraint for rule-making power has important consequences as neither 
parliament nor government systematically determines the overall level of regulatory 
activity in a given period, and that no office is responsible for establishing regulatory 
priorities across the government (1997: 150). A stronger rejection of the continued 
strength of the state is put forward by McBride and Shields who argue that the 
advancement of a neo-liberal agenda aimed at reducing the state and increasing reliance 
on market mechanisms provides the ideological venue for shifting decision-making 
outside of politics and is eroding the power of the state (1997: 18). According to Janet 
Newman, modernization, globalization and privatization all signal profound shifts in the 
process of governance. Government power is retreating with state institutions being 
slimmed down and hollowed out while at the same time decentralization and 
marketization has expanded to reach more aspects of citizens’ lives (Newman, 2005: 1).  
Falling in between government as the preeminent actor and the retreating of the state is 
the idea of “interactive governance”. Torfing et al. define interactive governance as “the 
complex process through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging 
interests interact in order to formulate, promote, and achieve common objectives by 
means of mobilizing, exchanging and deploying a range of ideas, rules and resources” 
(2012: 14). While interactive governance may still be conducted in the shadow of 
hierarchy (Torfing et al., 2012: 4) and governments often play a crucial role in facilitating 
and managing interaction, there is no privileged centre. From an interactive governance 
standpoint, society does not constitute an external environment for the actions of 
government, but instead societal actors are actively engaged in the formation and 
achievement of common objectives (Torfing et al., 2012: 15). As Jan Kooiman states, in 
the interactive governance model societies are governed by a combination of efforts from 
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the different actors within society (2010: 73). Torfing, Peters, Pierre, Sørensen clarify, 
however, that while interactive governance is an important form of governance, it may 
not be appropriate for all policy areas (2012: 4). 
2.3 Society-Centric Multilevel Governance: Societal Self-
Steering 
In contrast to the state-centric approach, which suggests the state continues to play a 
dominant role in governance, the society-centric perspective places greater emphasis on 
the actions of societal actors that exist outside of government. While state-centric 
arguments, such as the government’s role in metagovernance, place government in a 
position of steering (Jessop, 2005: 65; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009), society-centric 
governance advances the idea that societal actors outside of government are engaged in 
more self-steering and that government interacts with society to reach mutually 
acceptable decisions (Peters, 2000: 36). The modern patterns of governance that are seen 
to be emerging are not unilateral but bilateral or multilateral, as no single actor, public or 
private, have sufficient knowledge or action potential to act unilaterally (Kooiman, 1993: 
4). Furthermore, actors outside of government may take on the role of metagovernance 
that state-centric theorists reserve for government. From a society-centric perspective, 
any actor with sufficient resources, be they public or private, may act in a metagovernace 
capacity (Sørensen, 2006: 102-104). While both government steering and societal self-
steering views of governance contain the assumption that society must be governed, 
different assertions are made as to who the dominant actor is: government or society 
(Peters, 2000: 36-37).  
The governance change at the heart of society-centric governance is the shifting of 
responsibility outside of government. In 1993, Kooiman observed that in many countries 
the tendency has been a shift in the balance between government and society – a shift 
away from the public sector and toward the private (1993: 1). Kooiman claimed that as 
the capacities of political/administrative governing systems have reached or become close 
to the point of diminishing returns, governments have reduced the need for governing by 
deregulating or have shifted the need for governing through privatization (1993a: 35). In 
responding to the changes in the governance environment, Matthew Flinders states that 
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government now operates in highly heterogeneous networks of organizations where the 
control and scrutiny of diverse organizations and partnerships has become a central 
challenge of modern governance, especially when many actors operate with a significant 
level of autonomy from elected politicians and legislatures (2006: 223). While still a 
powerful and relevant participant in governance, government no longer governs in the 
conventional command and control manner (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 3). 
Within the patterns of modern governance, both a positive and negative version can be 
witnessed. The negative version stresses the capacity of social forces to resist the 
regulations and impositions of the state and contains the normative element that citizens 
know better what they want than does the state and are therefore justified in finding ways 
to avoid the incursions of authority into their lives (Peters, 2000: 40-41). Peters further 
states that the negative version of modern governance has been embraced in deliberative 
democracy (2000: 41). For deliberative democrats, strong emphasis is placed upon the 
protection of the public sphere where actors can deliberate and formulate views and 
opinions. The preferences of social actors are not fixed but instead are formulated and 
reformulated through deliberation. It is through participation in deliberation in the public 
sphere that the authentic will of the people may be discovered, which can then be 
translated into a discernible common good (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2007: 14-16).  
While representative democracy’s legitimacy is tied to minimal but equal participation 
through voting, the legitimacy of participatory democracy requires institutions that are 
transparent and open to all, but participation need only be from a minority (Wainwright, 
2004: 154). New governance arrangements including both government and non-
government actors have blurred traditional roles, the result being that legitimacy can no 
longer be solely understood in terms of the democratic accountability of elected 
governments (Wallington, Lawrence and Loechel, 2008: 11). Grafting elements of 
popular authority, like participatory democracy, onto representative democracy may be 
necessary to ensure the input legitimacy in governance. It has been cautioned, however, 
that the representational unevenness of direct citizen participation means that it is not a 
substitute (Skogstad, 2003: 968; Fung, 2006: 66). Psychology research into 
accountability has shown that individuals respond in a manner that indicates audience 
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approval matters (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999: 270). If decisions are influenced by the 
desire for audience approval the unevenness of direct citizen participation risks outcomes 
that benefit a narrow slice of the population. 
The positive version of modern governance is based upon the existence of sufficiently 
powerful resources within society that are capable of shaping policy at both the input and 
output stages. Networks, communities and other interest groups that are involved in a 
policy area are assumed to be in position to shape policy, meaning the strength, or even 
dominance, of society becomes an asset for governance within individual policy areas. 
The normative element identified by Peters in the positive approach to modern 
governance is that society should be capable of managing its own affairs without the 
intervention of the state (Peters, 2000: 41-42). This is consistent with Paul Hirst’s 
associated democracy model, in which as many functions as possible are devolved from 
the state to civil society, followed by the democratization of the new civil society 
organizations. In doing so, governance is shifted from top-down bureaucratic to 
democratically self-governed associations (Hirst, 2000: 28) According to Sørensen, 
government can play a role in the democratization of self-governance through the use of 
metagovernance to ensure that new governance processes are regulated in accordance 
with democratic criteria (2006: 105). 
The traditional pattern of governance has been one of state dominance through a pattern 
of hierarchical governing in which governments decide the laws and policies to be 
adopted (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209-210). The emergence of new forms of governance, 
however, has increased the number of private and public actors involved in the 
governance process (Sørensen, 2006: 98). From the society-centric perspective, societal 
actors have become more engaged in the governance process, with government working 
with society to bring about mutually agreed upon solutions (Peters, 2000: 36). If societal 
actors are taking a more prominent role and asserting greater influence in the governance 
process, we should expect Type II jurisdictions to be increasingly accountable directly to 
society. 
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New forms of participation may, however, privilege certain types of actors (Peters, 2010: 
217). Peters suggests that, somewhat paradoxically, in an era in which participation has 
become an increasingly important value to the public, the level of participation in many 
aspects of political life is declining (2010, 213). With a decline in political participation 
there is the possibility that organized societal interests may secure a formal accountability 
relationship that does not exist for the broader population. Peters claims that as 
organizations are removed from ministerial lines of responsibility influence is not 
achieved by average citizens acting autonomously, but instead through organized groups 
(2010: 215). Moreover, goals will not be uniform across members or groups of members 
within society (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 13). The potential of uneven participation is akin 
to violating the democratic norm of proportional inclusion as described by the all-affected 
principle. According to the all-affected principle, individuals have a normative claim to 
influence collective decisions to the extent that they are affected by those decisions 
(Warren, 2011: 687). Conversely, as new governance channels tend to grant more 
influence to stakeholders than to citizens, there also exists the possibility that in 
accordance with the all-affected principle, each citizen will obtain greater influence over 
the decisions that affect them most (Sørensen, 2006: 104). It is possible that democratic 
accountability can be enhanced through a governance process in which those who are 
most affected have considerable influence in shaping policy solutions (Skelcher, Mathur 
and Smith, 2005: 580). 
While increased participation should be good for democratic accountability, there is still 
the question of whether increased participation by societal actors affects the decision-
making of Type II jurisdictions. As amusingly stated by Sherry Arnstein in 1969, “the 
idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle 
because it is good for you” (1969: 216). However, as Arnstein further states, there is a 
critical difference between going through an empty ritual of citizen participation and 
citizens having the real power needed to affect outcome and process (1969: 216). Today, 
the question remains as to whether societal actors are capable of securing accountability 
mechanisms that promote accountability relationships directly between Type II 
jurisdictions and society within the institutional environment of Type II jurisdictions. 
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2.4 Multilevel Governance and Accountability Relationships 
Good governance can be thought of as a function of the extent to which citizens can hold 
political officials accountable for their actions (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003: 447). In a 
representative democracy, accountability is the principal mechanism through which mass 
publics exert control over their elected officials and is a central tenet of democratic theory 
(Rudolph, 2006: 99). While constituents are not required to act to be represented, they 
must be conceived of as being able to (Disch, 2012: 602). Accordingly, the institutional 
structure must be such that citizen preferences are made known and citizens are able to 
act to hold decision-makers accountable. 
Fritz Scharpf describes the democratic process as an exercise in collective self-
determination that operates on two dimensions – inputs and outputs. On the input 
dimension political choices should be derived directly or indirectly from the preferences 
of the citizen with government held accountable by those they govern, while the output 
dimension denotes the effectiveness of policy to achieve goals (Scharpf, 1997: 19). The 
empowerment of actors outside government to make decisions, however, means that not 
only must government be held accountable, but all involved in the governance process 
must also be held accountable. As Bell and Hindmoor state in elaborating on Scharpf’s 
work, for governance arrangements to be considered legitimate, not only must the policy 
be effective in producing the desired outcomes, the governance process must be 
democratic and accountable (2009: 29). It is this combination of both input and output 
legitimacy that compels us to obey collectively binding decisions, even when they do not 
align with our own personal preferences (Skogstad, 2003: 956). To this end, the act of 
governance must aim to improve the state of society and maintain and extend democratic 
values (Skelcher, Mathur and Smith, 2005: 577). 
Within the governance process, accountability serves three purposes: to control for the 
abuse and misuse of public authority; to provide assurance in respect to the use of public 
resources and adherence to the law; and to promote the continuous improvement in 
governance and public management (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000: 45; Auditor General 
of Canada, 2002: 4). Furthermore, Aucoin and Heintzman argue that due to the integral 
role accountability plays in the governance process, it is essential that it not be affected 
  30 
by the extent to which governance processes are undergoing change (2000: 45). 
However, as stated in the December 2002 Report of the Auditor General to the House of 
Commons, what accountability means and how it is supposed to work are often disputed, 
making its application difficult (Auditor General of Canada, 2002: 3).  
Defining the concept of accountability is not in itself problematic. Person A is 
accountable to person B if two conditions are met; there is an understanding that A is 
obliged to act in some way on behalf of B; and B is empowered by some mechanism to 
sanction or reward A. Stated in the form of an agency relationship person A can be 
understood to be an agent, who makes choices on behalf of person B as the principal 
(Fearon, 1999: 55). While the concept of accountability may not in itself be problematic, 
assessing accountability is decidedly more so. Assessing accountability can be elusive as 
accountability means different things to different people, thus becoming a general term 
for any mechanism that makes institutions responsive to their particular publics (Bovens, 
2007: 448-449).  
Jonathan Koppell attempts to provide conceptual clarity through the identification of five 
dimensions of accountability. According to Koppell, accountability can viewed as 
transparency - whether the organization revealed the facts of its performance; liability - 
whether the organization faces consequences for its performance; controllability – 
whether the organization does what the principal desires; responsibility – whether the 
organization follows the rules; and responsiveness – whether the organization fulfills its 
substantive expectation (2005: 96). Bovens argues, however, that broad conceptions of 
accountability make it empirically difficult to operationalize. Dimensions, such as 
transparency, are instrumental, but alone do not establish accountability. For other 
dimensions such as responsiveness, there is no general standard to measure against. 
Accordingly, Bovens provides a narrower definition stating, “Accountability is a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain 
and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and 
the actor may face consequences” (2007: 450). Bovens’s definition is consistent with the 
position of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada that states accountability in 
practice is how those responsible are held to account. Accountability is not working when 
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there is no or inadequate reporting, there is no serious informed review of the information 
reported, and there are no consequences for those responsible (Auditor General of 
Canada, 2002: 10). 
Consistent across the above definitions of accountability is the ability to sanction as a 
necessary element in the accountability relationship, however, as stated by Richard 
Mulgan, placing sanctions in the core of accountability is contestable (2000: 556). On 
one extreme, Richard Fraser has gone so far as to state that you cannot have 
accountability without liability and that accountability without fear of consequences is 
not likely to be accountability at all (1996: 36). Harlow and Rawlings argue, however, 
that it is not clear whether the possibility of sanction is an essential element of an 
accountability relationship (2007: 545). In determining what can be considered a 
sanctioning act, Hawlow and Rawlings argue that recommendations for improvement are 
sufficient to satisfy accountability requirements (2007: 546). This weaker 
conceptualization of sanctions and accountability aligns with what Bovens labels 
informal accountability in which consequences of accountability are tied to the public 
rendering of negative reports by an Ombudsmen or other agencies, which may damage 
the public image of agencies or individuals (2007: 452). 
In the tradition of democratic theory, elections are viewed as an important mechanism of 
accountability through which the policy preferences of citizens can induce government 
action (Fearon, 1999: 57). Adserà, Boix, and Payne argue that the existence of political 
control of public officials depends upon the occurrence of regular elections where the 
electorate holds the relevant information required to appropriately sanction politicians 
(2003: 478). According to Jane Mansbridge, electoral control can be conceptualized as 
either promissory or anticipatory. From the promissory perspective, constituent control is 
based upon the representative’s campaign promises. While from the anticipatory 
perspective representatives anticipate the preferences of future voters in the next election 
(Mansbridge, 2011: 627). Mansbridge further states that in representative democracies, 
members of the public most often hold the promissory understanding of representation, 
while accountability often works through the anticipatory mechanism (2011: 627). 
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Regular elections form the basis of an accountability relationship between the electorate 
and their elected representative. The elected representative is accountable to the 
electorate as the elected representative is expected to act in a way that promotes the 
preferences of the electorate and if the electorate is not happy with the actions of their 
elected representative, they can vote them out at the next election. Moreover, in a 
Westminster-style parliamentary system such as Canada, the use of the power of the state 
is governed by the principle of responsible government, which means that those who 
exercise power are held to account. Rooted in the democratic institution of parliament, 
the exercise of state power is done in accordance with the requirements of ministerial 
responsibility and parliamentary accountability. In this system ministers are answerable 
to parliament for the actions of government and parliament has the means to hold to 
account those who exercise the power of the state, be they elected or non-elected officials 
(D’Ombrian, 2007: 198-199). The result is a chain of accountability relationships 
connecting those who exercise state power to the electorate. The Auditor General of 
Canada states, however, that accountability relationships have become more complex. 
Public objectives are increasingly achieved through non-hierarchic relationships 
involving government and the private and voluntary sectors (Auditor General of Canada, 
2002: 4-5). The result is the need for an understanding of accountability that includes 
both traditional accountability relationships and the new relationships that have emerged 
as new actors become part of the governance process. 
When applying the concept of accountability and agency relationships to Type II 
multilevel governance, with its potential for both government steering and society self-
steering, it is evident that multiple principal-agent relationship paths may exist. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.2, three different accountability arrangements are possible: first, 
society2 as principals of Type II bodies where Type II bodies are directly accountable to 
society; second, citizens as principals of democratic governments who in turn are 
principals of Type II bodies meaning that Type II jurisdictions would be indirectly 
                                                
2  Society is referring to both individual citizens and groups outside of government who are affected by the 
decisions made by Type II bodies operating in the public realm.  
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accountable to the citizens; third, both the first and second accountability arrangements 
exist. Not shown in Figure 2.2, but understood, is that an additional possibility is the 
absence of any accountability relationship.  
Figure 2.2: Type II Multilevel Governance: Possible Principal-Agent Relationships 
 
2.5 Multilevel Governance and Problems of Accountability 
As authority migrates vertically up or down to different levels of elected government free 
and fair elections provide the central mechanism for accountability. However, when 
decision-making authority migrates horizontally to potentially unelected bodies, how 
decision-makers are held accountable requires consideration. Schattschneider 
hypothesized that the result of political contests is determined by the scope of public 
involvement in conflicts (1975: 5). With decision-making authority migrating beyond the 
reach of the ballot box, questions over the scope of public involvement arise. It must be 
considered whether the decisions made by government empowered external bodies are as 
public as those that occur within elected legislatures (Schattschneider, 1975: 65). 
Schattschneider argues that the origin of politics is strife and that political strategy deals 
with the exploitation, use of, and suppression of conflict (1975: 65). With the migration 
of authority, decisions are moved outside the standard arena of political contest – 
elections. In doing so, conflict is displaced and questions of public participation, 
accountability and legitimacy of decision-making arise. 
Type	  II	  MLG	  Government	  
Society	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While multiple accountability relationships may exist to hold Type II bodies accountable, 
the introduction of new forms of governance bring with it concern over the ability to hold 
new forms of public decision-making actors accountable. Responding to such concerns, 
scholars have explored a wide range of potential challenges to democratic accountability 
(for example, Anderson, 2006, 2008; Bache and Flinders, 2005a; Benz, 2007; Geber and 
Kollman, 2004; Kahler and Lake, 2004; Olsson, 2003; Peters and Pierre, 1998, 2005; 
Sørensen, 2006). The concern for accountability is most strict when considering 
autonomous actors (Busuioc, Curtin and Groenleer, 2011: 853). The emergence of new 
forms of governance, including the introduction of third-party decision-makers and 
arm’s-length public corporations, however, all cause the lines of accountability to be less 
clear (Skelcher, 2007: 63). Clarity is lost as a single organization becomes the agent of 
several principals, while at the same time the policy-making process is clouded by a 
mixture of representative, ‘delegative’, and direct democracy (Skelcher, 2007: 63). As 
Rhodes argues, “sheer institutional complexity obscures who is accountable to whom and 
for what” (1997: 101). To understand contemporary accountability and legitimacy one 
must depart from accountability as characterized by liberal democracy as it is not wholly 
satisfactory to hold solely elected officials to account (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 118-119). 
Concern over the growth and accountability of non-departmental forms of government in 
Canada is not new. In 1973, in his chapter titled “Structural heretics: the non-
departmental forms,” J. E. Hodgetts positioned the expansion of non-departmental 
entities as the result of the workload of conventional departments expanding to the point 
where tasks are unmanageable, as well as the taking on of new functions by government 
for which the traditional department structure no longer seemed appropriate (1973: 139). 
In adopting the new forms of organization, Hodgetts raises concern over the relationship 
with the Minister and the formal structure of ministerial command and responsibility, 
citing the obscuring of conventional channels of ministerial responsibility and 
diminishment of parliamentary supervision (1973: 143). The problem is not isolated to 
Canada. The challenges facing the hierarchical model of responsibility can be seen in 
what Dennis Thompson calls the ‘problem of many hands.’ According to Thompson, 
many political outcomes are the product of actions from multiple contributors who may 
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not be individually identifiable or whose individual contributions may not be 
distinguishable (Thompson, 1980: 907).  
In parliamentary systems a contributing factor to the diminishment of parliamentary 
supervision is the increasing variety of accountability chains brought about by the formal 
dispersion of authority associated outside the traditional department structure. Chains of 
delegation are not new; parliamentary democracies exhibit multiple steps in the 
accountability chain between citizens and those who govern (Laver and Shepsle, 1999: 
279; Strøm, 2007: 267). For parliamentary democracies, Strøm identifies four distinct 
steps in the accountability chain: from voters to their elected representatives; from 
legislators to the executive branch; from the head of government (prime minister) to 
ministerial or departmental heads; from the heads of executive departments to the civil 
servants (2000: 267). Yannis Papadopoulos argues, however, that accountability 
problems increase with the length of the chain of delegation. As the chain of delegation 
increases, the policy process becomes visible only to those who are closely involved in 
the decision-making process, the risk being a loss of direct accountability with delegated 
decision-makers subject to administrative rather than democratic accountability 
(Papadopoulos, 2007: 479). Papadopoulos concludes that delegation of authority weakens 
the direct accountability of policy makers as lines of responsibility become dispersed and 
do not form a coherent accountability system. While many mechanisms of accountability 
are believed to exist, they fail to operate in an effective manner (Papadopoulos, 2007: 
483). Similarly, Andrew and Goldsmith point to increased complexity brought about by a 
multi actor system in comparison to that of a single agency. A plurality of actors makes it 
more difficult for citizens to navigate the political system and more difficult to coordinate 
between the large number of special purpose bodies (Andrews and Goldsmith, 1998: 
107). As the number of bodies outside the hierarchy of traditional government 
departments increase so do the variations in accountability chains that link citizens to 
decision-makers.  
While the organizational structures that troubled Hodgetts were not beyond the pale of 
ministerial responsibility and therefore may not have warranted the name ‘structural 
heretics’ (Aucoin, 2003: 7), experimentation in governance structures in Canada have 
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continued to raise concerns. In Canada, the 1979 Royal Commission on Financial 
Management and Accountability (Lambert Commission) stated that a group of 
corporations, labeled as quasi-public, sat at the edge of the public sector. The 
commonalities among the corporations included a government role in creation by way of 
legislation, government funding of the corporation, government appointment of some 
board members, and the absence of formal accountability linkages (Aucoin, 2003: 8). The 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada raised similar concerns in 1999, stating that new 
governance arrangements involving external partners in planning, design and 
achievement of government objectives created situations where the partners were not 
accountable to ministers and Parliament (Auditor General of Canada, 1999: 23-5). The 
Auditor General’s report stated that of the new governance arrangements examined, 
“accountability to Parliament was often weak and good governance not always assured” 
(Auditor General of Canada, 1999: 23-31). Peter Aucoin also raised specific concerns 
over the use of independent foundations to distribute public funds in 2003. According to 
Aucoin, the independent foundations retained the characteristics identified as “quasi-
public corporations” by the Royal Commission on Financial Management and 
Accounting (2003: 8). Moreover, one-time endowments transferred to the independent 
foundations effectively turned public funds into private funds, making decisions in 
relation to the funds beyond the reach of government and the legislature (Aucoin, 2003: 
10). In such cases, it is not a case of an overly complex accountability chain, but the lack 
of an accountability linkage altogether between government and decision making bodies. 
As stated by Timothy Heinmiller, one of the greater virtues of ministerial responsibility is 
the establishment of clear lines of accountability, however, if ministers no longer have 
meaningful oversight and control, then ministerial responsibility is little more than a 
constitutional fiction (2011: 125-128). 
A second, but related concern is the information costs of multilevel governance. John 
Dunn has argued that in the modern state most citizens are unable to form a broad 
understanding of most of what is going on politically (1999: 335). According to Dunn, 
without sufficient knowledge and understanding, interaction between citizens and 
decision-makers in which the behavior of the decision maker is rationally sanctioned is 
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unlikely3 (1999: 335). While Dunn’s analysis focuses upon the relationship between 
citizens and their elected representatives, the same argument can be applied to the 
relationship between citizens and Type II jurisdictions.  
The existence of a multilevel system of governance creates further difficulties for citizens 
in attributing policy decisions to policy actors. As argued by Soroka and Wlezien, 
effective public responsiveness depends upon an accurate signal of what government is 
doing, while a vertical division of powers increases the number of different governments 
making policy in a given policy area thus making it less clear which government is doing 
what (2004: 552; 2011: 33). Identified by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 70, 
the information challenges faced by citizens are further exacerbated by the actions of 
governments who engage in blame shifting and credit taking for policy outcomes 
(Anderson, 2006: 450; Cutler, 2004: 19; Hamilton, 1788). Cameron Anderson argues that 
a multilevel environment can create incentives for governments within the multilevel 
system to camouflage their responsibility for decisions and outcomes (2006: 450). This 
practice of credit taking can be witnessed in Kathryn Harrison’s work on government 
involvement in Canadian environmental policy. Harrison observed that when 
environmental policy issues were salient in public opinion, both federal and provincial 
levels of government sought credit for environmental regulation, however, when public 
interest subsided the federal government was inclined to leave environmental policy to 
the provinces (2003: 340-341). Such actions demonstrate the willingness of government 
actors to attempt to take credit when it appears to be politically advantageous, and to 
shirk responsibility when it is not. 
Anderson argues that as political decentralization increases, the ability of citizens to hold 
a government accountable for political outcomes decreases (2006: 459). Furthermore, as 
governance becomes more decentralized and multilayered, the ability of citizens to cope 
with increased challenges to democratic accountability becomes more pressing 
                                                
3  There is a large literature in political behavior on the role of information. For greater insight see Delli 
Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters (1996) or Althaus, Collective 
Preferences in Democratic Politics (2003).  
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(Anderson, 2006: 459). While both Anderson and Soroka and Wlezien focus upon Type I 
jurisdictions, many of the same challenges can be applied to Type II jurisdictions. 
Concerns already exist over the ability of citizens to accurately recognize which powers 
belong to which level of government (Anderson, 2006; Brzinski, Lancaster, and 
Tuschloff, 1999; Schneider, Jacoby and Lewis, 2011), as authority migrates horizontally 
to a myriad of Type II bodies the likely result is the further clouding of citizens’ 
perceptions of who is responsible for which policy decisions. It is possible that the 
increasing complexity of governance arrangements, including the use of autonomous and 
quasi-autonomous organizations, may bring the governance process closer to the citizen, 
while at the same time leading to citizen confusion when confronting problems (Peters, 
2010: 211). In exploring the use of the private sector in delivering public services, Lorna 
Stefanick draws attention to the 1995 and 1998 reports from Alberta’s Ombudsman, 
which found that a major impediment to accountability in Alberta is the increasingly 
complex governance environment in which it is difficult to determine who is responsible. 
The report highlighted that members of the Office of the Ombudsman often have 
difficulty determining responsibility, and raised the question of how the average citizen is 
to know how to address problems (Stefanick, 2011: 248-249).  
In addition to concerns that authority migration has weakened democratic accountability, 
concerns that authority migration results in the absence of accountability relationships, 
either directly to society, or indirectly through government, have been put forward. 
According to Hirst, in many cases the use of the term governance signals a threat to 
conventional forms of democracy or potentially an attempt to sidestep democracy 
altogether. Instead of being accountable either directly to the citizens or indirectly to the 
citizens through government, governance mechanisms are seen to be tools of commercial 
interests or unaccountable bureaucracies (Hirst, 2000: 13). Adam Harmes provides an 
example of accountability loss in his look at neoliberalism and multilevel governance. 
Harmes suggests that multilevel governance is characterized by the dispersal of power 
away from central government and can be viewed as part of a deliberate neoliberal 
political project with the goal of separating economic and political power. The effects of 
this separation of powers can be witnessed in the growing use of legal-juridical 
mechanisms to lock in neoliberal policies and insulate them from democratic influence 
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(Harmes, 2006: 726-727). Hirst furthers the argument that accountability is being lost, 
stating that governance through partnerships and networks is intensely local and difficult 
for outsiders to penetrate, thus conferring benefits only on existing members (2000: 19). 
As such, it is conceivable that no formal relationship exist, either indirectly through 
government or directly with the citizens, by which Type II jurisdictions are held 
accountable. 
While numerous concerns have been raised over the weakening of democratic input and 
accountability, the possibility has also been put forward that accountability fears have 
been overblown. Bartle and Vass argue that problems of accountability are overcome 
when self-regulatory schemes are embedded within the systems of transparency and 
accountability of the modern regulatory society (2007: 897). The act of metagovernance 
by the state amounts to the supervision of nonelected bodies. The legitimacy and 
accountability of nonelected actors then become tied to the ability and willingness of 
government to exercise a credible response if the delegation of authority fails to engender 
compliance with the metagoverance arrangements (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 897). The rise 
of the modern state has brought about institutions, processes, and mechanisms of 
regulatory governance that reinforce accountability, these processes and mechanisms can 
be extended beyond traditional government to preserve accountability (Bartle and Vass, 
2007: 898).  
As Mark Bovens suggested in 1990, however, we are dealing with complex 
organizations, not rational person-like servants waiting quietly on the edges of society to 
be called upon (1990: 91). When attempting to ‘steer’ such organizations a minister is 
often confronted with the need to establish a second complex organization (agency) that 
has the technical expertise to hold the first in check. The second can then be subsequently 
steered by the department (Bovens, 1990: 93). So while the possibility for state steering 
exists, it may not be as easily implemented as it first appears. 
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2.6 Hypotheses: Migration of Authority and Creation of 
Type II Bodies 
As previously stated, there is the perception that changes have occurred in how we are 
governed. In some instances this includes decision-making responsibility shifting beyond 
the boundaries of elected government. In response to the idea that there has been a 
dispersal of decision-making authority, the extent to which authority has migrated beyond 
the boundaries of elected government at the provincial level in Canada is explored. The 
creation of Type II bodies forms the focus of Chapters 4 and 6. Chapter 4 explores both 
the rate at which Type II bodies are being created and the possible factors that may 
promote the migration of authority to Type II bodies in the provinces of Alberta, British 
Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario. Chapter 6 looks specifically at creation of Type II 
bodies in the area of healthcare provision. In the rest of the chapter, the hypotheses and a 
brief overview of the rationales put forward in Chapter 4 are provided.  
In assessing the extent to which concern over potential negative consequences associated 
with authority migration is warranted, the extent to which governments have utilized the 
migration of authority in response to policy issues is first explored. In response to 
concerns over the increasing use of authority migration the first two hypotheses are put 
forward as follows: 
H4.1 – The absolute number of Type II bodies is increasing over time. 
H4.2 – The annual creation rate of Type II bodies is increasing over time. 
Beyond the rate of creation is the question of what factors promote the creation of Type II 
bodies by government. Two potential explanations are put forward: 1) the capacity of 
government to meet governance demands plays a role in shaping the location of 
governance responsibility; and, 2) the ideological persuasion of the governing parties is a 
factor in the creation of Type II bodies.  
The level of government capacity as an explanatory factor is based upon the notion that 
the demand placed on the modern state outstrips the capacity of government to act. When 
demand increases and capacity fails to keep pace, the capacity gap can only be filled by 
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delegation, which allows the state to address a wide range of policy issues while not 
needing to be involved with the day-to-day socio-political interactions (Flinders, 2006: 
223-224). In Canada, the existence of government debts and deficits had a pervasive 
influence on government operations and reform (Kernagan, Marson and Borins, 2005: 6). 
While the state is unlikely to be able to fulfill all requests, the capacity argument suggests 
that the lower the fiscal capacity of the state to fulfill its responsibilities (both new and 
existing) the greater the rate of creation of Type II bodies is likely to be. Accordingly, the 
third hypothesis tested in Chapter 4 is as follows: 
H4.3 - The lower the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher 
the rate of creation of Type II bodies.  
The argument for ideology influencing the extent to which authority has migrated outside 
of government is anchored in the idea that parties on the left tend to resort to more 
government intervention and parties on the right are more likely to rely upon the market. 
It has been suggested that multilevel governance is characterized by the dispersal of 
power away from the national level of government and can be viewed as part of a 
deliberate neoliberal political project with the goal of separating economic and political 
power (Harmes, 2006: 726). While neoliberalism is a recent phenomenon, there are long-
standing debates over size of government. Neoclassical liberals argued that government 
should be as small as possible, while welfare liberals promote a larger role for 
government (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 77-79). In comparison to both forms of liberalism, 
social democracy calls for a larger state and promote the expansion of public ownership 
(Ball and Dagger, 1995: 44). Taking both the recent and historic trends into account, it 
can be argued that political ideology may influence the rate at which Type II bodies are 
created due to the differing views of the role of the state. Specifically, governments 
aligned further to the left are expected to create fewer Type II bodies than governments 
aligned further to the right. This leads to the fourth and final hypothesis evaluated in 
Chapter 4:  
H4.4 – The further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a government sits the 
lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies. 
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2.7 Hypotheses: Migration of Authority and Accountability of 
Type II Bodies 
While Chapters 4 and 6 explore the creation of Type II bodies, Chapters 5 and 7 delve 
into the accountability relationships between the new decision-makers and both 
government and society that emerge once authority has been migrated. Chapter 5 looks at 
the strength of both accountability relationships over time and which possible factors may 
promote the strengthening of accountability relationships. Type II bodies are again 
selected from the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario. 
Chapter 7 deals directly with the accountability relationships that have emerged from the 
creation of special purpose bodies charged with the provision of healthcare. Below the 
hypotheses and a synopsis of the rationales put forward for each in Chapter 5 are 
provided.  
While an underlying assumption of multilevel governance is that centralization has given 
way to new forms of governance that result in decision-making authority being dispersed 
across multiple jurisdictions, it can be argued that the state continues to play a 
fundamental role in the governance process. Through setting rules and maintaining the 
ability to intervene when policy outcomes do not appear to be in the public interest 
government can be seen to dominate the policy process. If government has continued to 
dominate the public policy process, then we can expect formal accountability 
relationships between government and Type II bodies to be present and to have either 
remained stable or increased in strength. The question of government’s continued 
governance capacity leads to the first hypothesis of Chapter 5, which is as follows: 
 H5.1 – The accountability relationships between government and Type II bodies has 
either remained stable or increased in strength over time. 
An alternative view is that the new governance arrangements have weakened the state. 
McBride and Shields argue that the advancement of a neo-liberal agenda aimed at 
reducing the state and increasing reliance on market mechanisms provides the ideological 
venue for shifting decision-making outside of politics and is eroding the power of the 
state (1997: 18). While neoliberalism is a modern construct, there are long-standing 
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debates over the role and size of government. Liberalism in both its neoclassical and 
welfare forms promote a smaller version of the state than social democracy. Taking into 
account both recent ideological trends and the historical debate over the appropriate size 
and role of the state, it can be argued that the ideology of the governing party influences 
the structure of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government. 
Specifically, governing parties aligned further to the right are expected to produce weaker 
accountability relationships when migrating authority as there is stronger belief in 
minimal state interference. Accordingly the second hypothesis of Chapter 5 is presented 
as follows: 
H5.2 – Governing parties further to the left on the political spectrum will produce 
stronger accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government than 
governing parties further to the right. 
In addition to the accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies 
there is the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and societal actors. Peters 
provides two opposing views of governance, a traditional approach where the state steers, 
and a modern approach where societal actors are involved in more self-steering rather 
than depending upon the guidance of government (Peters, 2000: 36-37). If social forces 
are taking a stronger role in the governance process, it follows that Type II bodies should 
be increasingly accountable directly to society as societal actors assert greater influence 
over policy inputs and outputs. The idea of increasing societal governance capacity leads 
to the third hypothesis of Chapter 5: 
H5.3 – The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased 
in strength over time. 
An additional area of interest is the influence of geographic scale on the accountability 
relationships between Type II bodies and both government and society. When 
considering elected government, a trade-off is seen to exist between the efficiency and 
coordination gains brought about by centralization and the accountability gains brought 
about by decentralization of accountability. The idea that accountability is strengthened 
by decentralization is based on the idea that as government becomes more centralized, the 
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ability of any one region to select a government based upon the government’s perceived 
performance in that region is diminished (Seabright, 1996: 65).  
Given the relative lack of elections for Type II bodies and the dearth of information on 
the effect of geographic scale on the accountability of Type II bodies, two exploratory 
questions are asked: First, do Type II bodies succumb to the same trade off as traditional 
elected government? And second, is there a corresponding weakening of accountability to 
government that occurs with decentralization?  
While Type II bodies for the most part lack elections as an accountability mechanism, it 
is still possible that centralization results in a similar tradeoff between economies of scale 
and accountability. When a Type II body moves along the continuum from decentralized 
to centralized, the number of citizens whose preferences must be taken into account 
increases. As the number of citizens increases, the ability of any one citizen to hold the 
Type II body accountable based upon their perceived performance of the Type II body 
decreases. If this is in fact the case, it is expected that the greater the level of 
decentralization, the greater the capacity of members of society to hold Type II bodies 
directly accountable. 
While it is expected that decentralization of Type II bodies have accountability benefits 
for citizens, the second question considers whether decentralization has an effect on the 
accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government. The premise put 
forward for testing is that as decision-making is decentralized there may be a willingness 
on the part of government to shift responsibility for holding decision-makers accountable 
closer to the citizen. If this is the case, it is expected that the greater the degree of 
decentralization, the weaker the capacity of government to hold Type II bodies directly 
accountable. Accordingly, the last two hypotheses of Chapter 5 are presented as follows: 
H5.4 – The accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will 
decrease as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. 
H5.5 – The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as 
the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. 
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2.8 Healthcare Governance and Canadian Healthcare 
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, the evaluation of the above hypotheses can be 
divided into groups. In Chapters 4 and 5 the hypotheses are evaluated against an original 
dataset of cases of Type II bodies operating between the years of 1946 and 2005 in the 
provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario. In Chapters 6 and 7 
case studies and qualitative interviews are leveraged to gain greater contextual 
understanding of the causes and implications that surround the migration of decision-
making authority to regional healthcare bodies. Here, a background on Canadian 
healthcare systems, regional health authorities, and healthcare reform is provided. 
Canada’s healthcare systems are publically financed with approximately 70% of 
expenditures financed by the general tax revenues of the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments. Within this funding structure the governance, organization, and 
organization of delivery of services has remained highly decentralized (Marchildon, 
2013:19). Marchildon attributes this continued path of decentralization to at least three 
reasons: 1) provincial responsibility for the funding and delivery of the majority of 
healthcare services; 2) the continued status of physicians as independent contractors; and 
3) the existence of organizations, from regional health organizations to privately run 
hospitals, that operate at arm’s length from government (2013:19). 
In a federal state, such as Canada, the division of powers is defined in the constitution. 
The challenge with the healthcare field, however, is that through time the field steadily 
changes while the Canadian Constitution has not. Neither the British North American Act 
nor the Constitution Act, 1982 gave explicit jurisdiction over health care, only the 
jurisdiction over hospitals to the provinces (Fierlbeck, 2013: 5). In addition to holding 
jurisdiction over hospitals, Subsection 92(16) of the Constitution has been used 
historically to grant provinces jurisdiction over healthcare as it has been argued that 
health is a personal and local matter (Braën, 2004: 32; Fierlbeck, 2013: 5). Personal 
health at the time of British North American Act was considered a purely private mater 
by society and by extension politicians (Braën, 2004: 28). From a constitutional 
perspective, André Braën states that the federal governments powers regarding health are 
limited to three areas: 1) criminal law (by way of its ability to control the manufacturing 
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and labeling of potentially hazardous products; 2) spending power; and 3) the authority to 
ensure peace order and good government (Braën, 2004: 34). While constitutionally 
limited to three areas, Fierlbeck argues that when considered in light of the extent of the 
spending power and the regulation over pharmaceuticals and other noteworthy goods 
their impact is quite extensive (Fierlbeck, 2013: 5). 
With responsibility for healthcare being divided along provincial and territorial 
boundaries, health system planning is done at the provincial/territorial level. In some 
provinces regional health authorities are responsible for more detailed planning at the 
regional level. Some provinces have also created health councils and health technology 
assessment agencies to aid both provincial governments and regional health authorities in 
their planning process (Marchildon, 2013: 20). Provincial governments, however, 
maintain primary jurisdiction over both the administration and delivery of pubic health 
services. This means that healthcare entities ranging from regional health authorities to 
private hospitals are regulated by the provincial government (Marchildon, 2013: 46). It 
should also be emphasized that with responsibility for healthcare being at the 
provincial/territorial level and not the federal there is no one healthcare system. Services 
are covered in one province that may be subject to fees in another. Some provinces 
require residents to pay healthcare premiums, while others do not. Private hospitals are 
legal in some provinces but not in others (Boessenkool, 2013: 160).   
As stated above, provincial/territorial healthcare systems differ.  One way in which health 
systems may vary is the degree to which decision-making responsibility is decentralized. 
In the late 1980s the provincial and territorial public finances were poor shape and being 
made worse by a recession. Beginning in 1991/92 a series of decisions signaled a 
retrenchment in healthcare. Over the next five years, provinces either tightened health 
care expenditures or succumbed to the growth in health service demand and by the end of 
the 1990s there was a growing sense of stress on the healthcare system including 
increased wait times (Lazar, 2013: 2). Consistent with hypothesis H4.3, Boessenkool 
attributes the provincial struggle with financial deficits to producing healthcare reforms, 
as most provinces opting to restructure their healthcare system regionally (2013: 161). 
Regionalization resulted in the simultaneous centralization and decentralization of 
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decision-making.  Decisions that were previously made by the province were 
decentralized and pushed to the regional level, while decisions that were once made at the 
local level were centralized to the newly created regional authorities (Tomblin, 2004: 
300). The current trend, however, has been the elimination of regional health authorities 
(Marchildon, 2013: 20) According to Stephen Duckett, the shift to a single health 
authority in Alberta is in line with the growing recognition of the failures associated with 
regionalization (Duckett, 2011: 23). In Alberta, the shift to a single health authority was 
brought about by the need to correct the negative effects of inequality and unhealthy 
competition that resulted from the regional system (Duckett, 2009: 156).  
Beyond the shift from regionalization and back, the majority of the primary health 
services in Canada are private and therefore decentralized (Marchildon, 2013: 39). The 
vast majority of physicians remain profit-making independent contractors who are neither 
employed by regional health authorities or provincial/territorial governments. Hospitals 
are owned by a number of sources, some are owned by regional health authorities while 
others are private, mostly not-for-profit, corporations. Services supporting primary and 
acute care, including ambulance, laboratory services and many ancillary hospital services 
are private. Moreover, dental, vision, psychology and rehabilitation services are privately 
funded and delivered by profit-making independent professionals (Marchildon, 2013: 
39). 
In regards to reforming one of Canada’s 13 healthcare systems, it has been found that for 
the most part governments focus on improvements within the existing health system 
model instead of moving toward a new model (Lazar, et al., 2013: 175). As mentioned 
above, Boessenkool attributes the fiscal challenges of the 1990s with producing a rush of 
healthcare reforms in which most provinces opting to restructure their healthcare system 
regionally (2013: 161). According to John Lavis, Canada’s lack of veto points suggests 
that political elites (including government officials) representatives from dominant 
healthcare providers, representatives from the bio-medical industry and other health-
based groups are the reason for the lack of reform (2004: 257-258) Similarly, Lazar et al. 
observe that the most engaged political actors in the healthcare field were much more 
effective at preventing reform than creating it (Lazar et al., 2013: 216). The citizens’ or 
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publics’ role in health care reform is exogenous. The public exercises influence by 
electing government, but they remain outsiders to the policy process (Lazar, 2013, 10). 
Researching trust, Abelson et al. found that individuals tend to portray themselves as 
outsiders of the health system, either entirely alone or in collaboration with their provider 
against government and private interests (2009: 68).  
2.9 Conclusion 
As evident from the discussion above there is the sense that the traditional form of state-
centred governance has given way, at least to some degree, to new governance structures. 
While new governance structures bring with them the potential for positive outcomes, 
this shift has also brought about questions of democratic accountability as decision-
making is spun away from the centre, both vertically to different levels of government, 
and horizontally to actors outside of traditional government. When authority is migrated 
outside of government and away from elected officials, concerns are raised over public 
input into the decision-making process, and how the decision-makers are held 
accountable for their actions. 
Wrapped in the language of multilevel governance, the ensuing chapters explore the rate 
and causes of authority migration, as well as the structure of the accountability 
relationships that emerge once authority migration has occurred. While this chapter has 
developed the theoretical background, the subsequent chapter describes the 
methodological approach and the data that is drawn on throughout the remainder of this 
undertaking. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Methodology and Data 
The central objectives of the research are two-fold: 1) to assess the extent to which 
Canadian provinces have opted to migrate decision-making authority horizontally in 
response to policy issues and what factors explain the use of migration of authority as a 
policy tool; and 2) to establish the existence, nature, and relative strength of the emergent 
accountability relationships. To achieve these objectives both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods are employed. Quantitative techniques are used with a custom dataset 
containing cases of authority migration in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, 
Nova Scotia, and Ontario between the years of 1946 and 2005 to assess the extent of 
authority migration over time as well as the existence and strength of accountability 
relations. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods are then utilized to 
provide a richer account of how specific non-government bodies are held accountable. 
This chapter provides a description and rationale of the research methods and types of 
data used to assess the accountability of non-governmental actors in multilevel 
governance in subsequent chapters. To begin, a rationale will be provided for the 
selection of provinces and timeframe used in the study. Next a description of how cases 
of authority migration are identified is provided. Lastly, both the quantitative and 
qualitative research designs are presented. 
3.1 Province Selection and Case Identification 
This research project explores the migration of authority to Type II bodies and the 
resulting accountability relationships at the provincial level in Canada. A provincial 
approach was adopted for three reasons: provincial politics is relatively under-studied in 
comparison to the federal politics; it allows for comparisons across provinces; and it 
provides a larger sample sizes than using national level data alone. As time constraints 
prohibited the inclusion of all provinces, the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, 
Nova Scotia, and Ontario were selected based on region and political ideology. While 
region was selected based on the potential for variation across Canada, political ideology 
was selected based on the data requirements of H4.4 and H5.2. 
  50 
Regionalism is viewed as an accepted fact of political life in Canada (Simeon and Elkins, 
1974: 397; Ornstein, Stevenson and Williams, 1980: 227; Henderson, 2004: 595). The 
effects of regionalism are reflected in federal cabinet building (Simeon and Elkins, 1974: 
397), the shape of national election campaigns – both under the brokerage party model 
and regionally based party politics (Cross, 2002: 117), and the birth of Canada through 
regional self-interest (Savoie, 2006: 14). Given its current and historical significance, 
regionalism was used to select a subset of provinces from across the whole of Canada. In 
drawing regional boundaries, however, it must be acknowledged that the lines between 
provincial boundaries, or groups thereof, are somewhat arbitrary and fail to take into 
account the cultural and political variations that may occur within the boundaries 
(Jackson and Jackson, 2001: 99). For the purpose of this research, the standard 
geographical regions of Canada were adopted, based on Statistics Canada’s definition: 
the Atlantic provinces; Quebec; Ontario; Prairie Provinces; British Columbia; and the 
Territories (Canada. Statistics Canada, 2011). Just as Simeon and Elkins eliminated 
Prince Edward Island due to its relatively small population size in their exploration of the 
regional political cultures in Canada (1974: 401), Prince Edward Island and the 
Territories were eliminated from this study. In 2013 the populations of the Yukon, 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut were 36.7, 43.5 and 35.6 thousand respectively, while 
Prince Edward Island’s population was 145.2 thousand (Canada. Statistics Canada: 
2013). The province of Quebec was also excluded from the study. The decision not to 
include Quebec is based on the province’s unique nationalism and cultural differences. 
Quebec has a unique cultural history within Canada stemming from its historical 
connection to New France in contrast to other province’s historical connection to British 
North America (McRoberts, 1997: 2 Wiseman, 2008: 43). 
In addition to region, political ideology was used in the province selection process. To 
satisfy the political ideology requirement, both left- and right-of-centre parties must have 
formed the government to test the effect of political ideology on the rate of authority 
migration and the resulting accountability relationships. As a proxy for political ideology, 
party systems were used. Politically, the provinces were divided into three groups based 
upon party system: single-party systems; two-party Liberal-PC systems; and two- or 
three-party systems with competitive left-right politics. The only province to fall into the 
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single-party category for the duration of the study is Alberta (Dunn, 2001: 457; Stewart 
and Carty, 206: 105). The Atlantic provinces historically fall under with in the category 
of two-party liberal-conservative systems (Dunn, 2001: 457), however, more recently 
Nova Scotia has witnessed competitive three-party politics (Stewart and Carty, 206: 106) 
The remainder of the provinces fall within the category of having either a competitive 
three-party system, or a two-party system with a right-left political polarization (Dunn, 
2001: 457; Stewart and Carty, 206: 106).  
While also a prairie province, Alberta’s inclusion in the study is foremost based on 
Alberta being the only province in Canada with a single-party system. Alberta’s Social 
Credit Party was at the far right of the Canadian political spectrum, believing in a limited 
role for the state in the economy, and resisting calls for government regulation of the oil 
and gas industry, marketing boards, and subsidies for new industries (Finkel, 1989: 138-
139). When the Social Credit Party was eventually defeated in 1971 it was by the 
Progressive Conservatives, another right-of-centre party. This party governed 
consistently from the right of the Canadian political spectrum, the inclusion of Alberta 
serves an ideological control throughout the study.  
The remaining three provinces were selected from the remaining geographic regions, 
with competitive left-right party politics being the criteria for selection between 
provinces within a region. Historically the Liberal and Conservative governments that 
emerged throughout Canada’s Atlantic region did not differ ideologically. As a whole, 
the region was elite-oriented, conservative and traditional (Wiseman, 2008: 24). For its 
early history, this holds true for the province of Nova Scotia, however, the March 24th 
1998 election saw the New Democrats and Liberals finish with 19 seats each and 35% of 
the vote. The Progressive Conservatives finished third with 14 seats and 30% of the vote. 
The results marked the emergence of the NDP as a major political player in Nova Scotia 
(Bickerton, 2001: 63). In the 2009 election the NDP took another step, winning the 
general election and Darrell Dexter becoming the first New Democratic Premier in the 
Atlantic region (Nova Scotia. Nova Scotia Legislature, 2014). The recent growth in 
competitive left-right party politics in Nova Scotia formed the basis for its selection 
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among the Atlantic Provinces. Ontario and British Columbia were included as both were 
classified as regions unto themselves and have competitive left-right party politics.  
Within each of the four provinces, the identification of cases of authority migration to 
Type II bodies is based upon the definition of Type II multilevel governance and 
authority migration. Type II bodies are defined as independent jurisdictions that fulfill 
specific functions. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Type II bodies are characterized 
by: intersecting memberships in the sense that borders will be crossed and jurisdictions 
may overlap; being organized across a large number of levels in which authority is not 
neatly layered but diverse in scale; and being flexible in design (Marks and Hooghe, 
2005: 20-21). In terms of authority migration to Type II bodies three conditions must be 
satisfied: authority over some part of the public realm must be granted to a new or 
existing body through an act of provincial legislation; the majority of decision-makers 
within the body must be comprised of individuals who are from outside of the 
government, legislature, and the public service; and the legislated decision-makers must 
have decision-making autonomy. Based on these criteria, bodies that act in an advisory 
rather than a decision-making capacity would be excluded, as would those where fifty-
per cent or more of the board is made up of elected representatives or public employees. 
For Example, the District Health Councils in Ontario, while charged with identifying 
areas of need, assessing health care alternatives, and establishing priorities at the local 
level, had no decision-making authority (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1987: 
14-15). As such, the District Health Councils where excluded from the study. In contrast, 
Alberta’s Regional Airport Authorities were included as the provincial government 
granted decision-making authority and the boards were not comprised of elected 
representatives or member of the public service. The range of policy areas where 
authority has migrated to Type II bodies includes: financial regulation, food and 
agriculture, education, healthcare, natural resources, public safety, social services, sports 
and entertainment, transportation, and other public goods.  
To summarize, instances of authority migration to Type II bodies in the province of 
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario between the years of 1946 and 2005 
form the universe of cases. In addition, Type II bodies must: be granted authority over 
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some part of the public realm through an act of provincial legislation; have a majority of 
decision makers comprised of individuals who are from outside of the government, 
legislature or public service; and have decision-making autonomy.  
3.2 Quantitative Methods – Chapters 4 and 5 
In assessing the extent to which provinces have utilized the horizontal migration of 
authority in public governance and the nature and strength of the ensuing accountability 
relationships a quantitative approach was first employed. The universe of cases for the 
quantitative analysis is comprised of all instances of authority migration to Type II bodies 
in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario where the Type II 
body was in existence at some point between the years of 1946 to 2005. The 1946 to 
2005 timeframe was selected as it provides a sixty-year observation window beginning 
with the emergence of Keynesianism and followed by the shift to neoliberalism as the 
dominant policy paradigm during the post-WWII time period. In Canada Keynesianism 
lasted as the dominant paradigm through the 1970s to some point in the early 1980s 
(Bradford, 2000: 63-64). Keynesianism was characterized as a period of state 
involvement in both society and economy and the building of a comprehensive welfare 
state, while the neoliberal period that followed has been characterized by pressures to 
create a lean state through shrinking social welfare expenditures and the reduction of 
state regulation (Burke, Mooers and Shields, 2000: 11- 13). The Keynesian paradigm was 
influenced by the work of John Maynard Keynes. Keynes principal assumption was the 
existence of a national economy that could intervene to influence levels of investment 
and domestic income. In doing so, the state could regulate the effects of unemployment 
through national policies (Teeple, 2000: 17). In contrast to Keynesianism is the neoliberal 
philosophy of reducing the state and increasing reliance on market mechanisms. 
Neoliberalism is seen to provide an ideological venue for shifting decision-making 
outside the public realm and erode the power of the state (McBride and Shields, 1997: 
18). As will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4, the shift in the perceived role of 
state suggests that a higher rate of authority migration may be occurring under the 
neoliberal paradigm than did under Keynesianism. 
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To test the hypotheses put forward in Chapters 4 and 5 a master dataset was created 
containing the universe of cases as defined above. The master dataset was then used in 
combination with provincial fiscal statistics retrieved from Statistics Canada and 
provincial election results to build topic specific datasets for each chapter. The creation of 
the master dataset, the creation of the annual authority migration rate dataset, the analysis 
of the authority migration rate dataset, the creation of the accountability relationship 
dataset, and the analysis of the accountability relationship dataset will be discussed in 
turn.  
3.2.1 Building the Master Dataset 
To build the master dataset instances of authority migration to Type II bodies were 
identified using the revised statutes for each province (Alberta: 1955, 1970, 1980, 2000; 
British Columbia: 1948, 1960, 1970, 1996; Nova Scotia: 1954, 1976, 1989; and Ontario: 
1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990) and the online publication of statutes from provincial 
government websites. Annual statute volumes were used to provide details on 
incremental changes to the legislation that altered the accountability relationship when 
multiple amendments made it impossible to obtain the information from the revised 
statutes. Working in chronological order, each piece of legislation in the revised statutes 
and on government websites was evaluated based upon the criteria for authority 
migration outlined above. Dataset records were created for: each Type II body in 
existence in 1946 but created prior to 1946; each new Type II body created between 1946 
to 2005; each termination of a Type II body between 1946 to 2005; and each modified 
accountability relationship for a Type II body that occurred between 1946 to 2005. A 
record type based upon the four scenarios described was coded for each new record to 
allow for differentiation when working with the data. For example, the record type would 
enable the distinction between records of authority migration that occurred between the 
years 1946 to 2005 and records of authority migration that occurred prior to 1946. In 
cases where a single piece of legislation creates multiple Type II bodies with the identical 
governance structure only one record is created. For example, the Alberta Public 
Libraries Act allows for the creation of both municipal and regional library boards. While 
multiple municipal and regional boards exist as a result of this legislation only two 
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records have been created in the dataset, one record for municipal libraries and one 
record for regional libraries. In taking this approach, instances of decision-making 
authority being migrated are captured and not the resulting number of Type II bodies.  
When collecting the data a unique id was assigned for each instance of authority 
migration to a Type II body. Subsequent records for termination or modification of the 
accountability relationships for that Type II body were coded with the same id – linking 
all records associated with a specific Type II body together. Not captured in the dataset 
are instances where the legislation has been amended, but the accountability relationships 
remained unchanged. Moreover, in cases when the Type II body remains in place, but the 
legislation that created it is repealed and replaced, the Type II body is not coded as 
terminated and recreated. Instead, only changes to the accountability relationships (if 
occurring) are captured. In cases when an amendment resulted in one or more of the 
criteria for authority migration to be no longer satisfied, the Type II body was treated the 
same as if the Type II body had been terminated and a termination record was entered.  
In addition to the type of record, the data collected from the provincial statutes include: 
the year, chapter, and title of the statute; the year, and chapter of the revised statute; the 
name or description (i.e. municipal libraries) of the Type II body; the policy area in 
which authority was migrated; the geographic scale of Type II body; whether the Type II 
body is a Professional Self-Regulatory body; and the existence of specified accountability 
mechanisms. The geographic scale of each Type II body was coded based on whether the 
Type II body’s geographic jurisdiction matched: that of a single municipality as in the 
case of municipal library boards; spanned municipalities as in the case of regional library 
boards; covered an entire province as does Alberta Health Services; or spanned multiple 
provinces as does the Atlantic Provinces Special Education Authority. A Type II body 
was coded as a Professional Self-Regulatory body when government granted 
responsibility for regulation over a specified profession to a body whose membership and 
majority of its board is composed of practitioners of that profession.  
In coding accountability relationships, a total of fifty-four specific accountability 
mechanisms, as detailed in Appendix A, were identified. The list of accountability 
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mechanisms was developed in accordance with Bovens’s definition of accountability as 
discussed in Chapter 2. To be included, the mechanism must either oblige the Type II 
body to explain and to justify its conduct, enable the public or government to ask 
questions and pass judgement, or enable the public or government to sanction the Type II 
body. A preliminary list of accountability mechanisms was initially created and tested 
against the cases of authority migration for the province of Alberta. New accountability 
mechanisms were appended to the list as they were identified in the Alberta statutes. Any 
previously coded statutes were then reexamined to ensure that the newly added 
accountability mechanisms had not been missed. Following the completion of Alberta, 
the provinces of British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario were processed. Each 
accountability mechanism was coded as a 1 when the mechanism was present within the 
legislation and a 0 when it was not. In cases where a new authority mechanism was 
identified in the remaining three provinces, it was added to the list, however, previously 
coded statutes were not revisited. The decision not to review previous coded statutes was 
based upon the experience gained reexamining statues in Alberta. When the Alberta 
statutes were reexamined no additional occurrences of the new accountability mechanism 
were found.  
Once all statutes had been coded, the accountability mechanism variables were used to 
create six additional variables for each record: three for the accountability relationship 
between the Type II body and government; and three for the accountability relationship 
between the Type II body and society. For each relationship, the three variables 
correspond with the three components of Bovens’s definition of accountability: the 
obligation to justify and explain; the capacity to question and pass judgment; and the 
ability to sanction. When determining the nature of an accountability relationship, all 
members of the public must be able to utilize the accountability mechanism for the 
accountability relationship to be with society. Accountability mechanisms that can only 
be utilized by narrowly defined subgroups of the population were deemed as supporting 
accountability to special interest groups. For example, only members of the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario are able to hold members of their board accountable 
through their capacity to elect board members. All six variables are coded as either 
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present (1) or absent (0), based on the existence of an accountability mechanism that 
meets the particular criteria for the variable.  
In addition to the six variables used to denote the existence or absence of each element of 
Bovens’s accountability definition, four overall accountability scores were created. For 
each of the three relationships listed above the scores for the three individual variables 
were added together to capture the overall strength of the relationship.4 For example, the 
existence of all three elements of Bovens’s definition of accountability would result in an 
accountability score of three, while the existence of any two would result in an 
accountability score of two, and so on, for each of the four accountability scores. 
3.2.2 Chapter 4: Dataset Creation 
Using the data compiled in the master dataset in conjunction with provincial election 
results and provincial fiscal data obtained from Statistics Canada a secondary dataset was 
created. The second dataset was used to evaluate the rate of authority migration to Type 
II bodies and the extent to which provincial finances and governing party ideology 
influence the authority migration rate. The secondary dataset contains a record for each 
province and year between 1946 and 2005. For each record two annual Type II body 
creation rates are created: one for all Type II bodies; and a second excluding Professional 
Self-Regulatory bodies. As discussed later in the chapter, the decision to evaluate the rate 
of authority migration with and without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies in the 
dataset is based upon the possibility that the inclusion of Professional Self-Regulatory 
bodies skew results. The decision to evaluate the rate of authority migration with and 
without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies was taken as a robustness check of the 
central findings for this chapter’s analyses. The rate of authority migration is calculated 
as the number of instances of authority migration in a calendar year minus the number of 
terminated instances of authority migration. A cumulative variable is also calculated for 
                                                
4  Assigning equal value to each of the three components of accountability gives the obligation of a Type II 
body to justify its actions the same weighting as the ability to sanction, when it could be argued that the 
ability to sanction is of greater value. When changes were made to the model, for example scoring 
sanctioning as a 2 or a 0 instead of a 1 or a 0, the results remained consistent with those reported in Chapter 
5. 
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each record and is equal to the cumulative value for the previous year plus the annual rate 
of authority migration for the current year. 
For each row in the secondary dataset the political composition of the legislature is also 
compiled. Dummy variables were created to denote if a left-of-centre party formed a 
majority government, a minority government, or the loyal opposition. In distinguishing 
between political ideologies, the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the Cooperative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) were labeled left-of-centre as content analysis of 
federal political party manifestos between 1945 and 2000 demonstrated consistent 
ideological disagreement between parties at the federal level with the NDP to the left of 
both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties (Cochrane, 2010: 590-591). When 
populating the dummy variables, if a left-of-centre party had both formed the government 
and been the loyal opposition during the same calendar year the variables were coded 
based upon which of the two options occurred for the longest duration in that calendar 
year. For example, if a left-of-centre party was in power for seven months and formed the 
loyal opposition for the remaining five months, the dummy variables would be coded as 1 
(yes) for having a left-of-centre government in power and 0 (no) for having a left-of-
centre party as the loyal opposition.  
In addition to capturing the political environment in a binary manner, the seat and vote 
percentage for the left-of-centre parties and the party in power were compiled for each 
calendar year. In cases where there was an election in the middle of the calendar year the 
seat and voter percentages were calculated base on the proportional value for that year. 
For example, if a left-of-centre party held 25% of the seats for 75% of the year and 40% 
of the seats for 25% of the year, the percentage of seats held would be calculated as (25 * 
.75) + (40 * .25) for a result of 28.75% of seats.  
To populate the political data for Alberta, election results were obtained from the 
Elections Alberta website (http://www.elections.ab.ca/Public%20Website/746.htm) 
which provides the votes and seats received by party for each election from 1905 to 2012. 
British Columbia election results were obtained from two Elections British Columbia 
publications, Electoral History of British Columbia 1871-1986 and Electoral History of 
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British Columbia Supplement, 1987-2001, as well as recent election results from the 
Elections British Columbia website. Nova Scotia election results were obtained from 
Election Nova Scotia’s Election Statistics website (http://electionsnovascotia.ca/election-
data/statistics). Ontario elections results, as Elections Ontario does not provide vote level 
data, were obtained from the results complied by Alan Siaroff in Christopher Dunn’s 
Provinces: Canadian Provincial Politics 2nd edition. 
In addition to political data, variables were included in each record for disposable 
income, provincial debt, and provincial deficit. Disposable income is used as an indicator 
of provincial economic performance as it is the longest running macroeconomic time-
series available for Canada (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2010: 171), and the only 
macroeconomic indicator that provides consistent time-series data from 1946-2005. 
Disposable income data was obtained from Statistics Canada’s Historical Statistics of 
Canada for the years prior to 1980 and from table 384-0012 of Statistics Canada’s 
CANSIM socioeconomic database for the years after 1986. For the five years of 
overlapping data from 1981 through to 1985 the average of the historical statistics and 
CANSIM data was used to smooth out the small differences between the two sets of 
statistics. Disposable income data was recorded on a per capita basis and in 2005 dollars 
to allow for consistency across provinces and across time. In addition, the percentage 
change in disposable income per capital over the previous four, five, and six years were 
calculated. Change over periods of four, five and six years were calculated based on the 
rationale that a government is more likely to respond to a fiscal trend than smaller shifts 
in the fiscal environment, while longer periods of time run the risk of smoothing out 
trends in the fiscal data that the government may have responded to. 
Provincial debt was captured as it is considered to be a key measure of the overall 
financial strength of government (Baker and Rennie, 2011: 359). Unfortunately, no 
continuous data source was available for government debt, and changes in how debt was 
calculated over time presented challenges in building a continuous time-series. To 
produce a single provincial debt variable multiple sets of provincial debt data were 
obtained from Statistics Canada. Table H404-415 from the Historical Statistics of 
Canada dataset was used to obtain the data for direct and indirect provincial debt for the 
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years 1933 through to 1975. Net fiscal debt collected from CANSIM table 385-0014 plus 
the debt guaranteed by the provincial government from CANSIM table 386-0026 were 
used to calculate public debt for the years 1971 through to 2005. Changes in the method 
of debt calculation resulted in different debt values being reported for the same year. As a 
result, for each of the five years in which the two datasets overlapped the average of the 
two scores was used to calculate the provincial debt value in order to smooth the 
transition from one dataset to another. Provincial debts were recorded on a per capita 
basis in 2005 dollars and as a percentage change per capita over four, five, and six year 
periods. 
The third fiscal component, budgetary surplus or deficit, also presented challenges when 
collecting the data, as an eight-year gap exists in the data available through Statistics 
Canada. Historical tables H197-208 (Total Net General Expenditures) and H124-135 
(Total Net Revenue) were used to calculate the annual deficit for all years up until 1969. 
Data for 1970 through to 1980 was obtained from CANSIM table 384-0023, while data 
for 1989 through to 2005 was obtained from CANSIM table 385-0001. Provincial deficits 
were recorded on a per capita basis in 2005 dollars. As a result of the eight-year gap only 
a short-term variable, annual per cent change per capita, could be created to present 
changes in deficit across time. 
When appending each piece of fiscal data to the yearly provincial record annual fiscal 
data is applied to the subsequent calendar year. For example, the fiscal results for 1995 in 
British Columbia are appended to the record of authority migration in British Columbia 
for 1996. The rationale for this approach is that government can only respond to what has 
already occurred or the existing trends in the province’s finances.  
Also included within the dataset were dummy variables for each of the four provinces, 
election year, and neoliberalism. All six dummy variables are used as control variables in 
the regression models discussed below. The province variables are populated with a 1 
when the record contains data for that province and 0 if not. The election year variable 
contains a 1 if there was an election held in that calendar year and 0 if not. Lastly the 
neoliberalism variable is coded as either a 1 or a 0 to denote the shift from Keynesianism 
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to neoliberalism, with 1980 onward being coded with a 1. While Keynesianism entered 
into crisis during the 1970s, 1980 was selected as the breaking point between the two 
paradigms as it was not until the 1980s that neoliberalism became embedded (Bradford, 
2000: 63-64).  
3.2.3 Chapter 4: Data Analysis 
A full list of Type II bodies can be found in Appendix B. In assessing the migration of 
authority, both descriptive statistics and regression techniques are employed. First, 
descriptive statistics are used to evaluate the hypotheses that the rate of authority 
migration is increasing over time and the absolute number of instances of authority 
migration is increasing over time. Line charts are used to plot both the annual rate of 
authority Migration of Type II bodies and the cumulative number of Type II bodies 
across time for each of the four provinces. 
Next, ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to test the effect of fiscal capacity 
and political ideology on the annual rate of authority migration. A sequential modeling 
approach is used to test the independent variables, with a regression model run for each 
independent variable and a final regression model containing all independent variables. In 
all models the control variables are included. A sequential approach was adopted so that 
the R-square, which provides an estimate of the effect of an independent variable on the 
dependent variable (Pollock, 2009: 180), could be observed for each independent variable 
and to ensure that results remained robust when all other independent variables were 
controlled for. Statistical significance is report for 90, 95, and 99 per cent confidence 
levels. Furthermore, independent variables are evaluated for each province separately and 
against combined provincial data to allow for comparisons across provinces and to assess 
overall trends in authority migration. 
In addition to looking at both provincial and aggregate data, both the descriptive and 
regression techniques are used to evaluate the rate of authority migration and the effect of 
provincial fiscal capacity and political ideology with and without the inclusion of 
Professional Self-Regulatory bodies. The decision to evaluate the annual rate of authority 
migration with and without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies in the dataset was based 
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upon the possibility that the inclusion of Professional Self-Regulatory bodies would skew 
results.  
In three of the four provinces the increase in the rate of creation of Professional Self-
Regulatory bodies was most prevalent in the area of healthcare. In Alberta, the Dental 
Discipline Act resulted in the addition of two Type II bodies in 1990, while the Alberta 
Healthcare Professionals Act saw an additional seven Type II bodies added between 1999 
and 2005. Together the two acts accounted for nine of the eleven Professional Self-
Regulatory bodies created in Alberta between the years of 1990 and 2005. In British 
Columbia the enactment of the Healthcare Professions Act resulted in the creation of nine 
new Type II bodies since 1994, accounting for eighty-two per cent of new Professional 
Self-regulatory Bodies created since 1990 in British Columbia. The Regulated Health 
Professions Act in Ontario resulted in an additional nine Type II bodies since 1991, 
account for seventy per cent of the new professional self-regulatory bodies created since 
1990 in Ontario. The only province that did not experience a sharp increase in the number 
of healthcare related Type II bodies in the 1990s and early 2000s was Nova Scotia, which 
only had an increase of three. However, the total number of new Professional Self-
Regulatory bodies in Nova Scotia during this fifteen-year period was ten. 
When collecting the data it was observed that the frequency at which authority had 
migrated to Professional Self-Regulatory bodies was higher during the last fifteen years 
included in the study. Overall, the increase in the number of Professional Self-Regulatory 
bodies created in the four provinces during the last fifteen years being studied appear to 
be the result of one of two trends: 1) the increasing degree of specialization within an 
existing area of healthcare expertise, and 2) the legal recognition and assignment of 
regulatory responsibilities to existing fields of professional practice. An example of the 
increasing degree of specialization is the change from one regulatory body governing 
both physiotherapists and massage therapists in British Columbia to two regulatory 
bodies, one to govern physiotherapists and a second to govern message therapists, in 
1994. Similarly, in Alberta a regulatory body for practical nurses was created through 
legislation in 2003; this act brought the number of professional nursing bodies in Alberta 
from two to three. Increased specialization within the healthcare field in general can be 
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seen in the emergence of Type II bodies charged with regulating professions such as 
medical laboratory technologists in Alberta, occupational therapists in British Columbia, 
respiratory therapists in Nova Scotia, and speech and language pathologists in Ontario. 
Special cases have also occurred, such as the legalization of midwifery that necessitated 
the need to regulate the new legalized professional body.  
To guard against changes in the rate of creation of Professional Self-Regulatory bodies 
unknowingly biasing the results, the decision was made to assess the data with and 
without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies in the dataset.  
3.2.4 Chapter 5: Accountability Relationships 
As with assessing the migration of authority, a secondary dataset was created to assess 
the accountability relationships that emerge once authority had been migrated. The new 
dataset uses data collected in the master dataset in conjunction with provincial election 
results. All records of authority migration between the years of 1946 and 2005 as well as 
all records for changes in the accountability mechanisms of existing Type II bodies are 
included in the dataset, while instances of termination of authority migration and records 
for the creation of Type II bodies prior to 1946 are excluded. Data elements included 
from the master dataset are: the unique id assigned to each instance of authority migration 
to a Type II body; the year, chapter, and title of the statute; the name of the Type II body; 
the record type code (new or modified), policy area, whether the Type II body is a 
Professional Self-Regulatory body; and the accountability scores for the relationship 
between the Type II body both government and society. 
Using the same data sources used to create the dataset for Chapter 4, the political 
composition of the legislature was again included. For each record, dummy variables 
were created to denote if a left-of-centre party formed a majority government, a minority 
government, or the loyal opposition. Seat and vote percentage variables for the left-of-
centre parties and the party in power were also created. The date of the legislation was 
used to determine which party was currently in power and which election results to use to 
calculate voter and seat percentages.  
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Also included within the dataset were dummy variables for each of the four provinces, 
geographic scale of the Type II body, whether the Type II body is Professional Self-
Regulatory, and time period. The province variables are populated with a 1 when the 
record contains data for that province and 0 if not. Four geographic scale variables were 
created: single municipality; spans municipalities; single province; and spans provinces. 
The geographic scale dummy variables were populated with a 1 if the geographic scale of 
the Type II variable fell into that category, and 0 when it did not. To create time period 
variables the overall timeframe being studied is divided into six ten-year periods and a 
dummy variable is created for each. All instances of creation or modification of Type II 
bodies were coded according to which time period it occurred in, with 1 indicating that it 
occurred in that time period and 0 indicating it did not.  
3.2.5 Chapter 5: Data Analysis  
To test the effect of time period, political ideology and geographic scale on the strength 
of the accountability relationships ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used. As with 
the analysis of the annual rate of authority migration a sequential modeling approach is 
used. Each independent variable was separately modeled. To ensure that results remain 
robust, an additional model with all independent variables is run. Statistical Significance 
is again reported at 90, 95, and 99 per cent confidence levels. Also consistent with the 
approach taken for Chapter 4, the independent variables are evaluated against the records 
for each individual province separately, as well as for all provincial records. This is again 
done to allow for cross province comparison in addition to the assessing the overall trend 
in accountability relationships. 
Differing from the approach used in Chapter 4 is the treatment of Professional Self-
Regulatory Type II bodies. While, Chapter 4 required a separate analysis of the annual 
rate of authority migration for all Type II bodies and non Professional Self-Regulatory 
Type II bodies, Chapter 5 uses a Professional Self-Regulatory dummy variable in the 
regression model. Furthermore, the decision to control for Professional Self-Regulatory 
bodies is not the result of an increase in number of Professional Self-Regulatory bodies, 
but instead the fact that Professional Self-Regulatory bodies represent a unique category 
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of Type II body. As these bodies are self-regulatory, there is the potential for a weaker 
accountability framework in comparison to other forms of Type II body.  
3.3 Quantitative and Qualitative Methods – Chapters 6   
and 7 
In chapters 6 and 7, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches is used to 
gain additional understanding. While all incidents of legislated authority migration to 
Type II bodies between the years of 1946 and 2005 in the provinces of Alberta, British 
Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario formed the universe of cases for Chapters 4 and 5, 
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on specific case studies from each of the four provinces. The 
cases include: Alberta Health Services, British Columbia’s Health Authorities, Nova 
Scotia’s District Health Authorities, and Ontario’s Local Health Integration Networks.  
Discussed in great depth in Chapter 6, the decision to select the creation of Health 
Authorities for case study is multifaceted. The criteria for case selection included the 
migration of authority in the policy area being consistent across all four provinces, while 
still providing sufficient provincial difference to allow for cross case comparisons. 
Provincial differences could include but is not limited to the timing of authority 
migration, or the institutional design of the Type II body to which authority was 
migrated. With the creation of Local Health Integration Networks in Ontario in 2006 the 
Type II health authorities met the “all province” criteria, while the institutional 
differences between the four provinces met the “provincial difference” criteria. The 
specific institutional difference of interest is the difference in geographic scale, with 
Alberta having one province wide health authority, while each the other three provinces 
have regional health authorities, and the unique decision in Ontario to maintain local 
hospital boards where in the other three provinces local hospital boards were completely 
replaced by regional or, in the case of Alberta, provincial boards.  
The decision to explore the migration of decision-making authority in healthcare was also 
influenced by the level of importance Canadian citizens place on healthcare. When asked, 
“Which of these five issues is the most important issue to you PERSONALLY in this 
election,” the results found that 48.8 per cent of respondents selected healthcare as the 
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most important issue in 2004 and 40.8 per cent selected healthcare in 2006 (Blais et al., 
2007). In addition, the decision took into account the relative lack of academic literature 
on migration of authority to health authorities since the initial wave of authority 
migration in the 1990s (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 507). Since the initial wave of 
authority migration the provinces of Alberta and Ontario have moved in directions that 
have substantially different institutional designs than those that were introduced in the 
1990s. Lastly, while the focus of analysis is on the creation of Type II bodies and the 
resulting accountability mechanism in the Canadian provinces, the migration of decision-
making authority in healthcare is widespread, meaning the study of authority migration in 
Canada has the potential to provide value beyond the Canadian border. 
In investigate the migration of authority to Health Authorities and how they are 
subsequently held accountable, both primary document sources and interviews were used. 
The remainder of this section describes the collection of documents, the interview 
process and how the data was analysed for Chapters 6 and 7. 
3.3.1 Government Healthcare Document Collection Process 
To provide context to the results of the quantitative analysis of the enabling legislation 
both government publications and contracts or accountability agreements between 
governments and regional health authorities were utilized. Government publications came 
from two categories: documents produced by or at the request of the ministry responsible 
for healthcare; and documents produced by external agencies or offices. Examples of 
documents produced by or on behalf of the ministry include task force or royal 
commission reports, government responses to task force and royal commission reports, 
and government white papers and policy papers. Examples of publications produced by 
external government agencies or offices include ombudsman reports, provincial auditor 
reports, or reports by other autonomous or semi-autonomous entities such as the Health 
Quality Council of Alberta.  
To obtain recent government publications a search of government websites was initiated. 
To find older publications the library catalogues of the University of Western Ontario and 
the University of Guelph were searched. Each document collected was then searched for 
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references to other government documents. Referenced documents were checked against 
those that had already been identified, with new documents then being retrieved. The 
search criteria for websites and library catalogues included: accountability, citizen 
engagement, citizen participation, and governance. Contracts or accountability 
agreements between governments and regional health authorities were searched for on 
both ministry and health authority websites. A full list of documents is provided in 
Appendix C. 
3.3.2 Interview Questions 
Interviews were semi-structured in design, with a set of predefined questions forming the 
general structure of the interview. The interviewer was free, however, to ask probing 
questions in response to the participant’s answers. The predefined interview questions are 
provided in Appendix D. The interview questions are divided into three sections: Section 
1 approaches accountability as defined by the participant; Section 2 approaches 
accountability as defined by Bovens; and Section 3 is specific to Alberta and asks about 
the shift from regional health authorities to one province-wide health authority. 
In Section 1, the first question asks the participant to define accountability. This is done 
to provide perspective to subsequent answers. Questions 1.2 and 1.3 are intended to 
determine whom the participant believes the Type II body is most accountable to and 
whose interests the Type II body most represents. Both questions are based on questions 
asked by Lomas Woods and Veenstra in their study of the motivations, attitudes and 
approaches of regional health authority board members published in 1997 (1997a: 673). 
Questions 1.4 ask the participant to describe the accountability relationship between the 
Type II body and government if not previously discussed, while question 1.5 does the 
same for relationship between the Type II body and society. Following each question, 
additional probes regarding the specific accountability mechanisms, the perceived 
effectiveness of the accountability mechanism or the need for change or strengthening of 
the accountability mechanism could be employed to further flesh out the participant’s 
position. 
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The questions in Section 2 are based upon Mark Bovens’s definition of accountability 
and mirrors the data collected for quantitative analysis. In modelling the questions after 
the variables used for the quantitative analysis the results can be directly compared and 
contrasted to the quantitative findings. As a result the case study objective of providing 
additional context to the quantitative results can be achieved. As previously stated, 
Bovens identifies three parts to an accountability relationship including the obligation of 
the actor to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the ability for the forum to pose 
questions and pass judgement, and that actor may face consequences (Bovens, 2007: 
450). For both the relationship between government and the Type II body and society and 
the Type II body the participant is asked to what extent there is an obligation on the part 
of the Type II body to explain and justify their actions; to what extent the ability exists to 
pose questions to the Type II body regarding their actions; and to what extent there is the 
ability to sanction the Type II body if their actions do not meet expectations. After each 
question follow-up questions are used to determine not only the formal existence of each 
of the three aspects of the accountability relationships, but perceived success or failure in 
enacting each component.  
The third section was only asked to participants from the province of Alberta. In Alberta 
nine regional health authorities were migrated into a single province wide health 
authority in 2008. Participants are asked what impact the shift from regional authorities 
the single province health board have had on the ability of both government and society 
to hold decision-makers accountable. The question is included to gain greater insight on 
influence of geographic scale on accountability relationship. Participants from Alberta 
are asked this question, as Alberta is the only province to move to a single provincial 
entity from regional boards.  
3.3.3 Interview Participants 
All names, e-mail address and phone numbers used to contact perspective participants 
were obtained from organizational websites or publically available reports, such as year-
end reports. Interview participants were selected across four categories: elected 
representatives, ministry employees, interest groups members, and members of the 
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organization being studied. The purpose of including participants from a diverse set of 
stakeholders is to obtain a wide range of viewpoints for inclusion in the analysis. 
The elected representatives category includes members of both governing and opposition 
parties. Within a parliamentary system, the exercise of state power is done in accordance 
with parliamentary accountability where the government answerable to Parliament and 
Parliament has the means to hold to account those who exercise the power of the state, be 
they elected or non-elected officials (D’Ombrian, 2007: 198-199). For this reason, the 
views of the party forming the government and those who are charged with holding 
government to account were sought. Interviews were sought from the Minister as well as 
the health critics from the opposition parties. Introductory e-mails were sent directly to 
each potential participant and followed up with additional e-mail requests, and finally a 
phone call if no response was received. A copy of the standard text used in the 
introductory e-mail is included in Appendix E. 
Interviews were also sought from public service employees. The size, complexity, and 
number of functions undertaken by the state make it impossible for elected officials to be 
involved in all aspects of how we are governed. Consequently, members of the public 
service perform large portions of government activities (Flynn, 2011: 43). As public 
employees perform much of the activities of government, they are attuned with the 
operational reality of accountability mechanisms. To recruit participants an introductory 
e-mail was sent to the appropriate branch of the public service requesting an interview 
with a representative of the department. In Ontario the introductory e-mail was sent to the 
Health System Accountability and Performance branch of the Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care. In Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia the appropriate area 
within the ministry was not clearly identified on publically available organizational 
charts. As a result, introductory e-mails were sent to the deputy minister’s office. If no 
response was received a follow-up e-mail was sent. In all cases, responses to the follow-
up e-mail were received. 
The views of interest group representatives where sought to gain insight into how the 
accountability of the Type II bodies were perceived from outside of government and the 
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Type II body. In each province the provincial associate of the Canadian Health Coalition 
and the province’s medical association were contacted for interviews. The health 
coalitions were selected due to their position as coalitions of organizations and 
individuals who are active or interested in healthcare policy at the provincial level. 
Medical associations were selected as they represent an important constituency group in 
the delivery of health services. For both the health coalitions and the medical associations 
introductory e-mails were sent in accordance with the contact information provided on 
the website to request an interview with a representative of the organization. In cases of 
non-response follow-up e-mails were sent and finally if needed a phone call was placed 
to the organization.  
Similar to the need to interview both elected politicians and public service employees, 
both board members and upper management were recruited from the health authorities. In 
each province, members of both the board and management were recruited from the 
health authority responsible for the capital region. Participants from a second health 
authority – with the exception of Alberta, which has only one health authority – were 
recruited to allow for additional perspectives to be put forward. In selecting a second 
regional authority, regions that include rural areas were selected to offset the largely 
urban characteristics of the capital region. In recruiting participants from the capital 
region prior members of the board and management were recruited when existing 
members declined to be interviewed. In selecting a second regional health authority, 
when members declined to participate an alternative region was identified and 
approached. When contact information was available, board chairs and CEOs were 
contacted directly. When such contact information was not available, the introductory e-
mail was sent either to organizational e-mail accounts, or to specified individuals 
identified on the organizations website, with the request that it be passed along to the 
desired recipient.  
While ideally participants from each category and groups within each category would 
have been interviewed, this was not the case as not all possible interviewees consented to 
being interviewed. The number of participants per category by province is shown in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Interview Participants by Category 
 Alberta 
British 
Columbia 
Nova 
Scotia Ontario Total 
Elected Representatives 1 1 1 2 5 
Ministry Employees 1 1 1 1 4 
Interest Groups 2 1 1 1 5 
Type II Board 0 2 1 2 4 
Type II Management 1 2 2 2 7 
Total 5 7 6 8 26 
Lastly, all participants were also required to read and sign a research consent form. The 
research consent form outlines the purpose of the research, the interview procedure and 
questions, possible risks and benefits, details pertaining to withdrawing from the study, 
and protection of participant confidentiality. In signing the consent form the participants 
state that they have read the research consent form, have had the nature of the study 
explained to them, and agree to participate. A copy of the research consent form is 
included in as Appendix F. 
3.3.4 Interview Procedure 
All interviews were conducted over the phone or over the Internet through Skype. While 
it is acknowledged that there are inherit disadvantages in using phone interviews, it was 
felt that the advantages far outweighed them. The disadvantages of conducting phone 
interviews include: evidence that suggests that open ended questions, such as those asked 
in this study, yield shorter answers in comparison to face to face interviews (Singleton 
and Straits, 2005: 241); there is increased difficulty in establishing trust and rapport with 
the respondents (Singleton and Straits, 2005: 241); and there is an inability on the part of 
both respondents and the interviewer to make use of visual in addition to verbal 
communication channels (Berg, 2007: 110). The largest advantage to conducting the 
interview by phone is the substantial savings in both time and money. There are 
additional advantages in terms of flexibility as interviews could be scheduled on very 
short notice with participants on both the East and West coast of the country.  
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When contacting the participant the option was given for the respondent to provide a 
contact number, or initiate the phone call. This option was provided as not all phone 
numbers were publically available. At the start of each phone interview participants are 
asked to consent to having a digital recording made of the interview. A set of predefined 
questions then formed the overall framework for interview. The order, however, in which 
the questions were asked, was not standardized across all participants. Instead, leeway 
was given to the interviewer to adjust the order based upon the responses to initial 
questions. For all participants the questions in Section 1 were asked in the predetermined 
order, with the participant defining accountability and then specifying whom they believe 
the health authorities are most accountable to. This is done to ensure that participant’s 
answers are not biased by the definition of accountability as set out in the quantitative 
analysis. Depending upon how the participant defines accountability and their response to 
the question, whom do you believe the health authority is most accountable to? Questions 
from Section 2 may be asked as part of the discussion. For example, if the participant 
defines accountability along the lines of Bovens’s definition and states that health 
authorities are most accountable to government, then questions from Section 2 regarding 
government can be asked as part of this discussion. In instances where the participant’s 
and Bovens’s definition of accountability do not align, the questions from Section 2 are 
asked upon the completion of Section 1. The same approach is taken with Section 3; if 
the topic emerges as part of a different discussion the questions regarding the shift from 
regional to one single provincial body in Alberta may be asked out of order. 
This semi-structured approach was taken as it provided sufficient structure to ensure that 
key questions were asked, while providing enough flexibility to the interviewer to discuss 
topics as the emerged within the conversation and to pursue topics that may or may not 
have been included within the predefined interview questions. For example, while the 
predetermined questions do not touch on the ideal number of health authorities in 
Ontario, such a line of inquiry can be pursued if a participant engages in this topic in 
relation to accountability to either citizens or government.  
The interviews were on average 46 minutes in length. For all interviews notes are taken 
throughout the duration of the interview. In addition, each participant was asked if they 
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would consent to having an audio recording of the interview made. In total eighty-five 
per cent of the participants agreed to the audio recording. Upon completion of the 
interview the interviewers notes, as well as the digital recording were transcribed. In 
instances where the participant’s answer is unclear a follow-up email is sent to the 
participant to ensure that the participants intent is captured correctly. All participants are 
asked at the end of the interview process if they desire a copy of the complete work.  
3.3.5 Data Analysis: Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 examines the factors leading to the migration of authority to Type II bodies in 
provincial health care. In each of the four provinces the initial migration of authority to 
Type II bodies as well as subsequent changes to the governance model is explored. 
Consistent with Chapter 4, Chapter 6 assesses the effect of fiscal capacity and political 
ideology, but also seeks to identify additional factors that have contributed to the 
migration of authority in each province. In investigating which factors played a role in 
the decision to migrate authority to Type II bodies, the provincial governments’ framing 
of the challenges facing the health care system were explored. To determine how the 
challenges facing health were defined, government policy documents, commission or task 
force reports, provincial legislation, and provincial regulations are used. Both the 
description of the existing structure and the recommendations or proposals for change 
were examined to build an understanding of how policy challenges in health care were 
framed leading up to the migration of authority.  
In addition to exploring how the policy problem was framed, the eventual policy 
outcomes are also considered. Specifically, the initial policy framing and the resulting 
policy implementation are assessed for inconsistencies. 
3.3.6 Data Analysis: Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches to explore the accountability 
relationships between the regional health bodies and both government and society. The 
chapter evaluates the effect of time, political ideology, and geographic scale on the 
accountability relationships. This is done through the evaluation of government 
documentation, contracts or accountability agreements between governments and 
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regional health authorities, and the use of descriptive statistics as well as individual 
interviewee responses from participant data. In evaluating accountability relationships 
both the existence and effectiveness of accountability mechanisms are considered. 
The existence and strength of the accountability relationships between health authorities 
and both government and society is first assessed based upon the existence of 
documented accountability mechanisms. In doing so, government-mandated mechanisms 
as set forth in the legislation, regulations, and accountability or operating are taken into 
account. Accountability mechanisms are identified based upon Bovens’s definition of 
accountability. The strength of the accountability relationship is assessed based upon the 
extent to which all three aspects of each accountability relationship exist. 
Moving beyond the formal prescribed accountability mechanisms, the ability of both 
society and government to hold health authorities accountable is evaluated. To do so the 
interview transcripts are used. To code the data, the widely accepted three-step procedure 
consisting of: 1) open coding or theming; 2) axial coding or tagging; and 3) selective 
coding (Archer and Berdahl, 2011: 350-351) is employed. In employing this approach, 
the data will be first explored for general patterns or themes, then searched for specific 
instances of each theme, and finally reviewed for both additional supporting and 
discrepant evidence (Archer and Berdahl, 2011: 350-352). 
3.4 Ethical Considerations 
The risks posed by this research are minimal. Interviewees may feel some psychological 
or emotional discomfort answering questions about the organization’s level of 
accountability if they have concerns over how the organization or those working for or 
with the organization will be perceived. Participants may feel some stress over being 
identified if they believe their comments to be unfavourable to the organization they are 
associated with. There is also the risk that the participant may be identifiable due to the 
small number of overall participants and the public nature of the organizations being 
studied.  
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In response to the potential risks, no information that discloses the identity of the 
participant will be released or published without the participant’s consent. Furthermore, 
at the recommendation of the Research Ethics Board, findings will be presented in a 
summarized manner to minimize the risk that participants will be identified as a result of 
the small number of potential participants linked with each organization. 
To further protect the privacy of participants all audio recordings and transcripts will be 
stored electronically and encrypted. Four copies of each file will be maintained: One on a 
personal laptop, one on an external backup drive, one on DVD and one on the H: (home) 
drive on the social science network to provide offsite backup. Audio recordings will be 
kept for 5 years after the thesis defence. Transcripts will be maintained indefinitely. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this research is to assess the extent to which provinces have utilized Type 
II multilevel governance bodies in public governance and to gain a greater understanding 
of the nature and strength of the accountability relationships that emerge when authority 
is migrated. To achieve these objectives both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods are employed. A quantitative approach was first employed to make use of the 
large number of cases available across the four provinces. Qualitative analysis was then 
employed to investigate specific cases in considerably more depth. The strength of 
existing theories regarding the migration of authority and the resulting accountability 
relationships were tested using OLS regression, while qualitative coding of documents 
and interview responses allowed new areas of inquiry to emerge and provide context to 
the quantitative findings. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Creation Myths: The Migration of Authority 
My little girl Miller can take the fridge magnets with the letters on them, put any three letters on 
the fridge in any order she wants to and she’ll get some government agency that you’ve never 
heard of but you’re paying millions and millions a year to sustain.” 
-Tim Hudak, 2011 Ontario Leader’s Debate 
For the majority of the past three centuries governance in the public realm has been 
associated with the state and a dominant pattern of hierarchical governing in which 
government decides the laws and policies to be adopted (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209). 
This traditional approach to governance, however, has been challenged as societal actors 
seek greater autonomy (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209-210) and the governance demands 
on the state expand to the point where capacity requirements cannot be fulfilled without 
widespread delegation (Finders, 2006: 223). Caught between increased demands on one 
hand and limited fiscal budgets on the other, governments have engaged a range of 
private and public actors in the governance process (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2011: 5). 
The demands placed upon government as the provider of public goods and services have 
pushed government toward the use of external actors to meet public demand, while at the 
same time growing societal complexity has made governance more difficult in terms of 
both managing demand and managing the growing number of interconnections (Pierre 
and Peters, 2005: 121-122). The attitude and actions of citizen have also played a role in 
challenging the traditional patterns of governance. There has been a decline in citizen 
confidence in the public sector, a reduction in citizen participation in politics, and a 
pattern of voting for governments who pledge to reduce the role of the state (Peters, 
2004: 130). The resulting change in governance model has been described as the 
‘marketization’ of the public sector, where an increasing number of special purpose 
bodies and private actors are enlisted to deal with specific policy problems (Andrew and 
Goldsmith, 1998: 104). 
In response to the idea that the traditional model of public governance is undergoing a 
change that is resulting in the dispersal of decision-making authority, this chapter 
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explores the extent to which authority has migrated beyond the boundaries of elected 
government at the provincial level in Canada. To do so, legislated instances of authority 
migration in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario 
between the years of 1946 and 2005 form the universe of cases. Two areas of inquiry are 
explored: the extent to which the aforementioned provinces have migrated decision-
making authority; and the degree to which period in time, political ideology and 
government fiscal capacity are able to explain variation in the likelihood of government 
migrating authority. 
4.1 Migration of Authority and Governance 
One dimension along which governance can vary is centralization of authority. Authority 
can be highly concentrated in a single hierarchical entity that claims exclusive 
jurisdiction or dispersed among various nodes, each exercising only limited jurisdiction 
(Kahler and Lake, 2004: 409). The dispersion of authority can then be thought of as 
occurring along both a vertical and horizontal axis. Along the vertical axis authority can 
be distributed to successively more local levels of government in which the more limited 
jurisdictions are nested within larger jurisdictions. Along the horizontal axis the authority 
can be dispersed to actors outside of government.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the dispersion of authority, both vertically and horizontally, is 
captured by Marks and Hooghe’s Type I and Type II models of multilevel governance. 
The analytical focus of multilevel governance is the increasingly contested jurisdictional 
and territorial boundaries both within and beyond the state, with the fundamental 
question being how to explain the dispersal of central government authority both 
vertically to actors at other territorial levels and horizontally to non-state actors (Bache 
and Flinders, 2005: 4). Marks and Hooghe provide two contrasting models for the 
dispersion of authority outward from the centre: Type I multilevel governance, which is 
concerned with power sharing among governments operating at different levels; and 
Type II multilevel governance, which denotes independent jurisdictions that fulfill 
specific functions. Focused on the vertical dispersion of authority, Type II bodies are 
defined as having intersecting memberships in the sense that borders will be crossed and 
jurisdictions may overlap; as being organized across a large number of levels in which 
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authority is not neatly layered but diverse in scale; and being flexible in design, allowing 
it to respond to changing citizen preferences and functional requirements (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2005: 20-21).  
While contrasting in structure, the applications of Type I and Type II multilevel 
governance are complementary with the selected model of multilevel governance being a 
function of the problem to be addressed (Marks and Hooghe 2005: 29). Furthermore, 
Type II multilevel governance structures can be embedded in legal frameworks 
determined by Type I jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe, 2003: 238, 2005: 24). The use of 
Type II multilevel governance as a tool of government where government delegates 
authority in response to a specific policy circumstance can be witnessed at the provincial 
level. While Type II multilevel governance may occur when private actors play a 
dominant role in the policy making process, causing public actors to adopt privately 
negotiated regimes (Marks and Hooghe, 2005: 25), it is a government’s use of Type II 
bodies to delegate authority outside the confines of elected government that is the focus 
of this chapter. 
The first objective is to place recent trends in the creation and termination of Type II 
bodies within a historical context. It has been argued that policy areas are becoming 
increasingly crowded, with government becoming just one of many actors involved in the 
governance process (Kennett, 2010: 20). If, as suggested, there has been an increased 
interest in governance partnerships between government and societal actors and an 
increase in the dispersal of political authority across multiple governance actors 
(Kooiman, 1993: 1, 35; Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104; Peters, 2004: 130; Flinders, 
2006: 224) an increase in both the rate and absolute number of Type II bodies should be 
witnessed across time. This leads to the chapter’s first two hypotheses, which are as 
follows: 
H4.1 – The absolute number of Type II bodies is increasing over time. 
H4.2 – The annual creation rate of Type II bodies is increasing over time. 
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Beyond the rate of creation, there is also the question of what factors promote the 
creation of Type II bodies by government. Two potential explanations are put forward in 
this chapter: first, the capacity of government to meet governance demands shapes the 
location of governance responsibilities; and, secondly, the ideological persuasion of the 
governing parties is a causal factor in the creation of Type II bodies. Both of these 
potential explanations are considered in greater detail. 
The argument that increased demands placed on government leads to increased migration 
of authority to Type II bodies is based upon the premise that the demands on the modern 
state outstrip the capacity of government. The growth in responsibilities demand a 
structural capacity that can only be filled with the widespread delegation that allows the 
state to address a wide range of policy issues, while not needing to be involved with the 
day-to-day socio-political interactions and in doing so simultaneously blurring the 
public/private distinction (Flinders, 2006: 223-224). The influence of capacity as a 
rationale for including new governance actors in the public realm can be seen in the 
argument put forward for the use of public-private partnerships that emerged in Canada 
in the mid-1990s. Changes to the governance structure were made with the intent of 
minimizing on-budget government expenditures and not increasing current levels of 
government debt (Vining and Boardman, 2008: 12). Kernagan, Marson, and Borins 
identified the pervasive influence of debt and deficit on public-service reform and 
government reform, which included privatization and the contracting out of public 
services (2005: 6). When the state is unable to fulfill the governance demands placed 
upon it, the capacity argument suggests that the lower the fiscal capacity of the state to 
fulfill its responsibilities (both new and existing) the greater the rate of creation of Type 
II bodies is likely to be. Accordingly the chapter’s third hypothesis accesses the effect of 
fiscal capacity on the rate of Type II body creation and is presented as follows: 
H4.3 - The lower the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher 
the rate of creation of Type II bodies.  
The argument for ideology influencing the extent to which authority is migrated outside 
of government is anchored in the idea that parties on the left tend to resort to more 
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government intervention and parties on the right are more likely to rely upon the market. 
Adam Harmes suggests that multilevel governance is characterized by the dispersal of 
power away from central government and can be viewed as part of a deliberate neoliberal 
political project with the goal of separating economic and political power. The effect of 
this separation of powers can be witnessed in the growing use of legal-juridical 
mechanisms to lock in neoliberal policies and insulate them from democratic influence 
(Harmes, 2006: 726-727). Similarly, the emergence of new public management in the 
1980s, with its promotion of the private sector and the delegation of authority as a 
remedy for the high taxes and deficits associated with the welfare state, has been 
characterized as a neoliberal approach (Hoehn, 2011: 77). As argued by McBride and 
Shields, the advancement of a neoliberal agenda, aimed at reducing the state and 
increasing reliance on market mechanisms, provides the ideological venue for shifting 
decision-making outside of politics and is eroding the power of the state (1997: 18). This 
suggests that the more closely aligned the government in power is with a neoliberal 
ideology the greater the rate of creation of Type II bodies, while governments on the left 
would be expected to resort less frequently to the use of Type II bodies in the governance 
process.  
While neoliberalism is a recent phenomenon, there are long-standing debates over size of 
government. Neoclassical liberals have long argued that government should be as small 
as possible and act as a night watchman whose only role is to protect the person and 
property of individuals, while welfare liberals have promoted a larger role for 
government, including the existence of state run institutions (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 77-
79). In comparison to both forms of liberalism, social democracy calls for a larger state 
and promotes the expansion of public ownership (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 44). Drawing 
upon both the recent and historic trends, it can be argued that differences in political 
ideology, specifically how the role of the state is viewed, may influence the rate at which 
Type II bodies are created. Specifically, governments aligned further to the left are 
expected to create fewer Type II bodies than governments aligned further to the right due 
to their belief in an expanded role for the state. Accordingly this leads to the chapter’s 
final hypothesis: 
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H4.4 – The further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a government sits the 
lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies. 
4.2 Data and Methodology 
To test each hypothesis the custom dataset described in full in Chapter 3 is used. The 
dataset includes the incidents of creation, termination, and modification of Type II bodies 
in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario between the 
years of 1946 and 2005. The reasons to use provincial data are threefold: provincial 
politics is relatively under-studied in comparison to the federal level, it allows for 
comparisons across provinces, and it allows for the creation of a larger sample size than 
the use of national level data alone would provide.  
The dataset includes records for Type II bodies created prior to 1946 and still in effect in 
1946, new Type II bodies created after 1946, and cases of Type II body termination since 
1946. For a Type II body to be included in the dataset three conditions must be satisfied: 
authority over some part of the public realm must be granted to the body through an act 
of legislation; the majority of decision-makers within the body must be comprised of 
individuals who are from outside of the government, legislature, or public service; and 
Type II body must have decision-making autonomy. For example, the Alberta’s Child 
and Family Services Authorities created under the Child and Family Services Authorities 
Act of 1996 are included within the dataset as they are created by legislation, the boards 
are comprised of non-government members, and they have the autonomy to make 
decisions for their region including: the planning and managing the provision of child and 
family services; the determining of priorities in the provision of child and family services 
and allocating resources accordingly; and working with other Authorities, the 
Government and other public and private bodies to co-ordinate the provision of child and 
family services.  
To test the effect of political ideology and government fiscal capacity on the creation of 
Type II bodies the annual creation rate of Type II bodies is used as the dependent 
variable. The annual creation rate is calculated by subtracting the number of terminated 
Type II bodies from the number of newly created Type II bodies in each calendar year.  
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The independent variables used as a proxy for government fiscal capacity are disposable 
income as an indicator of overall provincial economic health, and provincial debt as an 
indicator of government fiscal capacity. Both the provincial economic health and the 
government finances are included as they measure different financial aspects within the 
province. It is possible that provincial finances are structured in a way that limits capacity 
even during a booming economy. In assessing government finances, provincial debt is 
utilized as it is considered to be a key measure of the overall financial strength of 
government (Baker and Rennie, 2011: 359). Disposable income is used as an indicator of 
provincial economic performance. As the longest running macroeconomic time-series 
available for Canadian data (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2010: 171), disposable income is the 
only macroeconomic indicator that provides consistent time-series data from 1946 to 
2005. 
Both disposable income and provincial debt are measured using the percentage change 
per capita over the previous five years. A five-year period is used based on the rationale 
that a government is more likely to respond to a fiscal trend than smaller blips in the 
fiscal environment and that too long a time period runs the risk of smoothing out trends in 
the fiscal data that the government may have responded to. As discussed in Chapter 3, no 
continuous data source was available for government debt, and changes in how debt was 
calculated over time presented challenges in building a continuous time-series. To 
produce a single provincial debt variable two datasets from Statistics Canada were used, 
one containing records of public debt from 1933 to 1975 and a second containing records 
of public debt from 1971 to 2005. The changes in the method of debt calculation resulted 
in different debt values being reported for the same year. For each of the five years in 
which the two datasets overlapped the average of the two scores was used for the 
provincial debt value in order to smooth the transition from one dataset to the other. For 
both disposable income and provincial debt, the previous year’s fiscal data is used as 
governments can only react to what has previously happened.  
To test the effect of political ideology the percentage of seats held by a left-of-centre 
party is used as an independent variable. While a brokerage model has been traditionally 
applied to Canadian party politics, Cross and Young’s examination of party attitudes 
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suggest clear patterns of ideological differentiation between parties (2002: 859). Cross 
and Young conclude the Canadian party system manifests some characteristics of an 
ideological model (2002: 878). Content analysis of federal political party manifestos 
between 1945 and 2000 has demonstrated an ideological disagreement between parties at 
the federal level. The analysis places the NDP consistently to the left of both the Liberal 
and Progressive Conservative parties that alternate holding the position on the far right 
(Cochrane, 2010: 590-591). While organizational independence exists between the 
federal Liberal and Conservative parties and their provincial counterparts, the NDP 
remains a fully integrated organization with membership at the provincial level resulting 
in automatic membership in the federal party (Esselment, 2010: 871-872). Given the 
connection between the provincial and federal NDP parties, and the NDP’s consistent 
position to the left at the federal level, the percentage of seats held by the NDP or CCF 
party forms the percentage of seats held by left-of-centre parties. 
An alternative independent variable, a left-of-centre party forming the government, was 
considered, however, the absence of left-of-centre governments in Alberta and Nova 
Scotia facilitated the decision to use the number of seats held by left-of-centre parties as 
it allows for a consistent regression model across all datasets. Furthermore, it is expected 
that the greater the percentage of seats held by left-of-centre parties, the stronger the 
voice of the left will have in parliament and the greater the influence the left-of-centre 
will have on how the province is governed.  
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to test the effect of each independent 
variable on the rate of creation of Type II bodies. A Sequential modeling approach is 
used in which each independent variable is tested separately and then as part of a larger 
model. Sequential modeling was adopted so that the effect of each independent variable 
on the dependent variable, as expressed by the adjusted R2, could be observed 
independently. For each hypothesis the models are run for the entire dataset to identify 
overall trends and then for each province individually to identify differences between the 
provinces. Due to the skewing effect caused by Professional Self-Regulatory bodies 
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discussed in Chapter 35, when working with the aggregated provincial dataset the models 
will be run first for all Type II bodies, then for all Type II bodies excluding Professional 
Self-Regulatory bodies. When working at the individual province level, Professional 
Self-Regulatory bodies are omitted from the dataset.  
The regression models also contain a number of control variables. An election year 
dummy variable is included within all models to control for any effect an election may 
have on the rate of creation of Type II bodies. The election year dummy variable is coded 
with a 1 for years in which an election is held and 0 for all other years. Dummy variables 
are also created for each province to control for provincial differences. The provincial 
dummy variables are included in the model when the aggregate provincial dataset is 
evaluated. The Ontario dummy variable is omitted from the regression models, making 
Ontario the provincial variable against which all other provincial variables are compared.  
An additional control variable for neoliberalism is also included in the regression models. 
The neoliberalism dummy variable is used to denote the shift in policy paradigm from the 
Keynesian welfare state to a neoliberal political agenda. While as discussed above, there 
has been and remains an ideological difference between the left and right in regard to the 
role of the state, the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism is reflected in the policy 
platforms of parties on both sides of the political spectrum (Larner, 2000: 8-9). The 
neoliberalism dummy variable allows for the across party shift toward neoliberalism to be 
controlled for by denoting the years in which neoliberalism has been the more dominant 
policy paradigm. Neoliberalism existed prior to 1980; however, it was not until the 1980s 
that it became embedded (Bradford, 2000: 63-64). While the exact timing of the shift 
between paradigms, especially for each political party can be contested, the neoliberalism 
dummy variable is coded as a 1 for the years of 1980 through 2005 and 0 for the years 
1946 through 1979.  
                                                
5  Between 1990 and 2005 the number of Professional Self-Regulatory bodies increased rapidly as existing 
professional bodies, largely in healthcare, splintered into multiple new Type II bodies. The occurrences of 
such events cause spikes in the creation rate of Type II bodies, skewing the data. Testing the hypotheses 
with and without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies is done to control for such spikes. 
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While OLS regression is utilized in testing the effect of political ideology and 
government fiscal capacity, descriptive statistics are used to test the hypotheses that the 
rate and absolute number of Type II bodies is increasing over time. As with the 
regression analysis, the data is presented first for all forms of Type II bodies and then 
excluding Professional Self-Regulatory bodies. The cumulative number of Type II bodies 
is calculated by adding the annual creation rate to the previous years cumulative value. 
The baseline for the cumulative number of Type II bodies is the number of Type II bodies 
operating in and not terminated during the 1946 calendar year. 
4.3 Results: Annual Rate of Creation and Absolute Number 
of Type II Bodies 
The first of the four hypotheses to be evaluated is H4.1 – the absolute number of Type II 
bodies is increasing over time. Results are presented in Figure 4.1a through 4.1d, which 
containing all forms of Type II bodies, and Figure 4.2a through 4.2d in which 
Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are excluded.  
As depicted in Figure 4.1a through 4.1d the trend across provinces has been the gradual 
increase in the cumulative number of Type II bodies over the past sixty years. In Alberta, 
this trend began to reverse in the late 1980s, with the cumulative number of Type II 
bodies decreasing between 1990 and 2005. However, a corresponding shift, from an 
increasing to decreasing cumulative number of Type II bodies, is not evident in any of the 
other provinces. While the other provinces have sudden decreases in the cumulative 
number of Type II bodies during specific years – 2003 in British Columbia, 1999 in 
Ontario, and 2001 in Nova Scotia – all three provinces have since continued to add to the 
number of Type II bodies. 
Also evident in Figure 4.1a through 4.4d is a decline in the rate of accumulation of Type 
II bodies during the time period immediately prior to 2005. In Alberta, Nova Scotia and 
Ontario the leveling of the cumulative number of Type II bodies begins in approximately 
1988, while in British Columbia the trend begins a decade earlier in 1978. While the 
cumulative results show a decrease in the creation rate across all four provinces, the 
annual results indicate that in each of the four provinces new Type II bodies have 
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continued to be created throughout the entire duration of the period being studied. 
Overall, the results suggest a continuing increase in the number of Type II bodies 
supporting the hypothesis that the absolute number of Type II bodies is increasing over 
time. 
Figure 4.1: Type II Body Annual and Cumulative Creation Rate by Province 
Figure 4.1a     Figure 4.1b 
 
Figure 4.1c     Figure 4.1d 
 
When Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are omitted from the dataset the decline in the 
rate of accumulation of new Type II bodies becomes more prevalent. As shown in Figure 
4.2a through 4.2d, a more pronounced decrease in the slope of the line representing the 
cumulative number of Type II bodies is apparent when Professional Self-Regulatory 
bodies are removed from the dataset. In three of the four provinces the cumulative 
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number of Type II bodies ceases to increase after 1988 and then either decreases or 
remains at approximately the same level for the remainder of the period being studied. 
The exception is British Columbia, where the cumulative number of Type II bodies 
ceases to increase in 1978 and then remains relatively stable for the remaining 27 years 
included in the study.  
Figure 4.2: Type II Body (Excluding Professional Self-Regulatory) Annual and 
Cumulative Creation Rate by Province  
Figure 4.2a     Figure 4.2b 
 
Figure 4.2c     Figure 4.2d 
 
Consistent with the results for all forms of Type II bodies, Figure 4.2a through 4.2d show 
the continuous use of Type II body creation as a solution to policy requirements. Unlike 
when all forms of Type II bodies are analyzed, however, Figure 4.2a through 4.2d show 
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that when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are removed from the dataset a decrease in 
the rate of creation, as shown by the stabilization of the cumulative number of Type II 
bodies, exists. While some fluctuation is observed between years, in all four provinces, 
after an initial period of growth, the cumulative number of Type II bodies either 
decreases or stabilizes. When Professional Self-Regulatory Type II bodies are removed 
from the data set the results do not support the hypothesis that the absolute number of 
Type II bodies is increasing over time. 
The second hypothesis to be evaluated is H4.2 – the annual creation rate of Type II bodies 
is increasing over time. As depicted in Figure 4.1a through 4.1d, the annual rate of 
creation remains fairly consistent across the 60-year period. While both dips and spikes 
appear in the charts for each of the four provinces, there is no evidence of a trend toward 
an increasing rate of Type II body creation over time. This is consistent with the results 
for the absolute number of Type II bodies, which shows a gradual flattening of the slope, 
suggesting if anything a decrease in the annual rate of Type II body creation. As 
presented in Figure 4.2a through 4.2d, the results remain consistent when Professional 
Self-Regulatory bodies are removed from the data set. This suggests that no support 
exists for the hypothesis that the annual rate of creation of Type II bodies in increasing 
over time. 
What the above charts do show is that the use of Type II bodies is not new, in contrast 
there has been a history of Type II body use in public governance. Looking at the 60-year 
period between 1946 and 2005 the overall trend is toward a continuous increase in the 
cumulative number of all Type II bodies. The exception to this trend is the province of 
Alberta in which the cumulative number of Type II bodies decreases starting in the late 
1980s. When Professional Type II bodies are removed a decline is witnessed in both 
Alberta and Nova Scotia while the cumulative number of Type II bodies in British 
Columbia and Ontario become stable. Overall, when all forms of Type II bodies are 
included, the results support the hypotheses that the absolute number of Type II bodies is 
increasing with time, however, the results also show that the number of Professional Self-
Regulatory bodies has been increasing at a rate that compensates for the stabilization or 
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decrease in the number of other forms of Type II body. Moreover, the uniqueness of 
Alberta’s results means that caution must be taken when forming generalizations. 
4.4 Results: Aggregated Datasets - Creation Rate of Type II 
Bodies 
Two hypotheses are put forward regarding changes to the creation rate of Type II bodies: 
H4.3 - the lower the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher 
the rate of creation of Type II bodies; and H4.4 – the further to the left-of-centre on the 
political spectrum a government sits the lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies. 
Each hypothesis will be examined in turn starting with the aggregate dataset containing 
all provinces and all forms of Type II bodies, then with the aggregated provincial dataset 
without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies, and lastly with each of the four provincial 
datasets. 
The results of the regression analysis for each hypothesis against the dataset containing 
all provinces and all forms of Type II bodies are presented in Table 4.1. When looking at 
the effect of fiscal capacity on the annual rate of Type II body creation, two independent 
variables are tested. Provincial debt is used as it is considered to be a key measure of the 
overall financial strength of government (Baker and Rennie, 2011: 359). Disposable 
income, which captures funds available for individual and household consumption 
(OECD, 2003), is used as a macroeconomic indicator of provincial economic 
performance (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2010: 171). Based on the results in Table 4.1, Model 
1, an increase of one per cent in disposable income per capita over the previous five years 
produces an increase of 2.707 in the rate of Type II body creation, and is significant at the 
95% confidence level. The results, however, are not in the predicted direction, with the 
strengthening of the provincial economic health suggesting a higher level in the rate of 
creation of Type II bodies. When both disposable income and provincial debt are 
included in the regression model, as shown in Table 4.1, Model 3, the results for 
disposable income remain positive and are significant at the 99% confidence level. When 
all independent variables are included within the regression model (Model 5) the results 
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for disposable income again remain significant at the 99% level and in the positive 
direction. 
As shown in Table 4.1, Model 2, the provincial debt coefficient is positive as predicted, 
but does not produce significant results. When disposable income is included in the 
regression model as presented in Model 3, provincial debt remains positive but not 
significant. When all independent variables are included in the model the provincial debt 
coefficient again remains positive but not significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Taking into consideration the results for provincial debt and disposable income there is 
no support for the hypothesis that the lower the fiscal capacity of government the higher 
the rate of creation of Type II bodies. Instead, the results across all three models for 
disposable income are statistically significant in the opposite direction, suggesting that 
increased fiscal capacity is associated with a higher level of Type II body creation as 
opposed to the lower level that is predicted. 
When looking at the effect of political ideology on the annual rate of Type II body 
creation, the results for percentage of seats won by left-of-centre parties are not in the 
expected direction. As shown in Table 4.1, Model 4, when all provinces and forms of 
Type II bodies are included in the dataset the changes in the number of left-of-centre 
seats produces significant results. As displayed in Model 4, a one per cent increase in the 
number of seats held by a left-of-centre party produces an increase of 0.024 in the rate of 
type II body creation, with the results significant at the 95% confidence level. When all 
independent variables are included in the regression model (Model 5) the results indicate 
that an increase of one per cent in the number of seats held by a left-of-centre party 
produces a 0.025 increase in the annual rate of creation, with the results remaining 
significant at the 95% confidence level. While a lower level in the annual rate of creation 
of Type II bodies was expected the results indicate a higher level, suggesting that the 
hypothesis be rejected. 
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Table 4.1: Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Dataset includes AB, BC, NS and ON) 
 Model 16 Model 2 Model 37 Model 4 Model 5 
Disposable 
Income 2.707(1.057)**  2.925(1.066)***  2.966(1.056)*** 
Provincial 
Debt  0.222(0.211) 0.303(0.209)  0.298(0.208) 
Left Seats    0.024(0.0102)** 0.025(0.011)** 
Neoliberalism -0.626(0.260)** -0.853(0.244)*** -0.552(0.264)** -1.087(0.254)*** -0.746(0.275)*** 
Election Year -0.466(0.267)* -0.521(0.269)* -0.472(0.266)* -0.528(0.267)** -0.485(0.264)* 
Alberta -0.532(0.336) -0.481(0.341) -0.605(0.339)* -0.120(0.363) -0.288(0.363) 
British 
Columbia -0.465(0.334) -0.493(0.339) -0.489(0.334) -0.885(0.381)** -0.904(0.376)** 
Nova Scotia -0.522(0.338) -0.397(0.338) -0.552(0.338) -0.154(0.350) -0.321(0.350) 
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.0815 0.110 0.0968 0.101 
Number of 
Cases 240 240 240 240 240 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
Ontario is the category for comparison for province variables. 
As shown in Table 4.1, Model 5, neoliberalism, election year, and British Columbia also 
produce significant results. The results indicate that the time period in which 
neoliberalism is the dominant paradigm (1980-2005) is associated with a decrease of 
0.746 in the annual rate of creation. The results for neoliberalism are consistent across all 
models at the 95% confidence level or higher. The results indicate that election years are 
associated with a decrease of 0.488 in the annual creation rate and are consistent across 
all models at the 90% confidence level or higher. The results for British Columbia 
suggests a decrease of 0.929 in the annual rate of Type II body creation in comparison to 
Ontario, however, the results are only significant when the percentage of seats held by 
left-of-centre governments is included in the model. 
                                                
6  Change in provincial disposable income was also tested at 4 [3.864(1.285) ***] and 6 [2.882(0.883) ***] 
years to ensure that the 5-year results were not anomalous. 
7  Provincial Annual Surplus and Debt was included in previous models. The variable was removed as it 
was found to not be a significant predictor of the rate of creation of Type II bodies and due to a gap in the 
available data resulted in the dropping of 15% of the available cases. 
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Overall, the results suggest that both hypotheses be rejected. The results presented in 
Table 4.1 provide no support for the hypothesis suggesting that governing parties on the 
ideological left creates fewer Type II bodies. There is also no support for the hypothesis 
that government would turn to the creation of Type II bodies to meet new of governance 
demands when confronted with diminished fiscal capacity. Moreover, the results for 
disposable income, which was significant at the 99% confidence level when all 
independent variables were included in the regression model, suggests a strengthening of 
overall provincial economic performance is associated with a higher level in the creation 
rate of Type II bodies.  
The results of the regression analysis for each hypothesis against the dataset containing 
all provinces when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are excluded are presented in 
Table 4.2. When testing the effect of fiscal capacity on the creation rate of Type II bodies 
both disposable income and provincial debt are again evaluated. When evaluating the 
effect of disposable income, as shown in Table 4.2, Model 1, a one per cent increase in 
disposable income per capita over the previous five years produces an increase of 2.906 
in the annual rate of Type II body creation and is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
As shown in Model 3, when provincial debt is added to the regression model the results 
for disposable income remain in the positive direction and are significant at the 99% 
level. When all independent variables are included in the regression model the results 
again remain unchanged. As presented in Model 5, a one per cent increase in disposable 
income per capita over the previous five years produces a higher level in the annual rate 
of Type II body creation, with a positive coefficient of 3.18. The results are significant at 
the 99% confidence level. 
When testing the effect of provincial debt, as shown in Table 4.2, Model 2, the results 
failed to produce significant results, however, when disposable income was added to the 
regression model a one per cent increase in provincial debt was associated with an 
increase of 0.365 in the annual rate of Type II body creation. The results are significant at 
the 95% confidence level and are in the expected direction. As shown in Model 5, when 
all independent variables are included in the regression model, the coefficient for 
provincial debt remains positive and significant at the 95% confidence level. Taking the 
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results for both disposable income and provincial debt into account there is mixed 
support for the hypothesis that the lower the fiscal capacity of government the higher the 
rate of creation of Type II bodies. An increase in provincial debt indicates weakened 
fiscal capacity, and is associated with a higher level of annual creation rate of Type II 
bodies, however an increase in disposable income indicates a strengthening of the 
provincial fiscal environment, but is also associated with a higher level in the annual 
Type II body creation rate. 
Table 4.2: Annual Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Data Includes AB, BC, NS and 
ON – Excluding Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies) 
 Model 18 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Disposable 
Income 2.906(0.926)***  3.168(0.929)***   3.180(0.930)*** 
Provincial 
Debt  0.276(0.185) 0.365(0.183)**  0.363(0.183)** 
Left Seats    0.007(0.010) 0.007(0.009) 
Neoliberalism -0.799(0.228)*** -1.037(0.215)*** -0.710(0.231)*** -1.140(0.226)*** -0.767(0.242)*** 
Election Year -0.283(0.233) -0.343(0.237) -0.290(0.232) -0.338(0.237) -0.294(0.232) 
Alberta -0.573(0.294)* -0.526(0.300)* -0.660(0.296)** -0.379(0.323) -0.568(0.320)* 
British 
Columbia -0.450(0.293) -0.484(0.298) -0.480(0.291) -0.577(0.312)* -0.600(0.331)* 
Nova Scotia -0.516(0.296)* -0.383(0.287) -0.551(0.295)* -0.302(0.312) -0.484(0.308) 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.103 0.142 0.096 0.141 
Number of 
Cases 240 240 240 240 240 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance. 
Ontario is the category for comparison for province variables. 
In evaluating the effect of political ideology on the annual rate of Type II body creation, 
no significant results are produced when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are 
removed from the dataset. As shown in Models 4 and 5, the results remain consistent 
when all independent variables are included in the regression model. 
                                                
8  As with Model 4.1 the results for change in provincial disposable income was tested at 4 [4.138(1.122) 
***] and 6 [2.955(0.772) ***] years to ensure that the 5-year results were not anomalous. 
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While not related to specific hypotheses, the results for neoliberalism and British 
Columbia again produce significant results. As shown in Table 4.2, Model 5, the results 
for neoliberalism suggest a decrease of 0.767 in the annual creation for years in which 
neoliberalism was the dominant paradigm. When all variables are included in the 
regression model, the results for British Columbia suggests a decrease of 0.6 in the 
annual rate of Type II body creation in comparison to Ontario. For British Columbia, the 
results are again only significant when the percentage of seats held by a left-of-centre 
party is included in the regression model. Unlike the results presented in Table 4.1, 
election year produced no significant results.  
In addition, two new variables produced significant results when Professional Self-
Regulatory bodies were excluded from the dataset. When evaluating provincial fiscal 
capacity, Nova Scotia produced significant results when disposable income was included 
in the dataset, suggesting a lower level in the number of Type II bodies created annually 
in comparison to Ontario. However, the results failed to remain significant when all 
independent variables were included in the model. As shown in Model 5, the results for 
Alberta suggest a decrease 0.568 in the annual rate of creation in comparison to Ontario 
and the results are significant at the 90% confidence level. The results for Alberta are 
significant across models 1 through 3, however, are not significant in Model 4, which 
evaluates the effect of political ideology.  
Overall, when Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies are removed from the dataset the 
results remain largely consistent with those of the entire dataset. No support is found for 
the hypothesis that governments further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum 
create fewer Type II bodies. There is mixed support, however, for the hypothesis that the 
more limited the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demands the higher 
the annual rate of Type II body creation. As expected the results suggest that an increase 
in provincial debt, which indicates a decrease in government fiscal capacity, is associated 
with a higher level in the annual rate of Type II bodies created. Unexpectedly, however, 
an increase in disposable income, which indicates an overall strengthening of the 
provincial economic health, is also associated with a higher level in the annual rate of 
creation of Type II bodies. 
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4.5 Results: Provincial Datasets - Creation Rate of Type II 
Bodies 
Having tested the hypotheses against the aggregate dataset the next step is to test at the 
individual province level. For all provincial datasets, Professional Self-Regulatory bodies 
have been removed so that results are not skewed by the sudden increase in the number of 
Professional Self-Regulatory bodies as discussed in Chapter 3. The results for each 
hypothesis by province are presented in Tables 4.3 through 4.7. 
When looking at the effect of government fiscal capacity on the annual creation rate of 
Type II bodies at the individual province level, the results are varied. For Alberta, as 
shown in Table 4.3, Model 1 disposable income fails to produce significant results, 
however, as shown in Model 2, provincial debt produce statistically significant results in 
the positive direction as predicted. When both disposable income and provincial debt are 
included in the regression equation as, shown in Model 3, the results for disposable 
income and provincial debt remained consistent. When all independent variables are 
included in the regression model the results again remained unchanged. The results in 
Model 5 suggest a 0.438 increase in the annual creation rate for each one per cent 
increase in provincial debt per capita over the past five years and are significant at the 
95% confidence interval. 
In the case of British Columbia (Table 4.4), neither disposable income nor provincial 
debt produced statistically significant results. In the case of Nova Scotia (Table 4.5) and 
Ontario (Table 4.6) disposable income produces significant results in the positive 
direction, while the results for provincial debt were not significant. When all independent 
variables are included in the regression model, a one per cent increase in disposable 
income over the past five years was associated with a 3.624 increase in the annual 
creation rate in Nova Scotia and an increase of 6.754 in Ontario. The results for both 
Nova Scotia and Ontario are significant at the 95% confidence level, but not in the 
expected direction. Neither the results for Nova Scotia nor Ontario provide support for 
the hypothesis that weaker government fiscal capacity increases the annual rate of Type 
II body creation. 
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Table 4.3: Alberta – Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Excluding Professional Self-
Regulatory) 
 Model 1 Model 29 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Disposable 
Income 1.224(1.463)  1.648(1.441)   2.073(1.443) 
Provincial 
Debt  0.375(0.204)* 0.409(0.205)*  0.438(0.203)** 
Left Seats    0.052(0.041) 0.067(0.040) 
Neoliberalism -0.955(0.454)** -0.910(0.424)** -0.700(0.461) -1.358(0.466)*** -0.971(0.483)** 
Election Year -0.252(0.471) -0.313(0.461) -0.299(0.460) -0.284(0.468) -0.320(0.454) 
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.118 0.123 0.090 0.149 
Number of 
Cases 60
10
 60 60 60 60 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
 
Table 4.4: BC – Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Excluding Professional Self-
Regulatory) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Disposable 
Income 3.683(2.438)  3.764(2.914)   3.229(2.785) 
Provincial 
Debt  -0.435(0.577) 0.035(0.679)  -0.110(0.650) 
Left Seats    0.033(0.127)** 0.033(0.013)** 
Neoliberalism -0.857(0.526) -1.331(0.436)*** -0.846(0.573) -0.902(0.455)*** -1.254(0.570)** 
Election Year -0.755(0.479) -0.872(0.480)* -0.753(0.485) -0.902(0.455)* -0.793(0.463)* 
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.133 0.1143 0.218 0.222 
Number of 
Cases 60 60 60 60 60 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).  
                                                
9  Consistent with evaluating the robustness of disposable income in the aggregated dataset, the per cent 
change in provincial debt per capita over the past 4 [0.429(0.249) *] and 6 [0.163(0.178)] years were tested. 
Unlike the disposable income results, which were robust over both longer and shorter timeframes, results 
for Alberta’s provincial debt were consistent only for the 4-year timeframe, suggesting less robust results. 
10 The number of cases (60) is consistent across all provinces, as the dataset contains one record per year 
per province. See Chapter 3 for details.  
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Table 4.5: Nova Scotia – Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Excluding Professional 
Self-Regulatory) 
 Model 111 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Disposable 
Income 3.624(1.472)**  3.513(1.484)**   3.398(0.420)** 
Provincial 
Debt  0.744(0.740) 0.591(0.714)  0.361(0.716) 
Left Seats    -0.054(0.029)* -0.047(0.028)* 
Neoliberalism -0.504(0.379) -0.599(0.395) -0.453(0.385) -0.229(0.445) -0.097(0.434) 
Election Year 0.847(0.422)** 0.701(0.436) 0.841(0.423)* 0.808(0.430)* 0.929(0.420)** 
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.056 0.128 0.098 0.156 
Number of 
Cases 60 60 60 60 60 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
 
Table 4.6: Ontario – Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Excluding Professional Self-
Regulatory) 
 Model 112 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Disposable 
Income 6.754(3.016)**  6.829(3.075)**   7.230(3.021)** 
Provincial 
Debt  -0.164(1.094) 0.179(1.068)  0.430(1.056) 
Left Seats    -0.028(0.017) -0.031(0.017)* 
Neoliberalism -0.584(0.539) -1.320(0.457)*** -0.563(0.558) -1.062(0.467)** -0.229(0.577) 
Election Year -0.974(0.485)** -0.900(0.505)* -0.977(0.489)* -0.913(0.494)* -0.995(0.479)** 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.123 0.186 0.166 0.218 
Number of 
Cases 60 60 60 60 60 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
  
                                                
11 Change in disposable income in Nova Scotia was tested at 4 [4.849(1.777) ***] and 6 [3.444(1.205) 
***] years to ensure that the 5-year results were not anomalous. 
12 Change in disposable income in Ontario was tested at 4 [7.609(3.599) **] and 6 [6.754(3.016) **] years 
to ensure that the 5-year results were not anomalous. 
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Overall, the results for the individual provinces provide mixed support for H4.3. 
Supporting the hypothesis, the results for Alberta indicate that an increase in provincial 
debt is associated with a higher level in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies. When 
looking at the results for the other three provinces, none provide support for the 
hypothesis. In all three cases, provincial debt does not produce significant results, and the 
results for disposable income are in the opposite direction than predicted. In the cases of 
Nova Scotia and Ontario, the results for disposable income are significant at the 95% 
confidence level, and suggest that an increase in government fiscal capacity is associated 
with a higher level in the annual rate of Type II body creation. 
When the effect of political ideology is explored at the individual province level, the 
percentage of seats held by left-of-centre government produces significant but conflicting 
results. For British Columbia (Table 4, Model 4) a one per cent increase in the number of 
seats held by left-of-centre parties indicates a 0.033 increase in the annual rate of Type II 
body creation and is significant at the 95% confidence level. When all independent 
variables are included in the regression model, the results remain consistent..  
In contrast, the results for Nova Scotia and Ontario indicate a negative relationship 
between the percentage of seats held by left-of-centre parties and the annual creation rate 
of Type II bodies. When all independent variables are included in the regression model 
the results for Nova Scotia (Table 4.5, Model 5) suggest that a one per cent increase in 
the amount of seats held by a left-of-centre party suggested a decrease of 0.097 in the 
annual Type II body creation rate. The results for Ontario (Table 4.6, Model 5) suggested 
a decrease of 0.031 in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies for each one per cent 
increase in the seats held by left-of-centre parties. For both relationships the results were 
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.  
In Alberta (Table 4.3) the number of seats held by a left-of-centre party does not produce 
significant results. When considering the results for all four provinces, support for the 
hypothesis that the greater the number of seats held by left-of-centre parties the lower the 
annual creation rate of Type II bodies is inconsistent. The results for British Columbia are 
in the opposite direction than expected, suggesting a higher level in the annual rate of 
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Type II body creation when there are greater numbers of elected representatives from 
left-of-centre parties. In contrast, the results for Nova Scotia and Ontario are in the 
expected direction and support hypothesis H4.4.  
The neoliberalism and election year variables also produce statistically significant results, 
but not consistently across all four provinces. When all independent variables are 
included in the regression model (Model 5) neoliberalism produces statistically 
significant results at the 95% confidence level for the provinces of Alberta and British 
Columbia. For both Alberta and British Columbia the results are in the negative direction 
suggesting a lower level in the annual rate of Type II body creation for years in which 
neoliberalism is the dominant paradigm. The result for election year is significant in all 
provinces with the exception of Alberta. In British Columbia and Ontario the results 
suggest a negative relationship with fewer Type II bodies being created during an 
election year. However, the results for Nova Scotia are in the opposite direction, 
suggesting a higher level in the annual number of Type II bodies created during an 
election year. 
4.6 Results Summary 
A summary of whether support was found for either hypothesis is presented by dataset in 
Table 4.7. When the results for each of the provincial datasets and the aggregate dataset 
are taken into account, as shown in Table 4.7, partial support exists for H4.3 - the lower 
the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher the rate of 
creation of Type II bodies. Support for H4.3 is found in the results for provincial debt in 
Alberta and the aggregate dataset when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are 
excluded. However, the results for disposable income suggest that the hypothesis be 
rejected. The results for disposable income are consistently in the opposite direction than 
expected, with an increase in disposable income suggesting a higher level in the annual 
rate of Type II bodies created. The results for H4.4 – the further to the left-of-centre on 
the political spectrum a government sits the lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies, 
are again contradictory. Support for H4.4 is again centered in the provinces of Ontario 
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and Nova Scotia, however, results for the province of British Columbia are significant 
and in the opposite direction.  
Table 4.7: Annual Creation Rate - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset 
 H4.3 – Fiscal Capacity H4.4 – Ideology 
 Disposable Income Provincial Debt % Left Seats 
All Provinces No Support No Support No Support 
All Provinces – 
Excluding Self-
Regulatory 
No Support Support No Support 
Alberta No Support Support No Support 
British Columbia No Support No Support No Support 
Nova Scotia No Support No Support Support 
Ontario No Support No Support Support 
 
4.7 The Creation of Type II bodies: Time and Governing 
Paradigm  
While the results reject the hypotheses that the annual creation rate of Type II bodies is 
increasing over time, the pattern of Type II body creation over the 60 year period 
warrants discussion. In looking at the annual rate of creation of Type II bodies, as shown 
in Figure 4.1a to 4.1d, the trend that emerges is three decades of increase followed by a 
shift toward stabilization or decline. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4.2a to 4.2d, the 
trend becomes more pronounced when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are removed. 
As supported by the regression results for neoliberalism, this pattern is not dissimilar to 
the time periods associated with the rise of the Keynesian welfare state and the following 
period of neoliberalism. The time period directly following World War II, 1946 to the 
early 1970s, has been characterized as a period of steady economic growth and 
Keynesianism. During this time the state was involved in both society and economy with 
the aim of building a comprehensive welfare state (Burke, Mooers and Shields, 2000: 11- 
13). In contrast, the neoliberal period that followed was characterized by the aim to create 
a lean state and policy goals became those of shrinking social welfare expenditures and 
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reducing state regulation (Burke, Mooers and Shields, 2000: 11- 13). Neil Bradford 
identifies three distinct time periods and two governing paradigms in Canada after World 
War II: first a period of technocratic Keynesianism as the governing paradigm which 
lasted from the 1940s through to the end of the 1960s; second, a period of interlude 
between governing paradigms which lasted through the 1970s; and third the arrival of 
neoliberalism as the governing paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s (2000). Bradford 
describes technocratic Keynesianism as bureaucratic with its influence dependent upon 
administrative leadership in renovating the bureaucracy’s analytic capacity. The result 
was the recruitment of new technical and statistical expertise that produced a statist 
advisory setting that provided ‘neutral’ experts with the opportunities to perform a range 
of public policy functions. Neoliberalism, in contrast to being bureaucratic, was formed 
on the idea of substituting the market for the state. Under the neoliberal paradigm, not 
only bureaucrats, but politicians and other organized interests must all be disciplined by 
the market and market rules replaced policy discretion (Bradford, 2000: 57-65). 
The parallels between the timing of Bradford’s shifts in governing paradigm and the time 
of the changes in annual rate of creation are intriguing. It may be that the changes in the 
rate of creation of Type II bodies witnessed over time is a shift in the balance between 
state as regulator and market as regulator or as labelled by Bradford, the shift in paradigm 
from technocratic Keynesianism to neoliberalism. While the state will continue to be 
active in a regulatory function, changes to the dominant governing paradigm can alter the 
balance between the desired levels of state and market as regulators. The economic 
turmoil of the 1970s facilitated the emergence of a new governing paradigm in Canada in 
the 1980s, a paradigm that placed market rules at the forefront (Bradford, 2000: 63-65). 
The neoliberal paradigm sought to downsize the state and liberate market forces from the 
state’s regulatory constraints (McBride and Shields, 1997: 101). With the new governing 
paradigm focused on the minimization of state involvement during the 1980s and 1990s, 
it could be argued that the results above demonstrate a weakening of the willingness of 
the state to take on new responsibility, whether as part of the machinery of government or 
through delegation. The result may be a decrease in the legal delegation of authority to 
existing or newly created Type II bodies as market mechanisms are looked towards to 
produce regulatory constraints. 
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4.8 Creation of Type II Bodies: The Role of Ideology 
Beyond the possible effect of governing paradigm, the question remains as to what the 
impact of political ideology is on the annual creation rate of Type II bodies. When using 
the percentage of left-of-centre elected representatives to evaluate the effect of ideology, 
the results for Nova Scotia and Ontario support hypothesis H4.4, however, results of the 
aggregated and the Alberta and British Columbia datasets do not. Given the conflicting 
results, one possibility is that a change in the percentage of seats held by parties to the 
left-of-centre may not make a significant difference to the policies of government unless 
the percentage change makes the difference between whether a left-of-centre party forms 
the government or not.  
Instead of testing the percentage of seats held by left-of-centre parties, it may be more 
appropriate to test the effect of electing a left-of-centre government on annual Type II 
body creation rates. The cases evaluated will be limited to British Columbia and Ontario 
as they were the only provinces to elect left-of-centre governments during the period 
being studied. Using regression analysis, the results for the effect of a left-of-centre 
government being in power on the annual rate of Type II body creation for both Ontario 
and British Columbia are presented in Table 4.8. As Table 4.8 shows, the results for a 
left-of-centre government is different than the results for the percentage of elected 
members from left-of-centre parties. As shown in Table 4.8 a left-of-centre government 
in British Columbia suggests an increase of 1.026 in the annual rate of Type II body 
creation. The results are significant at the 90% confidence level and are in the positive 
direction. While the results for British Columbia are in the opposite direction than 
expected, the results for Ontario are not significant.13  
 
                                                
13 In addition to evaluating the effect of a left-of-centre party forming the government both percentage of 
votes for a party and the effect of a left-of-centre party forming the loyal opposition in both a majority and 
minority government were tested. None provided support for the hypothesis. 
  
103 
Table 4.8: Effect of Political Ideology on Annual Creation Rate – Percentage of Left-
of-centre Seats vs. Left-of-centre Government 
 British Columbia Ontario 
 Left Government Left Seats Left Government Left Seats 
Disposable Income  3.760(2.852)  3.229(2.785)  6.356(3.078)**  7.230(3.021)** 
Provincial Debt -0.055(0.666) -0.110(0.650) 0.217(1.062) 0.430(1.056) 
Ideology 1.026(0.557)* 0.033(0.013)** -1.188(0.924) -0.031(0.017)* 
Neoliberalism -1.106(0.579)* -1.254(0.570)** -0.428(0.564) -0.229(0.577) 
Election Year -0.663(0.478) -0.793(0.463)* -1.081(0.493)** -0.995(0.479)** 
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.222 0.195 0.218 
Number of Cases 60 60 60 60 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
Overall, the results for the effect of ideology on the rate of Type II body creation provide 
little support H4.4. The results for the number of seats held by a party to the left-of-centre 
are inconsistent, while the results for the presence of a left-of-centre government suggest 
the hypothesis by rejected. Moreover, in both British Columbia (Figure 4.1b) and Ontario 
(Figure 4.1d), NDP governments were responsible for the highest annual rates of 
increase.  
Adding to the debate over the role of ideology in Type II body creation is Neil Bradford’s 
account of governance paradigm shift in Ontario during the 1990s. Bradford argues that 
both the NDP and Progressive Conservatives embraced public-private partnerships in the 
face of policy challenges; however, they did so in different ways (Bradford, 2003: 1006). 
According to Bradford, the NDP introduced a social partnership approach which saw 
substantial policy discretion devolved to new multipartite bodies which operated at arm’s 
length of government (Bradford, 2003: 1010). Given the observed readiness of the NDP 
government in Ontario to shift governance outside of the traditional realm of government, 
having the regression results for the percentage of seats held by a left-of-centre party 
show a lower level in the annual rate of Type II body creation is surprising. Together the 
results indicate that in the face of fiscal challenges, the Ontario NDP acknowledged the 
benefits of public-private partnerships. However, the NPD’s usage of Type II bodies as a 
policy tool remained lower in comparison to other governments. This shows that 
  104 
regardless of the ideology of the governing party, they are still subject to the climate in 
which they govern. However, within that climate, ideological differences between parties 
can still result in differences in policy outcomes.. 
4.9 The Creation of Type II Bodies: Government Fiscal 
Capacity  
As with political ideology, the effect of fiscal capacity on the annual creation rate of Type 
II bodies is inconsistent. The regression results for Alberta and the aggregated dataset 
excluding Professional Self-Regulatory Type II bodies suggests an increase in provincial 
debt is associated with a higher level in the annual rate of Type II body creation. The 
results for Nova Scotia, Ontario and the aggregate provincial datasets, however, show 
that an increase in disposable income is associated with a higher level in the annual 
creation rate of Type II bodies, which is in the opposite direction to the hypothesized 
relationship. The conflicting results bring the exact nature of the relationship into 
question.  
The results for Alberta indicate that changes in the amount of provincial debt per capita 
have a significant effect on the number of Type II bodies created annually, with an 
increase in debt predicting a higher level in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies. 
This relationship is in the expected direction, as increasing provincial debt represents a 
weakening of government fiscal capacity. No support is evident, however, when 
evaluating the other three provincial datasets. The difference in the results may be 
attributed to Alberta being the only province in the dataset to have undergone a sustained 
period of debt reduction. Figure 4.3a through 4.3d presents provincial debt and 
disposable income per capita in 2005 dollars for the years of 1946 through 2005 for each 
of the four provinces. As depicted in Figure 4.3a through 4.3d, while each province 
experienced periods of debt reduction, Alberta is the only province of the four to have 
undergone sustained reduction in provincial debt. Beginning in 1990 Alberta experienced 
a sustained decreased in provincial debt per capita, which continued throughout the 
duration of the study. With Alberta being the only province to undergo a sustained period 
of debt reduction the results indicate that a reduction in provincial debt leads to a lower 
  
105 
level in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies in Alberta, however, they are not 
generalizable.  
Figure 4.3: Per Capita Disposable Income and Provincial Debt by Province  
Figure 4.3a     Figure 4.3b 
 
Figure 4.3c     Figure 4.3d 
 
While the decrease in provincial debt was unique to Alberta, the evaluation of disposable 
income produced more consistent results. The results from both aggregate datasets 
suggest that an increase in the level of disposable income produce a higher level in the 
annual creation rate of Type II bodies. Further support, while not as strong, for the 
existence of a positive relationship between disposable income and annual creation rate is 
evident at the province level, with the results for Nova Scotia and Ontario producing 
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statistically significant results. The relationship between disposable income and annual 
creation rate, however, is not in the expected direction. While the regression analysis 
suggests an increase in disposable income results in a higher level in the annual creation 
of Type II bodies, it was expected that an increased level of disposable income would 
result in a lower level of Type II bodies. One possible explanation for the unexpected 
result is that changes in personal disposable income, as the amount left over after 
payment of personal direct taxes, is capturing both changes in provincial economic 
conditions and changes in taxation strategies of government. What we may be observing 
is reductions in taxation levels that contribute to an increase in disposable income and a 
decrease in government capacity. 
If change in personal disposable income is capturing both changes in provincial economic 
conditions and changes in taxation strategies of government in which government is 
reducing taxation, a negative relationship can be predicted between disposable income 
and government revenue. What would be expected is an increase in disposable income 
resulting in a decrease in government revenue. The effect of disposable income on 
government revenue can be tested using ordinary least squares regression, with 
disposable income per capita and government revenue as the independent and dependent 
variables. With the exception of an eight-year gap in government revenue across all 
provinces, data for disposable income and provincial government revenue are available 
from Statistics Canada for the years 1946 to 2005. The results for the effect of personal 
disposable income on government revenue per capita are presented in Table 4.9. 
According to the results in Table 4.9, when looking at the relationship between 
disposable income and government revenue across all four provinces, disposable income 
is significant at the 99% level and indicates that a one-dollar increase in disposable 
income per capita results in a 40-cent increase in government revenue per capital. When 
province is controlled for, as shown in Model 2, the results remain consistent. 
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Table 4.9: Disposable Income as a Predictor of Change in Government Revenue 
(1946-2005) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Disposable Income 0.395(0.013)*** 0.406(0.0128)*** 
AB  1079.517(233.935)*** 
BC  623.462(233.750)** 
NC  1330.575(236.147)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.8006 0.8286 
Number of Cases 208 208 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
Ontario is omitted from the regression model. 
With an increase in disposable income resulting in a higher level in government revenue, 
the scenario where an increase in disposable income is weakening the government’s 
fiscal capacity is unfounded. Based on the findings above, an increase in disposable 
income results in a higher level of annual creation rate of Type II bodies as well as a 
higher level of government revenue. This would confirm that the relationship between 
disposable income and the annual creation rate of Type II bodies is in the opposite 
direction to that expected in H4.3. An increase in the fiscal capacity of government, as 
indicated by the correlation between disposable income and government revenue, results 
in an increase in the annual rate of Type II body creation.  
A plausible explanation for government capacity being positively associated with the 
annual rate of Type II body creation is the role of government in funding both public and 
private actors engaged in welfare provision and regulatory responsibility. Gregg Olseen 
points out that while public and private forms of welfare provision can be distinguished, 
states continue to play an important role in private provision. Private actors may be 
funded through tax revenues by the state or be the beneficiaries of tax incentives and 
disincentives aimed either at encouraging the contributions of others to the organization 
or lessening the financial costs to the organization (Olseen, 2002: 25-26). Furthermore, 
Olseen identifies a quasi-market form of welfare provision where governments provide 
the funding and private actors deliver the service, which is evident in the Canadian health 
insurance system where medical practitioners are private providers, but their services are 
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paid for by the state (Olseen, 2002: 26). As governments contribute either partially or 
fully to the financial operation of Type II bodies operating in the public realm it is 
reasonable that decreases in fiscal capacity reduce the rate at which government creates 
or enlists new actors in the act of public governance. During periods of economic 
downturn it may be more efficient for government to add new responsibilities to the 
portfolio of existing actors already operating in the governance field.  
The regression results for neoliberalism support the idea that government, when faced 
with fiscal challenges, is unlikely to create or enlist new actors in the act of public 
governance. While the neoliberal approach to public management has been characterized 
as the promotion of the private sector and the delegation of authority as a remedy for the 
high taxes and deficits associated with the welfare state (Hoehn, 2011: 77), the results 
suggest that neoliberalism is associated with a decrease in the legislative delegation of 
decision-making authority to Type II bodies. When the overall number of new Type II 
bodies is considered, the results in Figure 4.1a through 4.1d show a flattening of the slope 
and in the case of Alberta a decrease in the number of Type II bodies beginning during 
what Bradford describes as the period of interlude between Keynesianism and 
neoliberalism that lasted through the 1970s (Bradford, 2000: 63). As shown in Table 4.1, 
the results for the neoliberal time period are negative and significant when compared with 
the Keynesian time period. 
Taking into account the descriptive statistics and the regression analysis, the results 
suggest that a reduction in the number of Type II bodies created began in the 1970s, with 
reductions in the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia beginning earlier than in 
Alberta or Nova Scotia. With the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant policy 
paradigm in the 1980s, a statistically significant decrease in the rate of authority 
migration to Type II bodies is observed in comparison to 1946 to 1979 period of 
Keynesianism. While the enlisting of the private sector may have been promoted as a 
remedy of public debt, the results indicate that the neoliberal period was not one of 
increased migration of decision-making authority by the state. Instead, what we may be 
witnessing in the face of increasing governance demands is the entrenchment of state 
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authority where the state feels it is most necessary, and the willingness of government to 
leave to market mechanisms that which the state feels the market can best regulate. 
4.10 Election Year and Type II Body Creation 
In addition to the variables used to test the specified hypotheses, the election year dummy 
variable produced statistically significant results when all independent variables were 
included in the regression model for four of the six datasets. The results at the aggregate 
level produced statistically significant results in the negative direction when all Type II 
bodies were included in the dataset. At the provincial level, the British Columbia and 
Ontario cases also produced statistically significant results in the negative direction, 
while Nova Scotia produced statistically significant results in the positive direction. 
The results for election year in the case of Nova Scotia are not unexpected, as Francesco 
Lagona and Fabio Padovano have argued that legislators attempt to maximize their 
probability of being re-elected by concentrating the passing of laws directly before the 
elections and engaging in other activities the remainder of the time (Lagona and 
Padovano, 2008:202). It was unexpected, however, to find statistically significant results 
in the negative direction. An explanation for these finding may be the existence of a 
period of time both before and after an election when no legislation is passed. In this 
scenario, even if there is a spike in the volume of passed legislation in the last months 
before the closing of a legislature (Lagona and Padovano, 2008: 214), the ensuing 
campaign period and time required to get the new legislature up and working results in an 
extended period of time during which no legislation is passed. For example, during 
British Columbia’s 37th general election in 2001 the legislature was dissolved in on the 
18th of April 2001 and the new legislature opened on the 19th of June 2001 – meaning that 
no legislative work was done for the two-month period beginning April 18th (Government 
of British Columbia, 2002: 37). Furthermore, with the change in party in power from 
NDP to the Liberal Party (British Columbia. Legislative Assembly, 2002: 21, 37) the 
volume of legislation passed in the following six months would likely be low.  
  110 
4.11 Decreasing Creation Rates: Why the Disconnect 
between Expectations and Results? 
While an increase in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies was expected over the 
period included in the study, the results have not born this out. It was expected that the 
growth in government responsibilities had placed a level of demand upon government 
that exceeded the structural capacity and could therefore not be fulfilled without 
widespread delegation across a wide range of policy issues (Flinders, 2006: 223-224). 
Instead, the results indicate a pattern of increasing and decreasing annual rates of Type II 
body creation that move in lock step with the post World War II rise of the Keynesian 
welfare state and the subsequent supplanting of Keynesianism by the neoliberal 
paradigm. This raises the question of how we account for the difference in expectations 
and results. 
Two possible reasons are offered. First, the use of Type II bodies may in fact be 
increasing, however, the function of the majority of such bodies may not be decision-
making or regulatory responsibility per se, but instead augmenting the delivery of 
government services. In this scenario, the government remains the dominant actor in the 
governance structure, maintaining decision-making authority, but delegating delivery. As 
argued by Bell and Hindmoor, the existence of governance relationships between the 
state and society does not mean the relationships are equal (2009: 11). While still a 
concern in terms of efficiency and accountability, the use of external actors as solely 
service delivery mechanisms without decision-making authority sits outside the scope of 
this project. Second, the disconnect between expectations and results may not be due to 
numbers of Type II bodies but the policy areas in which Type II bodies are being used. 
New Type II bodies are being created in policy areas that have high public profiles and 
have a long history of being perceived as the responsibility of government. In this 
scenario it is not an increase in the number of Type II bodies, but their emergence in key 
policy areas that has led to an expectation of increased delegation of government 
authority.  
While the role of external actors in service delivery is of importance, it falls outside the 
scope of this research project. However, the possibility that the disconnect between 
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expectations and results is a function of the use of Type II bodies in higher profile policy 
areas warrants consideration. Support for this hypothesis is found in the public opinion 
literature which indicates an overall low level of political knowledge among citizens but 
also that while citizens cannot focus on every issue, they do have a higher level of 
knowledge about the issues that they care deeply about (Hayes and Bishin, 2012: 133; 
Hutchings, 2001: 848). This suggests that citizens would be more informed of instances 
of authority migration in areas of higher interest than instances of authority migration in 
general.  
In considering the possibility that the migration of authority in key policy areas has led to 
the perception of increased involvement of new governance actors in the public realm the 
creation of Type II bodies in the policy area of healthcare is be explored. Healthcare has 
been chosen due to its level of importance to Canadians. As reported by Stuart Soroka in 
a report to the Health Council of Canada in 2005, 85% of Canadians believed that 
eliminating public healthcare represented a fundamental change to the nature of Canada. 
Additionally, more respondents viewed eliminating healthcare as a fundamental change 
than any of the other policies listed in the survey, including abandoning English and 
French as Canada’s official languages, and ending peacekeeping missions (Soroka, 2007: 
5). A 1994 Ekos Research Association Inc. poll found that Canadians rank health 3rd in a 
list of 22 values, behind freedom and a clean environment (Fortier, 1996: 21). 
Furthermore, when asked what policy issues they are most concerned about, respondents 
have overwhelmingly expressed concerned for healthcare since 1997 and have not shifted 
from this position (Soroka, 2007: 5).  
When we look at the number of Type II bodies created in the area of healthcare14, 
including the regulation of healthcare professionals, as depicted in Table 4.7, we see that 
in the case of each province the largest percentage of Type II bodies created in the 
healthcare field over the 60 year period being studied is during the 1991 to 2005 time 
period. Furthermore, in the case of British Columbia and Ontario, 50% of the Type II 
                                                
14 A list of all Type II bodies is provided in Appendix B. 
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bodies created since 1946 in the healthcare policy area were created between 1991 and 
2005. 
Table 4.10: Number of Type II Bodies in the Healthcare Policy Area 
 Alberta 
British 
Columbia Nova Scotia Ontario 
All 
Provinces 
1946-1960 5 (17%) 3 (17%) 2 (15%) 6 (21%) 16(18%) 
1961-1975 7 (24%) 4 (22%) 3 (23%) 7 (25%) 21(24%) 
1976-1990 8 (27%) 2 (11%) 3 (23%) 1 (4%) 14(16%) 
1991-2005 9 (31%) 9 (50%) 5 (38%) 14(50%) 37(42%) 
Total 29 (100%) 18 (100%) 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 88 (100%) 
When looking at the results for the creation of Type II bodies for healthcare, what 
appears is a reversal of the overall trend. While the annual rate of Type II body creation 
overall has been decreasing since the late 1980s, what we can see when looking at Table 
4.10 is that in the healthcare policy area the rate of creation has increased since the late 
1980s, with two cases having 50% of the bodies created since 1946 being created during 
the last 15 years being studied. This suggests that it is possible, at least to an extent, that 
the perceived increase in the rate of Type II bodies is derived from the increase of Type II 
bodies in policy areas that are of high importance to citizens and not the overall rate of 
authority migration.  
4.12 Conclusion 
The creation of Type II bodies is a tale of consistency and difference. There is a 
consistent pattern across the four provinces in which the annual creation rate is initially 
sufficiently high to push the cumulative number of Type II bodies higher on a year over 
year basis. However, over time the creation rate decreases to the point of stability or 
decline in the cumulative number of Type II bodies. Beyond the consistency in the 
pattern of Type II body creation, there are also differences across the provinces in what 
factors are shown to contribute to changes in the annual creation rate. Such differences 
showcase the economic and political uniqueness of each province, but also serve to 
produce conflicting results and limit the ability to make generalizations.   
  
113 
Overall, the results produce two principal findings and one curious question. The first 
principal finding is that over the sixty-year period being reviewed the annual rate of 
creation and the cumulative number of Type II bodies have fluctuated over time. The 
existing data for Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario demonstrate that 
the use of Type II bodies in public governance is not a recent phenomenon, as Type II 
bodies have been used as a tool of government for over sixty years and the prevalence of 
the use of this tool is subject to periods of both increase and decline.  
The second principal finding is that the pattern of increase, stability, then decrease in the 
annual creation rate of Type II bodies mirrors that of the shift from the technocratic 
Keynesian approach that was the governing paradigm from the post-war period until the 
early 1970s through to the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant governing 
paradigm in the 1980s. The emergence of this pattern is unexpected, as neoliberal 
thinking tends to be associated with the shrinking of the state and the increased 
involvement of external actors in the business of the state. Two factors, however, provide 
insight into the unexpected results: 1) the neoliberalism paradigm places the market in the 
position of preferred regulator, and 2) government is a funding source for both public and 
private actors engaged in the provision of state delegated regulatory responsibility. As the 
goal of neoliberalism is the shrinking of fiscal commitments and the regulatory reach of 
the state, a weakening of the willingness of government to take on new regulatory 
responsibility, whether as part of the machinery of government or through existing or 
newly created Type II bodies, can be observed.  
As for the disconnect between expectations and reality, as the number of Type II bodies 
have not been increasing in recent years as expected, the question emerges as to why. The 
answer put forward to this question is that the perceived increase in the rate of Type II 
bodies is not derived from the overall rate of authority migration, but from the increase of 
Type II bodies in policy areas that are of high importance to citizens and traditionally 
viewed as the sole jurisdiction of the state. 
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Chapter 5  
“Another cause for the increase in alienation and cynicism is a feeling that too many policy 
decisions that affect individuals have been taken out of any system that has accountability or that 
they can influence.” 
-Robert Teeter 
5 Accountable to Whom: Migration of Authority and 
Accountability 
Elections, in the tradition of democratic theory, have been seen as an important 
mechanism of accountability through which the policy preferences of citizens can induce 
government action (Fearon, 1999: 57). However, new forms of governance introduce new 
challenges for the theory and practice of public accountability (Skelcher, 2007: 63). The 
migration of regulatory responsibility outside the boundaries of elected governments 
necessitates a different conceptualization of accountability relationships between citizens 
and public policy decision makers. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, while the annual rate 
of Type II body creation has not increased over the past sixty years, the absolute number 
of Type II bodies engaged in public decision making has. As stated by Peters and Pierre, 
the growing number of new governance actors and the dispersal of political authority led 
to questions of democratic input and accountability within the governance process (2006: 
209). The shift from a single agency system to a plurality of bodies increases complexity 
and opens the system to increased problems of accountability which in turn lead to 
problems of coordination and strategic direction as different agencies compete for limited 
resources (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 107). 
In responding to concerns of accountability brought about by the dispersal of governance 
authority, this chapter explores the accountability environment that has emerged when 
government has delegated decision-making authority. To do so, legislated instances of 
authority migration in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and 
Ontario between the years of 1946 and 2005 form the universe of cases. Two areas of 
inquiry are explored: the existence and relative strength of accountability relationships 
between new governance actors and both government and society as stipulated in the 
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legislation; and the extent to which political ideology, geographic scale, and the timing of 
the legislation are able to explain the strength of accountability relationships.  
5.1 Accountability and Public Governance 
Without accountability, there is no popular control. In a democracy, accountability is the 
principal mechanism through which mass publics exert control over their elected officials 
and is a central tenet of democratic theory (Rudolph, 2006: 99). As discussed in Chapter 
2, the concept of accountability is not in itself problematic: person A is accountable to 
person B if two conditions are met; there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in 
some way on behalf of B; and B is empowered by some mechanism to sanction or reward 
A. Stated in the form of an agency relationship person A can be understood to be an 
agent, who makes choices on behalf of person B as the principal (Fearon, 1999: 55). The 
assignment of a principal-agent relationship to elected representatives is straightforward; 
the elected representative is accountable to the electorate and is expected to act in such a 
way that promotes the preferences of the electorate. If the electorate is not happy with the 
actions of their elected representative, they can vote them out at the next election.  
Defining accountability relationships associated with Type II multilevel governance, 
however, is more complex as there is the potential for multiple principal-agent 
relationship variations. Society may be the principals and Type II bodies the agents, 
meaning that Type II bodies are understood to be directly accountable to society. Society 
as principals of democratic governments may hold Type II bodies indirectly accountable 
through the principal-agent relationship between government and Type II bodes. A third 
possibility is that each of the before mentioned accountability arrangements exist. 
Alternatively, there is the potential for the absence of any accountability relationship. 
While governments have migrated authority to address specific policy needs, it has been 
argued that Type II bodies remain accountable to the government and as such indirectly 
to the citizen. Jessop has argued that the governments, in responding to the 
institutionalization of political decision making upwards, downwards and sideways from 
the state, have enhanced the state’s role in managing inter-scalar relations, thus seeking to 
control how and where authority is migrated to minimize effects upon the overall power 
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of the state (2005: 64). Through what Jessop labeled ‘metagovernance’, the state provides 
the rules for governance and in doing so sets the conditions for self-organization and the 
overall process of collaboration. In doing so the state sets the overall ground rules for 
governance and regulatory order (2005: 64-65). Similarly, Tanja Börzel argues that in the 
modern state both public and private actors operate under the shadow of hierarchy where 
public actors set the legal rules of the game and intervene to correct distortions or 
outcomes that violate public interests (2010: 196-197).  
The underlying assumption of multilevel governance is that centralization has given way 
to new forms of governance that result in decision-making authority being dispersed 
across multiple jurisdictions. According to Bell and Hindmoor, however, regardless of 
the governance approach put into place, the state remains the preeminent actor in the 
governance process (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 10; 2009a: 153-154). In setting the rules 
and being positioned to intervene on outcomes that violate public interests, government 
can be seen to dominate the policy process. If government has continued to dominate the 
public policy process, then we should expect formal accountability relationships between 
government and Type II bodies to be present and to have either remained stable or 
increased in strength. This leads to the chapter’s first hypothesis, which assesses the 
ongoing strength of the accountability relationship with government, and is presented 
below as follows: 
H5.1 - The accountability relationships between government and Type II bodies has either 
remained stable or increased in strength over time. 
As stated in Chapter 2, the belief that shifts in state function and new forms of 
governance have not weakened the state is not universal. McBride and Shields argue that 
the advancement of a neo-liberal agenda aimed at reducing the state and increasing 
reliance on market mechanisms provides the ideological venue for shifting decision-
making outside of politics and is eroding the power of the state (1997: 18). Furthermore, 
the term governance can signal a threat to conventional forms of democracy or 
potentially an attempt to sidestep democracy altogether. Instead of being accountable 
either directly to the citizens or indirectly to the citizens through government, governance 
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mechanisms are seen to have become the tools of commercial interests or unaccountable 
bureaucracies (Hirst, 2000: 13). According to Harmes, the dispersion of power away 
from the centre can be viewed as a deliberate neoliberal political project with the goal of 
separating economic and political power (2006: 726-727). 
While neoliberalism is a modern construct, there are long-standing debates over the role 
and size of government. Since the second half of the 19th century neoclassical liberals 
have consistently argued that government should be as small as possible and act as a 
night watchman whose only role is to protect the person and property of individuals. In 
contrast, welfare liberals have promoted a larger role for government arguing that the 
powers of the state can be a positive force for promoting liberty and equal opportunity 
through the creation of regulations and state run institutions (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 77-
79). The desired role of the state is further expanded within the framework of social 
democracy. Being linked to socialism, social democracy calls for government to play a 
larger role in the lives of the people, promotes public ownership, and promotes the 
redistribution of wealth (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 44). 
Taking into account both recent ideological trends and the historical debate over the 
appropriate size and role of the state, it can be argued that the ideology of the governing 
party may influence the structure of the accountability relationship between Type II 
bodies and government. Specifically, governing parties aligned further to the right are 
expected to produce weaker accountability relationships when migrating authority as 
there is stronger belief in minimal state interference in the lives of individuals, while 
governing parties on the left are expected to develop stronger accountability relationships 
due to their stronger belief in government intervention. Accordingly, this leads to the 
second hypothesis:  
H5.2 – Governing parties further to the left on the political spectrum will produce 
stronger accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government than 
governing parties further to the right. 
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The second relationship under consideration is the accountability relationship between 
Type II jurisdictions and society. Peters outlines two opposing views of governance, a 
traditional approach where the state steers, and a modern approach where societal actors 
are involved in more self-steering rather than depending upon the guidance of 
government. While both government steering and self-steering views of governance 
contain the assumption that society must be governed, different assertions are made as to 
who the dominant actor is – government or society (2000: 36-37). Hirst’s ‘associated 
democratic’ model goes as far as stating that as many functions as possible should be 
devolved from the state to civil society, followed by the democratization of civil society 
organizations, thus shifting governance from top-down bureaucratic to democratically 
self-governed associations (2000: 28).  
As argued by Neil Nevitte, there has been a trend toward a decline in deference to 
authority by Canadians (1996: 38). Canadians have become increasingly dissatisfied, not 
necessarily at specific office holders, but with the office itself as they demand more 
meaningful participation in the political process (Nevitte, 1996: 55). Nevitte further states 
that while voting provides one avenue for participation, there is no consensus that voting 
is the most effective way for citizens to state the preference and make demands of 
government and that citizens are increasingly interested in utilizing other forms of 
participation (1996: 76). What has been witnessed is a culture shift where citizen access 
and participation in the policy making process have become more closely tied to 
legitimacy (Skogstad, 2003: 963). If social forces are seeking more meaningful 
participation and taking a stronger role in the governance process, it follows that Type II 
bodies should be increasingly accountable directly to society as societal actors assert 
greater influence over policy inputs and outputs. As such, the third hypothesis accesses 
the strength of the relationship with society and is presented as follows: 
H5.3 - The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased 
in strength over time. 
An additional factor to be explored is the effect the geographic scale of a Type II body 
has on the existence and relative strength of accountability relationships. With elected 
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government, a trade-off exists where centralization produces efficiency and coordination 
gains, however, diminishes accountability. This loss of accountability is based on the idea 
that as government becomes more centralized, the ability of any one region to select a 
government based upon the government’s perceived performance in that region is 
diminished (Seabright, 1996: 65). Similarly it has been found that while larger 
municipalities benefit from economies of scale, the gains come at a democratic cost as 
the increase in size is associated with a decrease in citizens’ perceived political efficacy 
(Dreyer and Serritzlew, 2011: 255). 
Like traditional elected governments, Type II bodies exist at different geographic scales. 
However, unlike elected government few Type II bodies have citizen-elected boards, 
consequently minimizing the electoral accountability benefit associated with traditional 
government. Taking into consideration the lack, or limited, accountability benefits of 
elections, and a dearth of information on the effect of geographic scale on the 
accountability of Type II bodies, this chapter puts forward two exploratory questions. 
First, do Type II bodies succumb to the same trade off as traditional elected government? 
While lacking the accountability function of elections, it is still possible that 
centralization results in a similar tradeoff between economies of scale and accountability 
of Type II bodies. When a Type II body moves along the continuum from decentralized 
to centralized, the number of citizens whose preferences must be taken into account 
increases. As the number of citizens increases, the ability of any one citizen to hold the 
Type II body accountable based upon their perceived performance of the Type II body 
decreases. If this is in fact the case, it is expected that the greater the level of 
decentralization, the greater the capacity of members of society to hold Type II bodies 
directly accountable. 
While it is expected that decentralization of Type II bodies provide accountability 
benefits for citizens, the second question posed is whether there is a corresponding 
weakening of accountability to government that occurs with decentralization. When 
decision-making bodies are decentralized there may be a willingness on the part of 
government to shift both decision-making and responsibility for holding decision-makers 
accountable closer to the citizen. If this is the case, it is expected that the greater the 
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degree of decentralization, the weaker the capacity of government to hold Type II bodies 
directly accountable. Accordingly the final two hypotheses address the effect of 
geographic scale and are presented as follows: 
H5.4 – The accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will 
decrease as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. 
H5.5 – The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as 
the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. 
5.2 Data and Methodology 
To test each hypothesis the custom dataset described in full in Chapter 3 is utilized. To be 
included in the dataset the Type II body must satisfy each of the following conditions: 
decision-making authority over some part of the public realm must be granted to the body 
through an act of provincial legislation; the majority of decision makers within the body 
must be comprised of individuals who are from outside of the government, legislature or 
public service; decision-making autonomy must exist; and the Type II body must have 
been operating in either the province of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia or 
Ontario at some point between 1946 and 2005. Type II bodies included in the dataset 
come from a wide range of policy areas including: financial regulation, food and 
agriculture, education, healthcare, natural resources, public safety, social services, sports 
and entertainment, transportation, and other public goods. The dataset contains incidents 
of Type II body creation, termination, and modification. Captured at the point of creation 
for each Type II body and for each subsequent amendment are the accountability 
mechanisms included within the legislation. The dataset does not capture cases where the 
legislation was amended but the accountability relationship was unchanged. In cases 
when the Type II body remains in place, but the legislation that created it is repealed and 
replaced, the Type II body is not coded as being terminated and recreated, but instead 
only changes to the accountability relationships (if occurring) are captured.   
Accountability is coded based upon the accountability mechanisms that are established 
directly in the legislation. The coding of the accountability relationships uses Mark 
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Bovens’s definition of accountability that states: “Accountability is a relationship 
between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor 
may face consequences” (2007: 450). Through the elimination of constructs which are 
instrumental but not essential, Bovens’s definition identifies three elements of an 
accountability relationship that are identifiable and can be easily coded: processes which 
force agents to explain and justify actions to their principals, processes which allow 
principals to question agents and pass judgment upon their actions, and processes which 
enable principals to sanction their agents. The decision to use Bovens’s definition is 
based upon its ability to capture the concept of accountability as discussed in the 
accountability section above and to allow for the standard coding of data along three 
easily identifiable elements. For each record six pieces of data are captured, three for the 
accountability relationship between the Type II body and government and three between 
the Type II body and society. Each element is coded as either present (1) or absent (0), 
allowing for an accountability score to be calculated for each of the relationships as the 
dependent variable.15  
Again using Alberta’s Child and Family Services Authorities as an example, in this case, 
the accountability relationship with government would score a 2 in 1996 as the Child and 
Family Services Authorities must justify their actions to government through the 
submission of reports to government and the provincial government is able to sanction 
members of the board through mechanisms of appointment and the ability to transfer the 
Authority’s powers to an alternate entity. Missing is a mechanism that legislates the 
ability of the Provincial Government to pose questions to the Authorities. The 
accountability score between the Authorities and society would be a 1 as the only 
                                                
15  The complex nature of accountability poses challenges for operationalization. This chapter captures the 
formal accountability rules that can be used by government or society; however, it fails to capture whether 
the formal rules are utilized, or whether an alternate form of accountability, be it informal or market 
mechanisms, exists. Furthermore, assigning equal value to each of the three components of accountability 
gives the obligation of a Type II body to justify its actions the same weighting as the ability to sanction, 
when it could be argued that the ability to sanction is of greater value. When changes were made to the 
model, however, scoring sanctioning as a 2 or a 0 instead of a 1 or a 0 produced results consistent with the 
reported findings. 
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accountability mechanism built into the legislation is the requirement for board records to 
be open to the public. A subsequent amendment that mandated board meetings being 
open to the public changed the accountability score to 2, as now society members would 
also be able to question members of the Authority’s board. Missing is a mechanism that 
legislates the ability of society members to sanction board members in response to the 
actions (or inactions) of the Authority. 
Consistent with Chapter 4, one of the hypotheses explores the effect of political ideology 
on accountability. As discussed in Chapter 4, content analysis of Canadian party 
manifestos between 1946 and 2000 demonstrates an ideological disagreement between 
parties at the federal level. This analysis demonstrates that at the federal level the NDP is 
consistently to the left and the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties taking turns 
holding the position on the far right (Cochrane, 2010: 590-591). While it is 
acknowledged that organizational independence exists between federal parties and their 
provincial counterparts, the NDP remains a fully integrated organization with 
membership at the provincial level resulting in automatic membership in the federal party 
(Esselment, 2010: 871-872). Given the connection between the provincial and federal 
NDP parties, and NDP’s consistent position to the left at the federal level, the percentage 
of seats held at the provincial level by the NDP or CCF party is used to test the effect of 
political ideology. The formation of government by a left-of-centre party was considered 
as an independent variable; however, no left-of-centre party formed the government in 
either Alberta or Nova Scotia during the 1945 to 2005 time period. 
To assess the influence of time period on the strength of accountability relationships, the 
overall timeframe being studied is divided into six ten-year periods and a dummy 
variable is created for each.16 All instances of creation or modification of Type II bodies 
were coded according to which time period it occurred in, with 1 indicating that it 
occurred in that time period and 0 indicating it did not. In the regression model, the 1946-
1950 dummy variable was omitted, making it the reference category for all other time 
                                                
16  The division of time by Keynesianism and neoliberalism as dominant policy paradigms as was done in 
Chapter 4 was also considered. The results remained consistent with that of results based upon decade. 
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periods. The 1946 to 1955 time period was selected as the reference category because it 
represents the starting point and therefore forms a baseline against which accountability 
scores from each subsequent time period can be assessed.  
To assess the influence of geographic scale the Type II bodies are coded according to 
four categories: Type II bodies that are geographically confined to one municipality; 
Type II bodies that span municipalities but are smaller in geographic scale than an entire 
province; Type II bodies that encompass the entire province; and Type II bodies that span 
provincial boundaries. For each category a dummy variable is created with a score of 1 
indicating that the Type II body operates at that geographic scale and a score of 0 
indicating that it does not. In the regression model the dummy variable for Type II bodies 
that operate within the boundaries of a single municipality is omitted, making it the 
reference category against which all other categories of geographic scale are compared. 
The geographic scale of single municipality was selected as the reference category as it is 
easier for comparison purposes to have the reference category at one end of the 
continuum and not all provinces have created Type II bodies that span provinces, which 
occupies the other end of the continuum. 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to test the effect of the independent 
variables on the dependent. As in Chapter 4, sequential modeling is used in which each 
independent variable is tested separately and then as part of a larger model. A sequential 
approach was again adopted so that the effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable, as expressed by the adjusted R2, could be observed separately for 
each independent variable. For each hypothesis the models will be run for the entire 
dataset to identify overall trends and then for each province individually to identify 
differences between the provinces. Due to the unique characteristics of Professional Self-
Regulatory Type II bodies outlined in Chapter 3 a self–regulatory control variable is 
included in all regression models with Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies coded as a 1 
and all other forms of Type II body coded as zero. Provincial control variables are also 
included in the regression models when evaluating the aggregate provincial dataset. 
Dummy variables are created for each province with a score of 1 indicating the Type II 
body’s province of origin. The Ontario dummy variable is omitted from the regression 
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models, making Ontario the provincial variable against which all other provincial 
variables are compared.  
The total number of cases evaluated, broken down by province and decade are presented 
in Table 5.1.   
Table 5.1: New and Modified Type II bodies by Province by Decade 
 Alberta 
British 
Columbia Nova Scotia Ontario Total 
1946-1955 31 10 10 23 82 
1956-1965 31 14 21 41 107 
1966-1975 43 43 32 65 183 
1976-1985 43 27 26 24 120 
1986-1995 39 32 43 42 147 
1996-2005 43 31 34 64 172 
Total 230 165 157 259 811 
 
5.3 Results: Accountability Relationship with Government 
Three hypotheses are tested in relation to the strength of the accountability relationship 
between government and Type II bodies. The first (H5.1) considers the extent to which the 
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies has either remained 
stable or increased in strength over time. The second (H5.2) proposes that governing 
parties on the left of the political spectrum will produce stronger accountability 
relationships between Type II bodies and government than governments further to the 
center and right. The third (H5.4) hypothesizes that the accountability relationship 
between government and Type II bodies will decrease as the geographic scale of the Type 
II body decreases. The results for each hypothesis when using the aggregated dataset are 
presented in Table 5.2. In testing each hypothesis, two regression models are used, one 
containing only the pertinent independent variables for the specific hypothesis and an 
overarching model including the combined set of independent variables from all three 
hypotheses.  
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Table 5.2: Government Accountability Index (Dataset includes AB, BC, NS and ON) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1956-1965 0.229(0.129)*   0.225(0.129)* 
1966-1975 0.331(0.117)***   0.324(0.118)*** 
1976-1985 0.487(0.125)***   0.478(0.126)*** 
1986-1995 0.434(0.121)***   0.416(0.130)*** 
1996-2005 0.647(0.118)***   0.642(0.118)*** 
Left Government  0.002(0.002)  0.001(0.003) 
Spans Municipalities   -0.040(0.168) -0.038(0.166) 
Single Province   -0.136(0.144) -0.127(0.142) 
Spans Provinces   -0.012(0.427) 0.007(0.420) 
Alberta -0.009(0.080) 0.003(0.086) -0.024(0.081) 0.003(0.087) 
British Columbia 0.093(0.087) 0.042(0.101) 0.098(0.089) 0.085(0.102) 
Nova Scotia -0.291(0.089)*** -0.257(0.091)*** -0.270(0.091)*** -0.279(0.093)*** 
Self-Regulatory -0.814(0.069)*** -0.762(0.069)*** -0.727(0.071)*** -0.794(0.073)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.1439 0.142 0.174 
Number of Cases 811 811 811 811 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***  
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
Ontario, 1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
Evaluating the effect of time period on the strength of the accountability relationship 
between government and Type II bodies produces significant results in the expected 
direction. As presented in Table 5.2, Model 1, each subsequent time period after 1946-
1955 is associated with a higher level in the government accountability index score and is 
significant at the 90% confidence level or higher. The results trend in the direction of 
higher levels in the government accountability index scores in comparison to 1946-1955 
as the time period becomes closer to present day. Type II bodies that were enacted or 
updated between 1996 and 2005 suggest an increase of 0.647 in the government 
accountability index score which ranges from 0 to 3. The exception to the upwards trend 
is the 1986-1995 time period, which produced a smaller coefficient than the immediately 
preceding time period (1976-1985), but still larger than the next most recent time period 
(1966-1975). As shown in Model 4, when all independent variables are included in the 
regression model, the results remain consistent. The results presented in both Model 1 
and Model 4 provide support for the hypothesis that the accountability relationships 
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between government and Type II bodies have either remained stable or increased in 
strength over time. 
When assessing the effect of a left-of-centre governing party on the strength of the 
accountability relationship between government and all Type II bodies, the results shown 
in Table 5.2, Model 2 are not significant. As displayed in Model 4, the results remain 
consistent when all independent variables are included in the regression model. The 
results from both models suggest that H5.2, governing parties further to the left on the 
political spectrum will produce stronger accountability relationships between Type II 
bodies and government than governing parties further to the right, be rejected.  
As shown in Table 5.2, Model 3, the results for differences in geographic scale produced 
no statistically significant results. As presented in Model 4, the results again remain 
consistent when all independent variables are included in the regression model, 
suggesting that hypothesis H5.4 be rejected. 
Although not related to the hypotheses, the dummy variable for Nova Scotia produces 
significant results across all models in Table 5.2. The results for Nova Scotia consistently 
suggest a negative relationship and are significant at the 99% confidence level. As shown 
in Model 4, when all independent variables are included in the regression model the 
result is a 0.279 decrease in the government accountability index in comparison to 
Ontario. Neither Alberta nor British Columbia produces statistically significant results. 
As Nova Scotia is the sole province to produce significant results, it suggests that the 
formal accountability relationship between special purpose Type II bodies and 
government, as measured by this study, are weaker in Nova Scotia than the other 
provinces. 
The dummy variable for Professional Self-Regulatory bodies also produced statistically 
significant results at the 99% confidence level across all models in Table 5.2. The results 
in Model 4 suggest that within a possible range of 0 to 3 there is an average decrease of 
0.794 in the government accountability index score when comparing Professional Self-
Regulatory bodies to other forms of Type II bodies. This result indicates that Professional 
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Self-Regulatory bodies tend to be held less accountable by government than other forms 
of Type II bodies. 
Discussion now turns to the province specific outcomes. The results for each hypothesis 
by province are presented in Tables 5.3 through Table 5.6. In testing the hypothesis that 
the accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies has either 
remained stable or increased in strength over time, all provinces but Nova Scotia produce 
statistically significant results in the expected direction. All three provinces produce 
statistically significant results for the 1996-2005 period when compared to 1946-1955. Of 
the four provinces, the results for Alberta (Table 5.3) produced the largest coefficient for 
government accountability index score. As shown in Table 5.3, Model 4, when all 
variables are included in the regression model a Type II body enacted or updated between 
1996 and 2005 indicates an increase of 1.051 in the government accountability index. 
The results are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
To evaluate H5.1, the results for the province of Alberta are presented in Table 5.3, Model 
1. The results indicate a higher level in the accountability index score for each time 
period variable in comparison to the 1946-1955 time period. With the exception of the 
1956-1965 period, all are significant at the 99% confidence level. The overall trend is an 
increase in the government accountability index score over time, however, the results 
show that change is not linear but varies from one time period to another. As shown in 
Table 5.3, Model 4, when all independent variables are included in the regression model 
the results remain consistent. 
To evaluate the effect of time the results for British Columbia are presented in Table 5.4, 
Model 1. While the three decades preceding 1946-1955 produced no significant results, 
both 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 produced significant results in the predicted direction. 
When all independent variables are included in the regression model, as shown in Model 
4, only the 1996-2005 time period remains significant.  
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Table 5.3: Government Accountability Index - Alberta 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1956-1965 0.293(0.213)   0.268(0.215) 
1966-1975 0.630(0.198)***   0.605(0.204)*** 
1976-1985 0.898(0.198)***   0.811(0.202)*** 
1986-1995 0.540(0.198)***   0.628(0.255)** 
1996-2005 1.042(0.200)***   1.051(0.200)*** 
Left Seats  -.009(0.010)  0.008(0.015) 
Spans Municipalities   -0.700(0.325)** -0.628(0.320)** 
Single Province   -0.531(0.293)* -0.434(0.287) 
Spans Provinces   Omitted17 Omitted 
Self-Regulatory -0.921(0.123)*** -0.819(0.127)*** -0.822(0.133)*** -0.933(0.130)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.151 0.161 0.260 
Number of Cases 230 230 230 230 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***  
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
Table 5.4: Government Accountability Index – British Columbia 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1956-1965 -0.041(0.315)   -0.089(0.307) 
1966-1975 0.134(0.252)   -0.241(0.264) 
1976-1985 0.124(0.269)   -0.049(0.265) 
1986-1995 0.600(0.259)**   0.123(0.282) 
1996-2005 0.766(0.258)***   0.803(0.249)*** 
Left Government  0.009(0.003)***  0.014(0.004)*** 
Spans Municipalities   0.262(0.433) 0.171(0.401) 
Single Province   0.012(0.278) 0.040(0.262) 
Spans Provinces   Omitted Omitted 
Self-Regulatory -0.605(0.162)*** -0.453(0.155)*** -0.467(0.163)*** -0.653(0.160)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.087 0.039 0.181 
Number of Cases 165 165 165 165 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***  
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
                                                
17  Spans Provinces is omitted when no Type II bodies that span provinces exist within the dataset.  
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Table 5.5: Government Accountability Index – Nova Scotia 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1956-1965 0.183(0.303)   0.175(0.315) 
1966-1975 0.002(0.286)   -0.004(0.294) 
1976-1985 0.467(0.293)   0.469(0.297) 
1986-1995 0.128(0.283)   0.142(0.289) 
1996-2005 0.278(0.286)   0.374(0.413) 
Left Seats  0.004(0.007)  -0.004(0.116) 
Spans Municipalities   0.305(0.453) 0.203(0.467) 
Single Province   0.263(0.404) 0.248(0.410) 
Spans Provinces   0.162(0.535) 0.205(0.538) 
Self-Regulatory -1.373(0.142)*** -1.375(0.142)*** -1.350(0.141)*** -0.382(0.151)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.394 0.387 0.379 0.380 
Number of Cases 157 157 157 157 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***  
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
Table 5.6: Government Accountability Index Ontario 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1956-1965 0.301(0.232)   0.261(0.231) 
1966-1975 0.324(0.216)   0.369(0.217)* 
1976-1985 0.113(0.259)   0.230(0.270) 
1986-1995 0.187(0.234)   0.568(0.310)** 
1996-2005 0.426(0.217)**   0.446.(0.215)** 
Left Seats  -0.008(0.004)*  -0.012(0.006)* 
Spans Municipalities   0.093(0.267) 0.096(0.268) 
Single Province   -0.242(0.234) -0.219(0.236) 
Spans Provinces   Omitted Omitted 
Self-Regulatory -0.467(0.131)*** -0.370(0.131)*** -0.381(0.128)*** -0.319(0.140)** 
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.060 0.060 0.071 
Number of Cases 259 259 259 259 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***  
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
The results for Ontario are presented in Table 5.6, Model 1. When evaluating the effect of 
time, the only time period to produce statistically significant results in comparison to 
1946-1955 was 1996-2005. When all variables are added into the regression model, as 
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presented in Model 4, the 1966-1975, 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 time periods produce 
significant results at the 90% confidence level or higher. The results for the 1996-2005 
time period suggests an increase of 0.446 in the government accountability index score 
(which ranges from 0 to 3) in comparison to the 1946-1955 period.  
Overall, the results for all four provinces support H5.1 – that the accountability 
relationships between government and Type II bodies have either remained stable or 
increased in strength over time. While occasional reductions in the government 
accountability score from one period to another are evident in all provinces, these results 
were not statistically significant. As predicted, the trend has been toward either higher 
levels of accountability as time progresses as seen in Alberta, British Columbia, and 
Ontario, or stability as witnessed in Nova Scotia.  
When testing the hypothesis that governing parties further to the left on the political 
spectrum will produce stronger accountability relationships between Type II bodies and 
government than governing parties on the right, the results for the individual provincial 
datasets produce conflicting results. Of the four provinces only British Columbia and 
Ontario produce significant results, however, the results are in opposite directions.  
When evaluating H5.2 the results for the province of British Columbia are presented in 
Table 5.4, Model 2. The results suggest that a 1% increase in the number of seats held by 
a left-of-centre party are associated with an increase of 0.009 in the government 
accountability index score which ranges from 0 to 3. The results are significant at the 
99% confidence level. When all variables are included in the regression model, as shown 
in Model 4, the results remain consistent. The results for Ontario are presented in Table 
5.6, Model 2. The results for Ontario indicate that a 1% increase in the number of seats 
held by a left-of-centre party is associated with a decrease of 0.008 in the government 
accountability index score and is significant at the 95% confidence level. When all 
independent variables are included, as shown in Model 4, the results remain consistent. 
Based on the individual provincial results, there is conflicting support for hypothesis H5.2 
– governments further to the left on the political spectrum will produce stronger 
accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government than governments 
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further to the right. The existing support is contingent upon the province in question, with 
each province producing statistically significant results, but in the opposite direction. 
Depending upon the province, it could be argued that the presence of a left-of-centre 
government suggests either a decrease (Ontario) or increase (British Columbia) in the 
strength of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government. 
When evaluating the hypothesis that the accountability relationship between government 
and Type II bodies will decrease as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases 
only the province of Alberta returns significant results, and the results are not in the 
expected direction. When evaluating H5.4 the results for the province of Alberta are 
presented in Table 5.3, Model 3. The results suggest a decrease of 0.700 in the 
government accountability index for Type II bodies that span municipalities and a 
decrease of 0.531 for Type II bodes that are the same geographic scale as the province 
when compared to Type II bodies whose jurisdiction is at the geographic scale of a single 
municipality. When all variables are included within the regression model the results 
remain in the opposite direction than what was predicted, however, only the dummy 
variable for Spans Municipalities remains statistically significant. In assessing the results 
of each of the four provincial datasets there is no indication of support for H5.4 – the 
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will decrease as the 
geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. 
Also of interest are the results for the Professional Self-Regulatory dummy variable. For 
all models in Tables 5.3 through 5.6 the results indicate statistically significant results at 
the 95% confidence level or higher, and all in the negative direction. Consistent with the 
aggregate dataset, the results suggest that Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are held 
less accountable by government than other forms of Type II bodies. 
A summary of whether support was found for each of the three hypotheses by dataset is 
provided in Table 5.7. As highlighted in Table 5.7 there is support across each of the 
provincial datasets and the aggregate dataset for H5.1 – the accountability relationships 
between government and Type II bodies have either remained stable or increased in 
strength over time. The Nova Scotia case is an outlier, however, as the accountability 
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relationship between government and Type II bodies remained stable in Nova Scotia, but 
strengthened in the other four datasets.  
In contrast to H5.1, Table 5.7 shows that no support was found for H5.4 – the 
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will decrease as the 
geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.  
Table 5.7: Government Accountability Index - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset 
 H5.1 – Time H5.2 – Ideology H5.4 – Geographic  
All Provinces Support No Support No Support 
Alberta Support No Support No Support 
British Columbia Support Support No Support 
Nova Scotia Support No Support No Support 
Ontario Support No Support No Support 
Moreover, Table 5.7 shows mixed support for hypothesis H5.2 – governing parties further 
to the left on the political spectrum produce stronger accountability relationships between 
Type II bodies and government than governing parties further to the right. In testing the 
effect of a left-of-centre government, Ontario and British Columbia produced significant 
results, however, the results were in opposite directions, with British Columbia indicating 
a strengthening of the relationship as predicted, while Ontario predicted a weakening of 
the accountability relationship.  
To test the robustness, the effect of a left-of-centre government on the accountability 
relationship with government and Type II bodes was evaluated using regression analysis. 
The results for H5.2 substituting left-of-centre government for percentage of seats held by 
a left-of-centre party is presented in Table 5.8. The results in Table 5.8 shows that the 
effect of a left-of-centre government is consistent with the findings for seat percentage. A 
left-of-centre government in British Columbia indicates an increase of 0.549 in the 
government accountability index, while a left-of-centre government in Ontario suggests a 
decrease of 0.673.  
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Table 5.8: Effect of Left-of-centre Governments on Accountability to Government 
 British Columbia Ontario 
1956-1965 -0.059(0.310) 0.317(0.229) 
1966-1975 -0.191(0.267) 0.308(0.213) 
1976-1985 0.110(0.264) 0.091(0.256) 
1986-1995 0.210(0.283) 0.597(0.291)** 
1996-2005 0.568(0.259)** 0.414(0.214)* 
Left Government 0.549(0.173)*** -0.673(293)** 
Spans Municipalities 0.104(0.406) 0.090(0.266) 
Single Province 0.036(0.265) -0.233(2.34) 
Self-Regulatory 0.655(0.162)*** -0.309(0.139) ** 
Adjusted R2 165 259 
Number of Cases 0.161 0.078 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively(two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
 
 
5.4 Results: Accountability Relationship with Society 
In looking at the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies two 
hypotheses are tested: H5.3 – the accountability relationship between society and Type II 
bodies has increased in strength over time; and H5.5 – the accountability relationship 
between society and Type II bodies will increase as the geographic scale of the Type II 
body decreases. When testing each hypothesis, two regression models are again used, the 
first model containing only the pertinent independent variables for the specific hypothesis 
and the second model including the combined set of independent variables for both 
hypotheses. Each hypothesis is examined in turn using the aggregated provincial dataset 
and then again using the individual provincial level datasets. The results for each 
hypothesis when using the aggregated data set are presented in Table 5.9.  
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Table 5.9: Society Accountability Index (Dataset includes AB, BC, NS and ON) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1956-1965 0.232(0.115)**  0.217(0.113)* 
1966-1975 0.270(0.105)***  0.276(0.102)*** 
1976-1985 0.190(0.112)*  0.177(0.110) 
1986-1995 0.500(0.108)***  0.489(0.106)*** 
1996-2005 0.506(0.106)***  0.499(0.103)*** 
Spans Municipalities  0.121(0.147) 0.099(0.145) 
Single Province  -0.402(0.126)*** -0.412(0.124)*** 
Spans Provinces  -0.676(0.373)* -0.732(0.367)** 
Alberta -0.117(0.071) -0.142(0.071)** -0.108(0.070) 
British Columbia -0.161(0.078)** -0.129(0.078)* -0.117(0.077) 
Nova Scotia -0.249(0.079)*** -0.200(0.080)** -0.203(0.079)*** 
Self-Regulatory 0.401(0.062)*** 0.568(0.062)*** 0.506(0.063)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.113 0.146 
Number of Cases 811 811 811 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
Ontario, 1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
When looking at the effect of time period on the strength of the accountability 
relationship between society and Type II bodies, the results displayed in Table 5.9, Model 
1, indicate that all time periods yield statistically significant results at the 90% confidence 
level or higher. For all time periods the relationship is positive; suggesting a higher level 
in the society accountability index score, which ranges from 0 to 3, for each subsequent 
time period when compared to 1946-1955. When all independent variables are included 
in the regression model, as shown in Model 3, the results remain consistent with the 
exception of the 1976 to 1985 time period, which is no longer statistically significant. 
The results for both Model 1 and Model 3 indicate that the most recent time period 
(1996-2005) produces the largest coefficient. The results in Model 3 suggest an increase 
of 0.499 in the society accountability index score for Type II bodies created or modified 
between the years of 1996 to 2005 in comparison to Type II bodies created or modified 
between the years of 1946 to 1955. Overall the observed trend is toward the 
strengthening of the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies over 
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time, lending support to the hypothesis that the accountability relationship between 
society and Type II bodies has increased in strength over time. 
When considering the effect of geographic scale on the strength of the accountability 
relationship between society and Type II bodies. The results in Table 5.9, Model 2 
indicate that Type II bodies that operate at the provincial geographic scale or higher 
produce statistically significant results in the negative direction at the 90% confidence 
level or higher. Based on the results in Model 2, a Type II body operating at the 
provincial geographic level suggests a decrease of 0.40, while a Type II body that spans 
provinces indicates a decrease of 0.676 in society accountability index score in 
comparison to a Type II body operating at the municipal geographic scale. When all 
variables are included within the regression model, as shown in Model 3, the results 
remain consistent, providing support for the hypothesis that the accountability 
relationship between society and Type II bodies increases as the geographic scale of the 
Type II body decreases. 
It should also be noted, as presented in Table 5.9, that the each of the provincial dummy 
variables produced statistically significant results in at least one of the three models. 
However, when all independent variables were included in the regression model, as 
shown in Model 4, only Nova Scotia remained significant. In Model 3, the results for 
Nova Scotia indicate a decrease of 0.203 in the society accountability index score in 
comparison to the province of Ontario. Overall the results suggest a weaker 
accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies in Nova Scotia than that 
which exist in the other provinces being studied. To a lesser extent, however, the results 
in Models 1 and 2 suggest a stronger accountability relationship between society and 
Type II bodies in Ontario than in either Alberta or British Columbia.  
As with the evaluation of the accountability relationship between government and Type II 
bodies, the dummy variable for Professional Self-Regulatory bodies produced statistically 
significant results at the 99% confidence level across all models in Table 5.9. In 
evaluating the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies, however, 
the relationship is in the opposite direction with a Professional Self-Regulatory body 
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producing an increase in the society accountability index score in comparison to other 
forms of Type II bodies. This result suggests that Professional Self-Regulatory bodies 
have more accountable mechanisms to society than other forms of Type II bodies. 
Proceeding to the evaluation of each hypothesis at the individual province level, the 
results for Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova Scotia will now be explored. 
The results for each hypothesis by province are presented in Tables 5.10 through Table 
5.13.  
Table 5.10: Society Accountability Index - Alberta 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1956-1965 -0.047(0.179)  -0.020(0.170) 
1966-1975 0.394(0.167)**  0.452(0.159)*** 
1976-1985 0.155(0.166)  0.249(0.160) 
1986-1995 0.494(0.170)***  0.477(0.161)*** 
1996-2005 0.982(0.168)***  0.940(0.234)*** 
Spans Municipalities  1.133(0.268)*** 0.940(0.253)*** 
Single Province  0.358(0.242) 0.235(0.229) 
Spans Provinces  Omitted18 Omitted 
Self-Regulatory 0.546(0.104)*** 0.806(1.109)*** 0.682(0.104)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.237 0.369 
Number of Cases 230 230 230 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively(two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
  
                                                
18  Spans Provinces is omitted when no Type II bodies that span provinces exist within the dataset.  
.  
  
137 
Table 5.11: Society Accountability Index – British Columbia 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1956-1965 0.609(0.285)**  0.497(0.277)* 
1966-1975 0.433(0.228)*  0.351(0.221) 
1976-1985 0.260(0.244)  0.252(0.235) 
1986-1995 0.656(0.234)***  0.546(0.229)** 
1996-2005 0.735(0.233)***  0.731(0.225)*** 
Spans Municipalities  -0.643(0.370)* -0.720(0.362)** 
Single Province  -0.926(0.237)*** -0.893(0.236)*** 
Spans Provinces  Omitted Omitted 
Self-Regulatory 0.239(0.146) 0.359(0.139)** 0.317(0.143)** 
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.089 0.133 
Number of Cases 165 165 165 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
Table 5.12: Society Accountability Index – Nova Scotia 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
1956-1965 0.141(0.275)  0.006(0.256) 
1966-1975 0.022(0.260)  0.138(0.241) 
1976-1985 0.043(0.267)  0.005(0.246) 
1986-1995 0.144(0.258)  0.181(0.238) 
1996-2005 0.180(0.260)  -0.151(0.241) 
Spans Municipalities  0.280(0.371) 0.383(0.385) 
Single Province  -0.666.(0.331)** -0.614(0.339)* 
Spans Provinces  -0.948(0.439)** -0.917(0.446)** 
Self-Regulatory 0.253(0.129)* -0.406(0.115)*** 0.401(0.124)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.175 0.157 
Number of Cases 157 157 157 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
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Table 5.13: Society Accountability Index – Ontario 
 Model 1 Model 2` Model 3 
1956-1965 0.208(0.219)  0.201(0.218) 
1966-1975 0.082(0.203)  0.059(0.203) 
1976-1985 0.200(0.244)  0.163(0.244) 
1986-1995 0.509(0.221)**  0.504(0.219)** 
1996-2005 0.114(0.204)  0.118(0.203) 
Spans Municipalities  -0.211(0.253) -0.164(0.252) 
Single Province  -0.411(0.222)* -0.393(0.222)* 
Spans Provinces  Omitted Omitted 
Self-Regulatory 0.427(0.124)*** 0.579(0.121)*** 0.499(0.128)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.075 0.087 
Number of Cases 259 259 259 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance). 
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables. 
When evaluating the effect of time period on the accountability relationship between 
society and Type II bodies at the individual provincial level the results vary across 
provinces. The results for Alberta are presented in Table 5.10, Model 1. For Alberta 
1966-1975, 1986-1995, and 1996-2005 produce statistically significant results – each in 
the positive direction. For Alberta the most recent time period, 1996-2005, produces the 
largest coefficient of 0.982, while the 1986-1995 period generated the second largest. 
Both the 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 results are significant at the 99% confidence level 
and the results are consistent when all independent variables are included in the 
regression model as shown in Table 5.10, Model 3. 
When evaluating H5.3 for British Columbia the results are presented in Table 5.11, Model 
1. All time periods produce results in the positive direction and are statistically significant 
at the 90% confidence level or higher with the exception of the 1976-1985. Like Alberta 
the most recent period, 1996 to 2005, produces the largest suggested increase in the 
society accountability index score, indicating an increase of 0.735 in comparison to 1946-
1955, while the 1986-1995 time period produced the second largest coefficient. The 
results for both the 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 time periods are significant at the 99% 
confidence level. When all independent variables are included in the regression model, as 
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shown in Table 5.11, Model 3, the results for 1966 to 1975 are no longer statistically 
significant. 
The results for the effect of time on the strength of the accountability relationship 
between society and Type II bodies for Nova Scotia are presented in Table 5.12, Model 1. 
No statistically significant results are produced and the results remain consistent when all 
independent variables are included in the regression model as show in Model 3.  
When evaluating H5.3 for Ontario the results are shown in Table 5.13, Model 1. For 
Ontario the only time period to produce statistically significant results is 1986-1995, 
which indicates an increase of 0.509 in the society accountability index score in 
comparison to 1946-1955 and is significant at the 95 % confidence level. When all 
independent variables are included in the regression model the results remain consistent. 
Of the four provinces, the results for both Alberta and British Columbia provide support 
for the hypothesis that the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies 
has increased in strength over time. Conversely neither the Nova Scotia nor Ontario case 
provides support for the hypothesis.  
Testing the effect of geographic scale on the accountability relationship between society 
and Type II bodies produce conflicting results. When evaluating H5.5 for Alberta the 
results are presented in Table 5.10 Model 2. In the case of Alberta, spans municipality is 
the only variable to produces statistically significant results. While spans municipality is 
expected to produce a negative coefficient, the results are in the positive direction. The 
results suggest an increase of 1.333 in the society accountability index in comparison to 
Type II bodies that operate within the jurisdictional boundaries of a single municipality 
and are significant at the 99% confidence level. As shown in Model 3, the results remain 
consistent when all independent variables are included in the regression model.  
When evaluating hypothesis H5.5 for British Columbia the results are presented in Table 
5.11, Model 2. The results are in the expected direction, with increases in the geographic 
scale of Type II bodies suggesting a decrease in the society accountability index score. 
As shown in Table 5.11, Model 2, spanning municipalities indicates a decrease of 0.643 
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and operating at the same geographic scale as the province indicates a decrease of 0.926 
in comparison to Type II bodies that operate within the boundaries of a single 
municipality. The results are significant at the 90% and 99% confidence level and remain 
consistent when all variables are added to the regression model as shown in Table 5.11, 
Model 3.  
When evaluating the effect of the geographic scale on Type II bodies in Nova Scotia the 
results are presented in Table 5.12, Model 2. In the case of Nova Scotia the results for 
Single Province and Spans Provinces produce statistically significant results in the 
expected direction at the 90% confidence level. As shown in Model 2, Type II bodies that 
operate on the same geographic scale as the province suggest a decrease of 0.666 and 
Type II bodies that span provinces suggest a decrease of 0.948 when compared to Type II 
bodies that operate within the boundaries of a single municipality. When all independent 
variables are included in the regression model the results remain significant at the 90% 
confidence level or higher as shown in Table 5.11, Model 3. 
When evaluating H5.5 for the province of Ontario the results are presented in Table 5.13, 
Model 2. For Ontario, single province is the only variable to produce statistically 
significant results. As shown in Model 2, the results of Single Province are statistically 
significant at the 90% confidence level and suggest a decrease of 0.411 in the society 
accountability index in comparison to Type II bodies that operate within the boundaries 
of a single municipality. As presented in Table 13, Model 3, the results remain consistent 
when all independent variables are included within the regression model.  
Overall, at the individual provincial level, the results for Albert refute the hypothesis that 
the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as the 
geographic scale of the Type II body decreases, while the results for British Columbia, 
Nova Scotia, and Ontario provide support for the hypothesis. 
In addition to the results for the independent variables being tested, the results for the 
Professional Self-Regulatory dummy variable are again noteworthy. As shown in Model 
3 in Tables 5.10 through 5.13 the results for the Self-Regulatory variable indicates a 
higher level in the society accountability index across all provinces. This suggests that 
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Professional Self-Regulatory bodies have a stronger accountability relationship with 
society than other forms of Type II bodies. 
When the regression models are run for each of the provincial datasets the results are 
inconsistent. A summary of whether support was found for each of the hypotheses by 
dataset is provided in Table 5.14. As shown in Table 5.14 there is mixed support for H5.3 
– the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased in 
strength over time. When evaluating the effect of time, the Alberta and British Columbia 
datasets produce significant results in the positive direction for both the 1986-1995 and 
1996-2005 time periods. The results suggest an increase in strength of the accountability 
relationship between society and Type II bodies in comparison to 1946-1955. The 
provincial dataset for Ontario produced significant results for 1986-1995; however, the 
results for 1995-2005 are not significant in comparison to 1946-1955. The results for 
Ontario suggest that any gains in accountability have since been lost. The Nova Scotia 
dataset produced no significant results, suggesting that the strength of the accountability 
relationship has remained consistent across the sixty years being studied.  
Table 5.14: Society Accountability Index - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset 
 H5.3 – Time  H5.5 – Geographic 
All Provinces Support Support 
Alberta Support No Support 
British Columbia Support Support 
Nova Scotia No Support Support 
Ontario No Support Support 
As shown in Table 5.14 mixed support also exists for H5.5 – the accountability 
relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as the geographic scale of 
the Type II body decreases. When testing geography, the results for all datasets with the 
exception of Alberta are significant in the expected direction. In British Columbia, Nova 
Scotia, and Ontario the results suggest a decrease in the society accountability index 
score when the Type II body is operating at the same geographic scale as the province in 
comparison to a Type II body that is operating on the same geographic scale as a 
municipality. The results for British Columbia further indicate a lower level in the society 
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accountability index score for Type II bodies that span municipalities, while the results 
for Nova Scotia further suggest a lower level for Type II bodies that span provinces. The 
results for Alberta, however, are significant in the opposite direction, suggesting an 
increase in the society accountability index for the Type II bodies that span municipalities 
in comparison to Type II bodies that operate within the jurisdictional boundaries of a 
single municipality. 
5.5 Comparing the Strength of Accountability Relationships 
In responding to concerns of accountability brought about by the dispersal of authority 
outside of government, this chapter has sought to gain an understanding of the 
accountability environment that has emerged when government has delegated decision-
making authority. In doing so, the effect of political ideology, time, and geographic scale 
on the accountability relationships between Type II bodies and both government and 
society have been explored. 
In looking at the accountability environment that emerges when authority migrates, two 
of the principal findings are that the accountability relationships between both Type II 
bodies and government and Type II bodies and society have been strengthened over time. 
This indicates that the ability for both government and society to hold Type II bodies 
accountable for decisions made and actions taken is greater today than it has been in the 
past, lessening concerns over democratic accountability. However, while the 
accountability relationships between both Type II bodies and government and Type II 
bodies in society have become stronger, it is important to note that the accountability 
relationship between Type II bodies and society remains weak when compared to the 
relationship between Type II bodies and government.  
As shown in Tables 5.15, the mean government accountability index scores, which are 
used to assess the relationship between government and Type II bodies, are consistently 
higher than society accountability index scores, which are used to assess the relationship 
between Type II bodies and society. Across all four provinces the mean government 
accountability index score for the entire time frame is above 1, while the society 
accountability score is below 1 and for no time period is the society accountability index 
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score higher than that of the government accountability index score. This is consistent 
with Tanja Börzel’s argument that in the modern state both public and private actors 
operate under the shadow of hierarchy where public actors set the legal rules of the game 
and intervene to correct distortions or outcomes that violate public interests (Börzel, 
2010: 196-197). So while an underlying assumption of multilevel governance is that 
centralization has given way to new forms of governance, resulting in decision-making 
authority being dispersed across multiple jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe, 2005 15-6), 
the state continues to play a dominant role within the governance process. 
Table 5.15: Mean Accountability Index Scores Across Time by Province 
 Alberta British Columbia Nova Scotia Ontario 
 Gov Acc 
Index 
Soc Acc 
Index 
Gov Acc 
Index 
Soc Acc 
Index 
Gov Acc 
Index 
Soc Acc 
Index 
Gov Acc 
Index 
Soc Acc 
Index 
1946-1955 1.32 0.42 1.61 0.33 1.50 0.60 1.70 0.74 
1956-1965 1.64 0.35 1.79 0.86 1.57 0.76 2.07 0.88 
1966-1975 2.06 0.74 1.98 0.67 1.66 0.59 2.08 0.78 
1976-1985 2.20 0.58 1.93 0.52 2.12 0.62 1.83 0.92 
1986-1995 1.85 0.92 2.34 0.94 1.68 0.74 1.74 1.38 
1996-2005 2.14 1.53 2.39 1.06 1.38 0.85 2.05 0.92 
All Years 1.91 0.79 2.06 0.75 1.66 0.71 1.96 0.93 
The results in Table 5.15 also bring to the forefront questions over the continued 
strengthening of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government 
and Type II bodies and society. While the results for Alberta and British Columbia 
indicated a reasonably continuous strengthening of accountability relationships, the 
sudden decrease in the mean government accountability index score for Nova Scotia 
during the most recent two 10-year periods raises concerns over democratic input and 
accountability within the governance process. Presented above in Table 5.2, the Nova 
Scotia case was unique among the provinces studied. Nova Scotia is the only province in 
which the government accountability index is consistently decreasing across regression 
models in comparison to Ontario. In Table 5.15, the Nova Scotia case shows that 
accountability gains can be lost. Small increases in the strength of the accountability 
relationship between Type II bodies and society are more than offset by decreases in the 
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies.  
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Furthermore, the highest mean accountability for the 1996 to 2005 time period presented 
in Table 5.15 is 2.39, which is far from the maximum accountability score of 3. This 
suggests that while the strength of both accountability relationships may be improving, a 
full accountability relationship with either government or the public does not exist for a 
large number Type II bodies. The limited nature of accountability relationships for a 
portion of Type II bodies bolsters concerns over a loss of public input and democratic 
accountability when decision-making processes are delegated to Type II multilevel 
governance bodies. 
While time period had a positive effect on the accountability relationships between Type 
II bodies and government and Type II bodies and society, the geographic scale of a Type 
II body had an effect only on the relationship between Type II bodies and society. 
Specifically, Type II bodies that exist on a smaller geographic scale have stronger 
accountability relationships with society than Type II bodies that have boundaries that 
align with the province. In contrast, the accountability relationship between Type II 
bodies and government remains constant across geographic levels. As government is in 
control of the legislation used to create Type II bodies, the results indicate that 
governments are willing to, and in fact do, incorporate mechanisms that provide for a 
stronger accountability relationship between Type II bodies and society when the Type II 
body is operating and making decisions at a geographic scale that is less than the area of 
the province. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results also indicate that there is no 
willingness on the part of government to give up any control they may gain over the 
actions of the Type II body through their accountability relationship, as the strength of 
the accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government remain constant 
across geographic scales.  
Just as the strength of the accountability relationship between government and Type II 
bodies remains constant regardless of geographic scale, so too does the relative strength 
of the two accountability relationships. The mean government and society accountability 
index scores for Type II bodies smaller in scale than the provincial boundaries are 
presented by decade in Table 5.16. Consistent with the overall results, the results in Table 
5.16 shows than the mean government accountability index score remains consistently 
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higher than the mean society accountability index scores when looking at Type II bodies 
that are smaller in geographic scale than provincial boundaries. This indicates that the 
stronger of the two accountability relationships remains the relationship between 
government and Type II bodies. While the ability for societal actors to hold Type II 
multilevel governance bodies accountable increases as the geographic scale of the Type II 
body deceases, the state continues to hold the dominant position. 
Table 5.16: Mean Accountability Index Scores for Type II bodies at the Single 
Municipality or Spans Municipalities Geographic scale 
 Government 
Accountability 
Index 
Society 
Accountability 
Index 
1946-1955 1.82 1.18 
1956-1965 2.00 1.05 
1966-1975 2.29 1.03 
1976-1985 2.27 0.63 
1986-1995 2.27 1.14 
1996-2005 2.46 1.50 
All Years 2.22 1.07 
One area in which the strength of the accountability relationships between Type II bodies 
and government and Type II bodies and society approaches parity is for Professional 
Self-Regulatory bodies. The results for Professional Self-Regulatory bodies show the 
strength of the accountability relationships to be moving in opposite directions, producing 
a statistically significant increase in the accountability relationship between Type II 
bodies and society and a statistically significant decrease in the accountability 
relationship between Type II bodies and government when compared to other forms of 
Type II bodies. The mean government and society accountability index scores for 
Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies as compared to other forms of Type II bodies are 
presented in Table 5.17. As the results in Table 5.17 show, the decrease in government 
accountability index scores and the increase in society accountability index scores for 
Professional Self-Regulatory bodies in comparison to all other forms of regulatory body 
are consistent across time periods.  
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Table 5.17: Mean Accountability Index Scores for Professional Self-Regulatory 
Bodies 
 Government Accountability Index Society Accountability Index 
 Non Self-
Regulatory Bodies 
Professional Self-
Regulatory Bodies 
Non Self-
Regulatory Bodies 
Professional Self-
Regulatory Bodies 
1946-1955 1.83 0.85 0.40 0.53 
1956-1965 2.16 0.45 0.66 0.86 
1966-1975 2.13 1.07 0.68 0.89 
1976-1985 2.22 1.50 0.53 1.00 
1986-1995 2.17 1.39 0.78 1.40 
1996-2005 2.17 1.82 0.90 1.28 
All Years 2.13 1.37 0.68 1.14 
While being a Professional Self-Regulatory body has opposite effects on the two 
accountability relationships, the relationships only approach but do not reach parity. The 
results in Table 5.16 show that although the government accountability index scores 
decrease and the society accountability index scores increase, the accountability 
relationship between society and Type II bodies remains the weaker of the two 
relationships. Furthermore, when the difference between the means of the two 
accountability index scores is tested using a t-test the results indicate the difference 
between means to be significant at the 99% confidence level.19 This indicates that while 
the two accountability scores may be converging, a significant difference in strength of 
the two accountability relationships remains, meaning the state retains its position as the 
dominant actor.  
5.6 Discussion: What makes Nova Scotia Different? 
The results for Nova Scotia also indicate significantly weaker accountability to both 
government and society. One possible explanation for the difference is Nova Scotia’s 
smaller population size. To test the effect of population the provincial dummy variables 
were replaced with the provincial population size in the regression models. When testing 
                                                
19  Satterthwaite’s approximation formula for the degrees of freedom is used to when conducting the t-test 
(StataCorp, 2013: 2242), as variances between samples were not assumed to be equal. 
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the effect of population on the accountability relationship with government the results are 
not significant, however, when testing the effect of population on the relationship with 
society the results are significant and suggest an increase of 0.000186 in the society 
accountability index score for every additional 10000 people. These findings suggest that 
while population size does not help to explain the weak accountability relationship with 
government, it has some explanatory power for the weaker relationship between Type II 
bodies and society. 
A second possible explanation for the different results is the effect of political culture. 
The effects of cultural differences on the political processes, government institutions, and 
policy choices have long been recognized. Cultural differences influence both the policy 
problems that confront government, and the types of policies elected officials are likely to 
pursue (Lieske, 2012: 108). While in the recent past all provinces have been subject to 
the pressures to balance budgets and shrink the role of the provincial state (Dyck, 2006: 
57), historical differences exist that have shaped unique political cultures. Historically, 
the political culture of Nova Scotia has been firmly based on a clientist model (Black and 
Fierlbeck, 2006: 522). Nova Scotia’s political culture has been characterized as 
hierarchical, elite oriented, conservative and traditional (Wiseman, 2006: 24, 31). 
Furthermore, the Conservative and Liberal parties, which governed the province during 
the duration of timeframe being studied, lacked substantive ideological difference and 
both maintained the dominance of traditional conservative politics (Wiseman, 2006: 24; 
Bickerton, 2001: 53). What developed between the late eighteenth and mid-twentieth 
centuries was a pervasive system of patronage and deference to authority that became 
cemented in the Maritimes Provinces (Wiseman, 2006: 38). While the 1990s brought 
change to the political landscape in Nova Scotia, with the Buchanan government, who 
practiced traditional elitist politics, replaced by a government with a more reformist 
agenda (Bickerton, 2001: 60), the traditional hierarchical elitist nature of Nova Scotia 
politics may still play a role in the development of accountability relationships between 
Type II bodies and government. With the provincial elites dominating politics and 
political rewards doled out through a patronage system, they may have been little need 
for politicians to build formal mechanisms into the legislation that enforce the 
accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government. The elites have a 
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vested interest in maintaining the status quo, while those rewarded patronage positions 
have a vested interested in acting according to preferences of those handing out the 
rewards. The threat of being replaced, coupled with the deference to authority associated 
with hierarchy may be sufficient to keep Type II bodies in check.  
5.7 Conclusion 
In looking at the accountability environment that emerges when authority migrates, two 
overarching trends emerge: 1) the strength of accountability relationships between Type 
II bodies and government and Type II bodies and society have increased over time, and 
2) that regardless of increases in the strength of the accountability relationship between 
Type II bodies and society, the relationship between Type II bodies and government 
remains the stronger of the two relationships. 
As the cumulative number of Type II bodies involved in the governance process continue 
to expand, as the results from Chapter 4 show, the increase in both the strength of the 
accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government and Type II bodies 
and society can be seen as positive for public input and democratic accountability. As 
laid out at the start of the chapter, three different accountability arrangements may exist 
to hold Type II bodies accountable to citizens. First, society may act as principals with 
Type II bodies as agents where Type II bodies are directly accountable to society. 
Second, citizens may act as principals with democratically elected government as agents, 
who are in turn acting as principals with Type II bodies again as agents where Type II 
bodies are indirectly accountable to the citizens. Finally both accountability arrangements 
may exist. The results indicate the existence of both accountability arrangements, with 
citizens increasingly able to hold Type II bodies directly accountable and able to hold 
Type II bodies accountable indirectly through the chain of accountability from citizens 
through government to Type II bodies. 
While the overall increase in the strength of accountability relationships is an 
encouraging sign of democratic accountability, there is still some reason for concern. As 
shown in Table 5.15, decreases in the mean government accountability index score for 
Nova Scotia during the two most recent ten-year periods presents a situation where past 
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gains in accountability are lost. While the results for Nova Scotia are unique among the 
provinces studied, it does raise concerns over democratic accountability when Type II 
bodies are brought into the governance process. Moreover, in the Nova Scotia case, small 
increases in the strength of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and 
society were more than offset by decreases in the accountability relationship between 
government and Type II bodies during the most recent time period. In the case of 
Ontario, the increase in society accountability index for the 1986 to 1995 time period is 
statistically significant compared to 1946-1955, while the 1996 to 2005 time period is 
not. Both the Nova Scotia and the Ontario case raise concern over the ability to maintain 
accountability gains and secure public input and democratic accountability once decision-
making authority has migrated. 
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Chapter 6 
“There will come a time when the Ministry of Health is the only Ministry we can afford to have 
and we still won't be able to afford the Ministry of Health” 
- Dalton McGuinty, Premier of Ontario  
6 Migration of Authority and Healthcare Reform 
Chapters 4 and 5 explored the rate at which the provincial governments of Alberta, 
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario migrated decision-making authority to actors 
outside of elected government and the accountability relationships that emerged once 
authority migrated. Having evaluated the migration of authority using the universe of 
cases from 1946 to 2005, Chapters 6 and 7 now focus on a specific policy area – 
healthcare. In doing so, a more nuanced account of the factors and reasoning that led to 
the migration of decision-making authority away from elected officials is provided. 
In Canada, the trend toward migrating healthcare authority away from the centre of 
government emerged in the 1970s with the creation of District Health Councils in 
Ontario. While having no decision-making authority, the councils identified areas of 
need, assessed healthcare alternatives, and established priorities at the local level 
(Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1987: 14-15). New instances of authority 
migration emerged in the 1990s, as Alberta, British Columbia, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Saskatchewan all 
devolved authority to regional bodies between the years of 1991 and 1994, with Manitoba 
following suit in 1996 (Lomas, Woods and Veenstra, 1997: 371). While implementing 
District Health Councils as advisory boards in the 70s, Ontario was the last province to 
devolve decision-making authority with the creation of Local Health Integration 
Networks in 2006.  
Building on the results of previous chapters, this chapter explores the process by which 
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario legislated the migration of authority 
and the creation of new Type II bodies in each provincial healthcare system. In doing so 
specific attention will be paid to determining what factors may have precipitated the 
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migration of decision-making authority in each case. To continue to develop an 
understanding of why authority migrates, both the fiscal capacity and political ideology 
hypotheses put forward in Chapter 4 will be evaluated against the migration of authority 
in the four healthcare systems. To reiterate, the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 4 are: 
H4.3 - The lower the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher 
the rate of creation of Type II bodies.  
H4.4 – The further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a government sits the 
lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies. 
A summary of the support found for each hypothesis in Chapter 4 is provided in Table 
6.1. As shown in Table 6.1, the analysis in Chapter 4 produced inconsistent results, with 
support evident in some datasets, but not in others. 
Table 6.1: Type II Body Annual Creation Rate – Support for Hypothesis by Dataset 
 H4.3 Fiscal Capacity H4.4 – Ideology  
 Disposable Income Provincial Debt % Left Seats 
All Provinces No Support  No Support No Support 
All Provinces – 
Excluding Self-
Regulatory Bodies 
No Support  Support No Support 
Alberta No Support  Support No Support 
British Columbia No Support  No Support No Support 
Nova Scotia No Support  No Support Support 
Ontario No Support  No Support Support 
While Chapter 4 evaluated the effect of fiscal capacity and political ideology on the 
migration of authority to Type II bodies, this chapter further seeks to explore the 
existence of other factors that may have contributed to the migration of authority in 
provincial healthcare. The unique context surrounding the creation of Type II healthcare 
bodies in each province offers the potential to further identify additional factors that 
promote the migration of authority. One factor that may either promote or suppress the 
creation of Type II bodies is how problems are defined or framed. Due to the inconsistent 
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results in Chapter 4, the impact of how policy problems in the healthcare system are 
framed by government for public consumption is also considered. To do so, government 
policy documents, commission reports, provincial legislation, and provincial regulations 
will be used to gain an understanding of how policy challenges in healthcare were framed 
during the authority migration process. Consistency in policy framing in relation to 
policy solutions and eventual policy outcomes are considered in the evaluation of factors 
that contributed to authority migration. For each of the four provinces the initial 
migration of authority as well as subsequent changes to the governance model will be 
explored.  
6.1 Problem Definition, Issue Framing and Policy Images 
To gain insight into what factors played a role in the migration of authority from central 
provincial governments to multilevel governance Type II bodies, how each province 
defined the challenges facing the healthcare system will be explored. There is universal 
agreement that a key factor in policy response is how the problem, or the situation that is 
considered to be problematic, is defined (Pal, 2006: 97). How a problem is structured acts 
as a steering mechanism that shapes of all subsequent phases of policy development 
(Dunn, 2004: 72; Pal, 2006: 97). Simply stated, as policies are responses to problems, 
how the problem is defined shapes the nature of the policy response (Pal, 2006: 97). 
Linked to the idea of problem definition is the concept of issue framing. On a basic level, 
issue framing can be characterized as something akin to an optimal rhetorical strategy 
through which policy actors emphasize the aspects of an issue that gives their preferred 
solution a rhetorical edge (Jerit, 2008: 1-2). When expanded upon, framing can be 
defined as “a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex 
reality so as to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting” (Rein 
and Schon, 1991: 263). As argued by Rein and Schon, it is through framing that vague 
issues can be made sense of and eventually acted upon (1991: 263). However, frames do 
not simply reduce the issue to an argument on one side or another. Frames are broader; 
they suggest how an issue should be thought of and recommend what, if anything should 
be done (Nelson and Kinder, 1996: 1057). In essence, frames shape how citizens think 
about political issues (Sniderman and Theriault, 2004: 136).  
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Rein and Schon suggest that frames are never self-interpreted. Instead the interpretation 
of policy issues, in its various frames, is usually undertaken by a group of individuals or 
by informal or formal organizations. Sponsors of the frame, such as government officials, 
seek to develop the frame, make explicit its implications for action and establish grounds 
for arguments surrounding it (Rein and Schon, 1991: 274-275). As all people cannot be 
equally interested in or knowledgeable on all policy issues facing society, specialists in 
any particular area have an advantage over others. When communicating with the broader 
public and political elites specialists explain issues and justify policy approaches in a 
simplified manner. The result is a set of policy images that are a combination of empirical 
information and emotional appeals, leaving the problem understood in simplified and 
symbolic terms (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 25-26).  
At the centre of the process of transforming issues into policy problems are causal ideas. 
As stated by Deborah Stone, “Problem definition is a process of image making, where 
images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility” 
(1989: 282). As such, difficulties or issues do not have inherent properties that make 
them more or less likely to be seen as problems, but instead, political actors deliberately 
portray them in ways calculated to give support for their position (Stone, 1989: 282). 
Stone further contends that, in the world of public policy, there is always choice about 
which factors to address. Focusing on different storylines will locate the responsibility 
and burden of reform differently (Stone, 1989: 296). When considering the migration of 
authority to Type II bodies in provincial healthcare, what are the causal factors that 
promote the adoption of Type II healthcare bodies as a corrective action? Reflecting back 
on the original hypotheses, will the policy problem be defined in terms of fiscal capacity, 
political ideology, or something yet to be defined? 
A challenge posed by issue framing is that it is possible for multiple, potentially 
conflicting, frames to be built using the same underlying facts or evidence. At play is the 
reality that divergent worldviews produce differences in how the underlying facts are 
interpreted. As a result there is the potential for variation in how issues are framed and 
what if any action should be taken in response to the issue (Rein and Schon, 1991: 264-
265; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 26). No one individual has the power to define the 
  154 
policy image or to guarantee that a specific solution will be adopted; both are the result of 
political conflict (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 29). In basing the analysis of the 
migration of authority in the healthcare system on government documents, the frame that 
is being assessed is the policy image that emerged as successful from the political 
battlefield. On the political battlefield, the differing conceptions of both the policy 
problem and policy solutions would have been contested. 
6.2 Why Healthcare? 
The decision to explore the migration of decision-making authority in healthcare 
provision is rooted in high level of importance placed on healthcare by Canadian citizens 
and the declining presence of academic literature on healthcare decentralization since the 
early days of authority migration as a vehicle for healthcare reform. The importance of 
healthcare to Canadians is evident in Canadian Election Study results. Results for both 
the 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Study identify healthcare as the most frequently 
selected issue, chosen over taxes, social welfare programs, the environment and 
corruption in government when asked, “Which of these five issues is the most important 
issue to you PERSONALLY in this election.” The results found that 48.8 of respondents 
selected healthcare as the most important issue in 2004 and 40.8 per cent selected 
healthcare in 2006 (Blais et al., 2007). Also, as discussed in Chapter 4, in 2005 85% of 
Canadians stated that they believed that eliminating public healthcare represented a 
fundamental change to the nature of Canada, with more respondents viewing eliminating 
healthcare as a fundamental change than any other policy in the survey, including 
abandoning English and French as Canada’s official languages, and ending peacekeeping 
missions (Soroka, 2007:5). However, while healthcare is identified as an important issue 
to Canadians, the literature on the decentralization of the healthcare system has 
diminished. Paradoxically, as authority migration has become common-place across 
provincial healthcare systems, Black and Fierlbeck lament that there is less literature now 
than when the policies were first being implemented (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 507). 
In addition to political salience and the decline in academic focus stated above, the 
selection of healthcare is also guided by practical considerations. With the creation of 
LHINs in Ontario a degree of decision-making authority was migrated outside of the 
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central provincial governments in all 10 Canadian provinces, which allows for the 
continued use of cross provincial comparisons between Alberta, British Columbia, Nova 
Scotia and Ontario. Furthermore, how decentralization works within each province is 
affected by contextual differences such as: variation in size, economies, political cultures 
and other local features (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 523). This perception of 
decentralization is consistent with outcomes in provincial healthcare, as they are not 
uniform, but differ in governance models, degree of authority migration, and, in the case 
of Ontario, timing of events. Taken together, the common use of horizontal migration of 
authority as a healthcare reform policy solution coupled with differences in its 
implementation provide a venue for investigating how contextual differences influence 
the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 4 as well as factors specific to each provincial 
context. 
Lastly, while the focus of analysis is on the creation of Type II bodies and the resulting 
accountability mechanism in the Canadian provinces, the migration of decision-making 
authority in healthcare is not unique to Canada. For example, in New Zealand the district 
offices of the Department of Health were merged with local hospital boards to create 
Area Health Boards during the 1980s (Anderson, 1996: 78). Subsequent reforms saw 
New Zealand’s Area Health Boards broken up and their functions divided among a 
number of public and private actors (Anderson, 1996: 82). In the United Kingdom the 
management of the National Health Service was decentralized to regional and district 
levels through the creation of Health Authorities (Dekker, 1994: 283), while the 
Netherlands has traditionally been a mix of public and private, with regulation of services 
falling to government and quasi-autonomous non-government organizations (Dekker, 
1994: 284). Given the widespread adoption of devolved decision-making authority in 
healthcare, the analysis of authority migration in healthcare reform has the potential to 
provide value beyond Canada. 
6.3 Healthcare Reform and Authority Migration 
While an important issue, the migration of decision-making authority in healthcare 
reform has proven to be complex (Vaughan, 1990: 139). Mills argues that patterns of 
institutionalized local behaviour, even those that are peripheral to healthcare, can 
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influence which healthcare governance structure is ultimately adopted (1990:38). The 
unique historical experiences of each jurisdiction have made generalizations over the 
reason for authority migration in healthcare difficult. Countries with their own unique 
historical context and with governments differing in political beliefs and policies have 
felt the need to reform healthcare by way of shifting authority to some degree away from 
central government (Vaughan, 1990: 139). 
In assessing what decentralization in healthcare looks like, Mills states that while 
decentralization can be defined in terms of transferring authority from higher levels to 
lower levels of government, decentralization in the health system takes on many forms, 
making decentralization not only an important theme in healthcare, but a confused one 
(1990, 11). Four paths through which aspects of the healthcare system can be shifted 
outside of central government are identified: deconcentration, devolution, delegation and 
privatization (Mills, 1990: 16). Deconcentration is the movement of administrative 
authority to locally based offices of central government (Mills, 1990, 16). Devolution is 
the creation or strengthening of subnational levels of government that are substantively 
independent from central government (Mills, 1990, 19). Delegation is the transfer of 
managerial responsibility for defined functions to organizations that are outside the 
government and are only indirectly controlled by central government (Mills, 1990, 21). 
Lastly, Privatization involves the transfer of government functions to voluntary 
organizations, private profit-making organizations, or non-profit enterprises (Mills, 1990, 
22).  
Lomas views the four paths put forward by Mills as a continuum along which the central 
branch of government has decreasing a level of direct control over the decisions being 
made (1996: 28). An alternative conceptualization is a continuum between state-centric 
and society-centric steering along which decision-making control shifts between the 
central state and societal actors. To determine where authority migration to Type II 
healthcare bodies would be placed on that continuum, the three conditions laid out in 
Chapter 3 must be considered. Authority migration to Type II bodies must satisfy three 
conditions: authority over some part of the public realm must be granted to a new or 
existing body through an act of provincial legislation; the majority of decision-makers 
  
157 
within the body must be comprised of individuals who are from outside of government, 
the legislature, and the public service; and the legislated decision-makers must have 
decision-making autonomy. As such, the operationalization of migration of authority to 
Type II bodies is consistent with delegation and privatization but not deconcentration and 
devolution. 
Where on the continuum each instance of healthcare decentralization occurs, however, is 
a negotiation process as pressures on the state combined with local attitudes shape the 
decentralization process (Lomas, 1996: 28). In combination, three sources grant power 
during the authority migration process. The government grants the newly formed 
healthcare body formal powers. Health professionals and institutions recognize and 
conform to the decisions made by the new healthcare body. Citizens provide credibility to 
the new healthcare body and a mandate to represent their needs, wants, and preferences. 
As each source of power has its own agenda, the new healthcare authorities are situated at 
the intersection of government’s expectations, providers’ interests and citizens’ 
preferences (Lomas, Woods and Veenstra, 1997: 734). The successful policy image that 
ultimately triumphs within the negotiation process will be a product of the unique 
historical experiences of the specific jurisdiction. While the state must work within the 
confines of the internal and external pressures placed upon the healthcare system, it 
maintains the capacity to set the overall ground rules and regulatory order. Despite the 
participation of government, health professionals, and citizens in the negotiation process, 
government continues to occupy a privileged position as the lone entity with the 
legislative capacity to set the rules of governance (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 895; Rhodes, 
2007: 1244; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 13).  
Informing the negotiation process and ultimately the devolved structure that emerges are 
the perceived advantages and disadvantages of devolved authority that have been 
developed by issue framers in promoting their preferred solution. Consistent with the 
assertion that multiple frames be built using the same underlying facts or evidence, Mills 
argues that attributing advantages and disadvantages to devolution is complex, as 
alongside each advantage exists a corresponding disadvantage. For example, increased 
citizen participation is promoted as an advantage, while increased difficulty in developing 
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national policies, priorities and standards can be seen as a disadvantage (Mills, 1990: 38). 
This is not unique to healthcare; authority migration is cast in both positive and negative 
light more broadly. As discussed in Chapter 2, from the positive perspective, authority 
migration holds the potential for more responsive governance than a single political 
monopoly (Bollens, 1986: 119; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 633). From the critical 
perspective, however, authority migration has the potential to weaken legitimacy and 
create disillusionment with the political process (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104). In 
healthcare, experts have continued to debate over the success of decentralization. Some 
experts claim that the promise of greater accountability and increased citizen 
participation in decision-making has been realized, while others argue that such claims 
have remained unfulfilled (Collier, 2010: 331). 
In the Canadian context, there is no one national system of healthcare, but instead a set of 
provincial systems (Deber, 2003: 20). While each province has its own unique story, 
there is a degree of commonality across the provincial healthcare systems due to their 
shared history. When Canada was formed, healthcare was the concern of religious 
groups, charitable organizations or individuals (Braën, 2004: 25). Though coming under 
provincial jurisdiction, the healthcare systems remained largely a matter of local public 
initiative, with the delivery of health services remaining in the hands of municipal 
hospitals, or religious and charitable institutions (Dorland and Davis, 1996: 4). Personal 
health was seen as purely a private matter (Braën, 2004: 28) and a direct financial 
relationship, with the recipients of local healthcare services paying the healthcare 
providers directly (Lomas, 1996:29). 
The expansion of the social welfare system following the end of World War II altered the 
provincial healthcare systems as both provincial and federal governments became more 
involved in healthcare policy (Braën, 2004: 25). This movement toward centralization 
was spurred on by the increasing complexity of medical care and corresponding rising 
costs (Dorland and Davis, 1996: 4; Johnson, 2004: 208) as well as a shift in perception 
from individual to social importance of healthcare (Braën, 2004: 28; Dorland and Davis, 
1996: 4) As mindsets changed, the financial relationship between patients and service 
providers became increasingly indirect with the provinces reimbursing healthcare 
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professionals for services (Lomas, 1996: 29). By 1971, all provinces and territories were 
participating in the medical and hospital services programs in which funding was shared 
by the provincial and federal governments (Deber, 2003: 21; Naylor, 1999: 11). The 
resulting healthcare environment was one in which funding decisions and setting of 
healthcare standards was centralized while hospital boards continued to operate at the 
local level. 
Just as increased costs facilitated the shift from a largely local healthcare system to one 
that was increasingly centralized, growing financial pressures in healthcare helped again 
to bring healthcare reform onto the public agenda. Inflationary pressures in the 1970s led 
to increasingly harder lines being taken by governments in collective bargaining with 
organized medicine, leading some practitioners to levy extra charges, which prompted 
concerns over the erosion of Medicare’s principle of accessibility. The federal 
government responded with the Canada Health Act in 1984. The Canada Health Act 
consolidated previous insurance legislation and reduced federal funding to provinces that 
allowed hospitals and doctors to impose extra fees. Over the next two years all provinces 
passed legislation that abolished such fees (Naylor, 1999: 11-12). While the Canada 
Health Act reaffirmed a commitment to the principles of Medicare (Johnson, 2004: 205), 
the federal proportion of health expenditures fell (Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia, 1994: 491; 
Naylor, 1999: 12). The combination of ever-growing expenditures and reduced revenue 
streams pushed provincial governments to reevaluate their healthcare systems and initiate 
major healthcare reforms (Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia, 1994: 491).  
One of the possible factors contributing to the migration of authority discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter is the weakening of a government’s ability to meet the fiscal 
obligations of a growing governance demand. Hurley, Lomas, and Bhatia described such 
a scenario in Canadian provincial healthcare where ever-growing demands and reductions 
in revenue sources pushed provincial governments to consider healthcare reforms (1994: 
491). However, internal fiscal pressures alone did not drive the widespread enactment of 
provincial healthcare reforms. In conjunction with the changing fiscal circumstances 
came changes in public confidence in the functioning of their healthcare system. While 
citizens remained generally satisfied and supportive of provincial healthcare in the early 
  160 
1990s, a shift from support to concern emerged throughout the 90s (Tomblin, 2004: 291; 
Lavis 2004: 257). The public continued to support the principles of a publicly funded 
universal system, however, there were growing concerns over the system’s sustainability 
(Tomblin, 2004: 291). As concerns rose, the Canadian public began to call for large-scale 
change in the healthcare system (Lavis, 2004: 257). The growing public worry added to 
the existing government concerns over the fiscal sustainability of the existing healthcare 
systems. During a health policy conference focused on regionalization and 
decentralization, then Ontario Premier David Peterson remarked, “you can introduce 
change at two times – when all is quiet and successful or when there is a sense of crisis. I 
believe that, right now, we are close enough to a sense of crisis that the time is ripe for a 
change in the health-care system” (Peterson, 1996: 14).  
One hypothesis evaluated in Chapter 4 is that when the fiscal capacity of government 
fails to keep pace with the demand placed on government to deliver a good, government 
is more likely to migrate authority. Flinders argues that through the delegation of 
authority the state retains the ability to address a wide range of policy issues, while 
removing itself from the day-to-day socio-political interactions (2006: 223-224). With 
fiscal and public pressure mounting in the late 80s and early 90s the majority of Canada’s 
provincial and territorial governments created royal commissions or task forces charged 
with producing a strategy for change in the healthcare system. The issues and solutions 
brought forward through this exercise were consistent, with solutions all involving 
devolving some degree of authority away from central government (Lomas, Woods and 
Veenstra, 1997: 371-172). While fiscal pressures led the provinces and territories to 
examine health system alternatives, cost containment was one of many reasons given to 
devolve authority. The reasons cited for devolving authority away from provincial 
governments included cost containment, improving health outcomes, increasing 
flexibility and responsiveness of delivery, and the better coordination of services (Lomas, 
Woods, and Veenstra, 1997: 372; Lomas, 1996: 25). Following the blueprints developed 
by the commissions and task forces, all provinces but Ontario proceeded to devolve 
authority away from central government during the 1990s. Through the provincial 
creation of new healthcare bodies, there was the devolution of some degree of provincial 
administrative and budgetary authority as well as a shift of administrative control 
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previously held by local institutions and agencies (Naylor, 1999 13-14; Lomas, Veerstra, 
and Woods, 1997: 514).  
Having explored the broader issue of authority migration in health, attention is now 
turned to the migration of authority in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova 
Scotia, and Ontario. Given their shared history and the common fiscal constraints faced 
by the provinces, it is not surprising that the proposed solutions, and reasons given for the 
solutions, share commonalities. Not all provinces, however, initially adopted the 
migration of authority as the preferred policy alternative. Ontario waited a decade after 
the other nine provinces had already moved forward. Moreover, not all ten provinces 
adopted the same governance arrangements, nor have all ten provinces kept their initial 
devolved structure. Instead, provincial differences have emerged from the unique 
contexts of each jurisdiction. For Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario the 
initial migration of authority as well as subsequent changes to the governance model in 
healthcare will be explored. In doing so, a greater understanding of how the healthcare 
system policy challenges were framed during the authority migration process will be 
gained. Beyond evaluating solely fiscal capacity and political ideology, as was done in 
Chapter 4, exploring the unique contextual realities of each province offers the potential 
to further identify additional factors that promote the migration of authority.  
6.3.1 Healthcare Authority Migration in Alberta 
In Alberta, an order-in-council established the Premier’s Commission on future 
healthcare for Albertans in 1987. The purpose of the Commission was to examine 
changes in future health requirements for Albertans. The Commission was instructed to 
take into account such issues as population and illness trends, technological advances, 
organizational funding, and public needs and wants. In addition, the Commission was 
instructed to examine the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of individual Albertans, 
volunteers, community agencies, medical professionals, private sector interests and 
governments in planning, delivering, and funding healthcare (Alberta. Premier's 
Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989a: 11-12).  
  162 
After two years of consultations, the Commission released the Rainbow Report: Our 
Vision for Health. While the Commission’s report identified Alberta’s healthcare system 
as one of the best in the world, concerns were raised over the fragmentation and 
availability of resources (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for 
Albertans, 1989a: 13). The Commission identified five principles: people, choice, 
change, decisions, and opportunity, stressing that people are the core of the healthcare 
system and that “people must have meaningful control” (Alberta. Premier's Commission 
on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989a: 17-18). Continuing on the theme of 
people, the Commission recommended greater personal responsibility and accountability 
for managing health and health resources and the need to return the power to make 
choices closer to Albertans (Alberta. Premiers's Commission on Future Health Care for 
Albertans, 1989b: 116). As such, the Commission report framed the challenges facing the 
healthcare system in terms of both fiscal capacity and citizens’ attitude toward healthcare. 
In response to the fiscal and attitudinal challenges, and consistent with the stated belief 
that people need meaningful control of their healthcare system, the Commission 
recommended that the province be divided into nine autonomous administrative areas 
with an appropriately named health authority being responsible for the provision of 
healthcare services (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for 
Albertans, 1989a: 40-41). It was recommended that healthcare funding would be made 
available directly to health authorities, which would then be responsible for the provision 
of services and appropriate compensation methods within their administrative areas 
(Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989a: 41). 
Moreover, it was recommended that each health authority board be comprised of locally 
elected trustees plus a representative from the department of health (Alberta. Premier's 
Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989a: 40). The Commission report 
stated that the creation of regional health authorities would allow for responses to 
changes at the local level, resulting in a better mix of services and treatments that 
matched local needs (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for 
Albertans, 1989b: 117). 
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While the Alberta government initially rejected the idea of autonomous regional bodies 
(Church and Smith, 2008: 221), the Alberta government eventually followed the direction 
of the Commission’s report with the enactment of the Regional Health Authorities Act, 
1994. The Act established regional health authorities with the power to determine 
priorities in the provision of health services and allocate resources accordingly within 
their region (Alberta. Legislative Assembly, 2000: 3-4). The Act replaced nearly 200 
existing local health and public health boards with initially seventeen, then eventually 
nine regional authorities (Church and Smith, 2008: 234). As recommended in the 
Commission’s report, the health authorities were created with provisions for elected 
board members (Alberta. Legislative Assembly, 2000: 4). A subsequent taskforce, 
however, recommended that the elections option not be implemented and instead board 
positions be filed by appointment (Church and Smith, 2008, 232).  
The shift from rejecting to implementing the autonomous health authorities can be 
viewed as political in nature. Initially, political resistance to change made the 
introduction of regional governance models too risky. However, with a shift in focus 
toward a government wide issue of deficit and debt reduction, the creation of autonomous 
regional authorities was able to be embedded within a broader fiscal agenda (Church and 
Smith, 2008, 218). In 1992, the Alberta government began work on a plan to reduce 
spending, balance the budget, and pay down provincial debt. As part of this goal, each 
department, including health, was required to produce a three-year business plan 
including spending targets (Philippon and Wasylyshyn, 1996: 74). The timing of the 
change in governance model coinciding with the government wide focus on debt 
reduction supports the fiscal capacity hypothesis. The government’s focus on debt 
reduction would limit the fiscal capacity of the department to fulfill its governance 
obligations in healthcare and promote the migration of authority to Type II bodies. 
Beyond the direct focus on the broader fiscal pressures facing government, Church and 
Smith identify the influence of two policy paradigms in the government’s decision to 
implement autonomous health authorities. First, is the idea of personal responsibility and 
self-reliance, or that individuals are responsible for their own wellbeing (Church and 
Smith, 2008, 224), which is consistent with the message that Albertans need to take 
greater responsibility for their own health. The second is the new public management 
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message emphasizing smaller government (Church and Smith, 2008, 224), which is 
consistent with the migration of authority away from central government. The new public 
management component lends a political ideology component to the creation of Type II 
healthcare bodies in Alberta. New public management is associated with the promotion 
of the private sector and delegation of authority as a remedy for high taxes and deficits, 
which are characteristic of a neoliberal approach (Hoehn, 2011: 77).  
In addition to altering the governance structure, the reform process also involved a shift 
in emphasis on who should be making decisions regarding public healthcare. The 
Rainbow Report called for residents of Alberta to have more meaningful control of their 
healthcare system (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for 
Albertans, 1989a: 18) and the movement of healthcare decisions closer to the people, 
stating the need to delegate certain responsibilities to a more appropriate level of 
authority (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989b: 
117). The shift towards citizen participation in the healthcare process is also evident in 
the recommendation for and the initial legislating of elected regional boards. The 
subsequent shift away from an elected model in favour of appointed board members, 
however, may have been an indication of changes to come. 
During the decade that followed the creation of regional health bodies, reports on the 
direction of healthcare in Alberta recommended increases in the scope and authority of 
the regional Health Authorities (Alberta. Premier's Advisory Council on Health, 2001; 
Alberta. Alberta Health and Wellness, 2004). In May of 2008, however, it was announced 
that Alberta would move from the existing governance model to a single fully integrated 
province wide health system. The creation of Alberta Health Services brought together 
the regional health authorities as well as the Alberta Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Commission, Alberta Mental Health Board, Alberta Cancer Board and ground ambulance 
service (Alberta Health Services, 2012). The reasons given for the amalgamation to a 
single health authority were financial. According to government reports, there was 
concern over the ability to provide accessible high quality care in a sustainable manner to 
Albertans (Alberta. Alberta Health and Wellness, 2008: 3).  
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While regionalization had been identified as healthcare’s solution in the Rainbow Report, 
the Provincial Service Optimization Review: Final Report emphasized the need for better 
healthcare coordination. The report cited challenges in coordinating health services in 
Alberta, including a lack of coordination across regions, sites of care, and providers. As 
well, the report critiqued the lack of standardization of care within facilities and 
organizations. The report stated that the “regional health authority-based organizational 
and funding structure did not optimally facilitate coordination of care delivery among the 
regions. Incentives and structure drove a regional focus rather than a focus on care across 
the province” (Alberta. Alberta Health and Wellness, 2008: 38). The report further stated 
that Alberta could “use its new found scale as a single ‘system’ to ensure greater 
performance transparency and continuous improvement (Alberta. Alberta Health and 
Wellness, 2008: 2). 
Today, with the creation of Alberta Health Services, decision-making remains outside of 
central government, but the governance structure moved from nine regional Type II 
bodies to one provincial wide Type II body. With the formation of Alberta Health 
Services, the preferred policy solution remained an autonomous body outside of 
government, but went from regional to provincial in geographic scale. The initial change 
in governance model was consistent with the fiscal capacity hypothesis, as the fiscal 
challenges facing the healthcare system in Alberta played a pivotal role in kicking off the 
exploration process. Moreover the shift toward new public management appears to have 
given the final push required to move the changes from recommendations to reforms. 
Beyond fiscal capacity, the migration of authority was also framed in terms of increased 
public participation and the moving of decision-making closer to the citizen. By moving 
decision-making closer to the citizen, the specific needs of each region could be better 
met. With the move from regionalization back to centralization, the framing shifted from 
the need for each region to better meet local needs to the need for increased coordination 
and standardization across the province.  
6.3.2 Healthcare Authority Migration in British Columbia  
In 1991, the British Columbia Royal Commission on Healthcare and Costs released its 
final report entitled Closer to Home. The Commission was tasked with examining the 
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structure, organization, management and mandate of the current healthcare system in BC 
(British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 1991: iii). In its report, 
the Commission stated that in regard to healthcare, “there has never been an overall plan, 
and, quite naturally, the structure that has evolved lacks coherence and, sometimes, logic. 
It also lacks the ability to assess itself, to objectively judge how just, efficient and 
effective it is in providing healthcare,” and called for the creation of an independent 
advisory body that, reporting directly to parliament, would be independent of the 
government, the Ministry of Health and the healthcare profession (British Columbia. 
Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 1991: A-15).  
In addition to an independent province-wide body to provide guidance and advise the 
government on healthcare issues, the Commission recommended the distribution of 
healthcare decision-making to the regional and local levels. The Commission’s final 
report recommended the Ministry of Health retain responsibility for province wide goals 
including priorities, strategic plans, standards and guidelines. The Commission did not 
recommend the migration of decision-making authority outside the Ministry of Health, 
but instead the adoption of regionally placed general managers who would report to an 
assistant deputy minister responsible for all regions within the Ministry of Health (British 
Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 1991: B-38). Included within 
the Commission’s recommendations was the need for decisions to be made with 
community involvement and that improvements to the healthcare system must be made 
with current levels of spending. In regard to community involvement, the Commission 
argued that government should be prepared to fund coordinators, to encourage the 
creation of advisory boards and to not force citizens to participate in schemes designed by 
the Ministry of Health (British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 
1991: A-6).  
The recommendations in Alberta called for the delegation of authority, where managerial 
responsibility for specified functions are outside of government and only indirectly 
controlled by central government (Mills, 1990, 21). In contrast, the recommendations in 
British Columbia called for the deconcentration of authority, with the movement of 
administrative authority to locally based offices of central government (Mills, 1990, 16). 
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Responding to the recommendations of the British Columbia Royal Commission on 
Healthcare and Costs’, the Ministry of Health published New Directions for a Healthy 
British Columbia in February of 1993. Acknowledging the Commission’s 
recommendations for increased local management of the healthcare system, the 
government announced two pertinent reforms. In contrast to the recommendation of 
advisory boards, however, the NDP government announced the establishment of 
community health councils at the local level with individual board members being both 
elected and appointed. The community health councils would be primarily responsible for 
the planning and coordinating of health services and identifying local health priorities. 
The councils would absorb existing hospital boards and have a goal of providing greater 
accountability and reducing duplication within the system. The second reform was the 
creation of Regional Health Boards. Members of the Regional Health Boards would 
include representatives from the community health councils and individuals appointed by 
the Minister. While the initial role would be regional health planning and service 
coordination, the long-term goal was to have the regional boards allocate budget 
resources amongst the local councils (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 14-
15). The proposed reforms fundamentally altered the decision-making structure for 
healthcare in British Columbia; shifting a broad set of planning, management, and 
funding decisions to regional and local bodies (Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia, 1994: 496).  
The framing of the challenges facing the healthcare system in British Columbia centred 
on fiscal concerns (consistent with the hypothesis that the weaker a government’s fiscal 
capacity to meet governance demands the higher the rate of Type II body creation). The 
Commission’s report highlighted the belief that “in these times of rapidly expanding 
population, changing technologies and rising costs, innovative solutions are a necessity, 
and creative alternatives a must” (British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care 
and Costs, 1991: A-10). Likewise, the government’s policy position called for fiscal 
responsibility, stating that funds are limited and there are many demands for funding 
within the healthcare system (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 11). One 
proposed solution to the fiscal woes facing British Columbia’s healthcare system was 
decentralization. The Commission’s report stated that the decentralization of control 
would encourage public accountability for the management of healthcare resources and 
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cost control through greater efficiency, coordination and integration of services that serve 
local needs (British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 1991: B-
36). The government claimed that a decentralized partnership approach was imperative to 
building and maintaining the healthcare system (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 
1993: 17).  
Beyond fiscal framing, the government’s policy statement argued that increased public 
participation and responsibility was an important part of a responsive and flexible health 
system (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 13). In addition to the creation of 
community health councils the government announced an increase in public participation 
on professional boards, with lay representation constituting at least one-third of members 
(British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 13). The intent of the government’s policy 
to shift power over health services to the community level can be viewed as an attempt to 
both counter the power of health professional elites, and foster a community orientation 
toward wellness. It was hoped that a combination of democratic community 
development, an active citizenry, and collaboration among institutional actors would 
bring about the emergence of a health community. The health community in turn would 
create the social and economic conditions required for healthy individuals and encourage 
the mindset of parsimony with regard to healthcare utilization (Davidson, 1999: S35).  
In December of 2001, the Liberal government announced the streamlining of the 11 
Regional Health Boards, 34 Community Health councils and 7 Community Health 
Services Societies then existing in the province. Replacing the existing structure were 15 
health service delivery areas organized under five new geographic Health Authorities. A 
sixth governing body responsible for the governing and administering provincial 
programs and highly specialized services was also included within the new governance 
design (British Columbia. Ministry of Health Planning, 2001: 1-2). The restructuring 
again centred on issues of cost, with the existing structure described as “one of the most 
complicated and expensive governance and management systems in the country” (British 
Columbia. Ministry of Health Planning, 2001: 1). In simplifying the governance 
structure, the British Columbia government promised the highest possible levels of 
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efficiency, service, coordination and accountability (British Columbia. Ministry of Health 
Planning, 2001: 1).  
Moving from a highly localized model to one that encompassed fewer but larger regions, 
the government documents assured citizens that there would be an elimination of 
duplication, and with an increase in jurisdictional size, the ability to realize economies of 
scale (British Columbia. Ministry of Health Planning, 2001: 5). Like Alberta, British 
Columbia’s initial governance changes were set into motion by fiscal concerns. Similarly, 
further restructuring continued to place decision-making authority outside the boundaries 
of central government, but in the hands of a small number of individuals. Unlike in 
Alberta, where the initial governance changes came about while the right-of-centre 
Progressive Conservatives were in power, the creation of Regional Health Boards in 
British Columbia were undertaken by a left-of-centre NDP government. 
6.3.3 Healthcare Authority Migration in Nova Scotia 
In November of 1990, the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Healthcare released Health 
Strategies for the Nineties: Managing Better Health. In contrast to the British Columbia 
Royal Commission, which claimed their healthcare system was one of the best in the 
world (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 1), the Nova Scotia Royal 
Commission expressed great concern over Nova Scotia’s healthcare system. The Nova 
Scotia Royal Commission stated that the level of expenditures on healthcare was not 
reflected in health outcomes for the people of Nova Scotia. When compared to other 
Canadian provinces the health of Nova Scotia’s residents was poor with its overall 
mortality and disability rate being the highest in the country (Nova Scotia. Royal 
Commission on Healthcare, 1990: ix). 
While the perception of the quality within British Columbia and Nova Scotia healthcare 
systems were divergent, both provinces still identified fiscal capacity as their central 
challenge. The framing of their fiscal challenges, however, differed across provinces. The 
challenge in British Columbia was positioned as the need to maintain the existing high 
level of quality while also maintaining the current level of funding. In contrast, the 
challenge in Nova Scotia was framed in terms of the existing level of expenditure not 
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resulting in positive health outcomes (Nova Scotia. Royal Commission on Healthcare, 
1990: ix). The Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Healthcare report suggested that the 
health system in Nova Scotia was a legacy of insurance programs for hospital and 
physician services that had resulted in 80% of the Department of Health and Fitness 
budget being allocated to hospitals and physicians, while the occupancy rate of hospital 
beds sat below the national average (1990: vii). Accordingly a combination of healthcare 
expenditures and health outcomes were the focus of the Commission in Nova Scotia, with 
a goal of optimal health outcomes and more efficient management (Nova Scotia. Royal 
Commission on Healthcare, 1990: xi). In the Commission’s report, the reduction of the 
rate of growth for healthcare expenditures is stated as one of the guiding precepts (Nova 
Scotia. Royal Commission on Healthcare, 1990: xii). In suggesting how to control 
healthcare costs the Commission recommended more attention be paid to disease 
prevention and health promotion, moving from institutional to community based care, 
and greater user participation in the planning of health services (Nova Scotia. Royal 
Commission on Healthcare, 1990: 29).  
As was the case in Alberta and British Columbia, the decentralization of healthcare 
authority in Nova Scotia was framed as a way to increase citizen participation and 
alleviate fiscal challenges. Consistent with Alberta, Nova Scotia’s Royal Commission on 
Healthcare recommended the delegation of authority over health services through the 
creation of autonomous Regional Health Authorities that would be responsible for the 
planning and management of health services and program delivery (1990: 5). The 
Commission argued that creating autonomous regional bodies would increase 
responsiveness and flexibility to meet regional needs, increase the coordination and 
integration of health services, increase efficiency, and allow for greater participation of 
citizens in health planning (Nova Scotia. Royal Commission on Healthcare, 1990: 6). 
Taking the Commission’s recommendations into account, the Nova Scotia government 
announced its reform program in 1993. The original plan for healthcare reform in Nova 
Scotia was to unfold opposite to healthcare reform in British Columbia. While the 
Commission called for planning and managerial responsibility to be devolved away from 
the provincial government, the health authorities announced by the Progressive 
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Conservative government were to be merely advisory bodies with all members appointed 
by the Ministry of Health (Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia, 1994: 500). Contrary to the 
political ideology hypothesis, the left-of-centre government in British Columbia 
delegated authority to Type II healthcare bodies, while the right-of-centre government in 
Nova-Scotia planned hold onto the existing healthcare governance model and maintain 
central decision-making authority. Upon the Liberals assuming office, however, the 
government announced a far more decentralized governance structure (Hurley, Lomas 
and Bhatia, 1994: 500). In 1996, the Liberal government in Nova Scotia implemented its 
decentralization strategy through the creation of four Regional Health Boards. In doing 
so, the existing 36 local hospital boards were amalgamated into the new Regional Health 
Boards (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 507). 
In 1999, the Minister’s Task Force on Regionalized Healthcare released its Final Report 
and Recommendations. The mandate of the task force was not to study the validity of 
regionalization, but the strengths and weaknesses of the existing governance structure and 
present recommendations for improvement (Nova Scotia. Minister’s Task Force on 
Regionalized Healthcare in Nova Scotia, 1999: 4). The Task Force reported that both 
providers and consumers were critical of the existing system of healthcare, believing that 
the main goal was to cut costs and that they has less input into the healthcare system 
since the inception of the Regional Health Boards. Moreover, the Task Force believed 
that the existing levels of dissatisfaction were the result of an incomplete transition to the 
new governance structure as key components of the healthcare systems remained outside 
of the control of the Regional Health Boards. The Task Force argued that for the existing 
governance structure to work it must be strengthened and completed and that reversing 
the regionalization process would disrupt the system, increase costs and lead to a 
fragmented healthcare system. To strengthen and complete the system, the Task Force 
recommended defining in law the status of the already established Community Health 
Boards, ensuring that two-thirds of the members of Regional Health Boards are selected 
by Community Health Boards, and funding for health services be administered by the 
Regional Health Boards (Nova Scotia. Minister’s Task Force on Regionalized Healthcare 
in Nova Scotia, 1999: 4-6). The Task Force, however, did not recommend the altering of 
the boundaries for the four existing healthcare regions, stating that any changes would be 
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premature and disruptive (Nova Scotia. Minister’s Task Force on Regionalized 
Healthcare in Nova Scotia, 1999: 7).  
Despite recommendations against changes altering the existing boundaries, in June of 
2000 Bill 34 received royal assent, replacing the Regional Health Boards with District 
Health Authorities (Nova Scotia. Legislative Assembly, 2000). By 2001 the four health 
regions had become nine District Health Authorities (Black and Fierlbeck 2006: 508). 
The initial creation of the four regional health units and the expansion to nine District 
Health Authorities shared a common set of justifications – cost containment, 
accountability, and citizen engagement (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 508). As Black and 
Fierlbeck identify, contradictions and tensions characterize many theories of 
regionalization: cost efficiencies through the removal of duplication requires greater 
centralization, while enhanced public participation typically means greater 
decentralization (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 508). While a degree of cost effectiveness 
has been attributed to regionalization in general, Black and Fierlbeck attribute 
regionalization in Nova Scotia to neither cost containment nor public participation (2006: 
523). Rather, Black and Fierlbeck argue that the shift from authority from Regional 
Health Boards to District Health Authorities took place for political purposes as it 
restored the system of elite representation (2006: 522-523).  
As with the other provinces, fiscal capacity and concerns over the ability to fulfill 
obligations in healthcare played roles in raising questions over the shape of the 
governance model in healthcare. The creation of the Regional Health Boards and District 
Health Authorities, however, were political in nature. While the creation of the Regional 
Health Boards shifted decision-making authority downward away from central 
government and upward out of the hands of the local elite, political power was lost at the 
local level. The decision to move to District Health Authorities restored some degree of 
power to local elite.  
6.3.4 Healthcare Authority Migration in Ontario 
While the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia initiated similar 
health system policy choices in the 1990s, the province of Ontario was both an early 
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adopter of decentralization, and a late adopter of migrating decision-making authority. In 
1973, twenty years ahead of the decentralization curve in healthcare, the Ontario Council 
of Health via the Mustard Report devised the idea of District Health Councils (Warren, 
1996: 128). In 1974, Ontario’s Health Planning Taskforce recommended that District 
Health Councils, operating within the framework of guidelines and standards set out by 
the Ministry, be responsible for the development of policies and plans for healthcare 
within each district (1974: 25). The Health Planning Task Force was charged with the 
responsibility of developing proposals for a comprehensive plan to meet the health needs 
of Ontario residents (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1974: 1). The Task Force 
stated that for effective planning and operation of the health services to take place a 
suitable organizational arrangement needed to be established. To this end, the task force 
stated that there should be local responsibility for planning within the healthcare system. 
However, the existing mix of agencies and organizational arrangements operating in the 
healthcare system did not allow for the development of a comprehensive health services 
plan. To resolve this problem, the District Health Councils were recommended as an 
additional level of planning. (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1974: 23-24). 
In 1975 The Ontario Ministry of Health responded to The Health Planning Task Force 
regarding the proposed changes to the Ontario healthcare system. The Ministry of Health 
claimed that the proposed changes were too wide in scale to be completed without further 
understanding, support and cooperation from public health, health professionals, and 
health agencies. As such, further consultation was sought on the part of the Ministry 
(Ontario. Ministry of Health, 1975: 2). In regard to the establishment of District Health 
Councils, the Ministry’s consultation efforts found widespread support for this 
recommendation from both the health community and public groups. A second 
recommendation, the creation of area health service management boards responsible for 
logical grouping of facilities and resources was found to be more contentious. In the end, 
while the Ministry concurred that this recommendation would improve coordination and 
efficiency, the Ministry conceded imposing such a change in the face of opposition from 
health professionals and the public would be unproductive (Ontario. Ministry of Health, 
1975: 12-13). The implementation of the District Health Councils was voluntary. Lead 
citizens in the various districts had to take the initiative and convince local politicians, 
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citizens, and health providers of the value of the District Health Councils. The result of 
this strategy was a prolonged implementation, taking over 20 years to develop a full 
network of District Health Councils across the province. Moreover, the responsibilities of 
the District Health Councils were limited and defined as advisory in nature (Warren, 
1996: 128).  
In 1986, the minority Liberal government appointed the Ontario Health Review Panel to 
look at Ontario’s health policy. The Panel reported its findings to the Premier in June of 
1987 (Spasoff, 1992: 130). The report outlined five pressures on the existing healthcare 
system: the changing demographic makeup of the province; changing patterns of illness; 
changing public expectation of healthcare; new technology; and rising expenditures on 
healthcare. In terms of expenditures, the report highlighted the 50% increase per capita in 
expenditures on healthcare between 1981 and 1985, bringing healthcare to one-third of 
the province’s total expenditures (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1987: 17-18). 
Consistent with the fiscal capacity hypothesis the report argued that participation from 
government, individuals and organizations outside of government was necessary to meet 
the challenges facing the healthcare system. The report further suggested there was a 
need for a concept of health that embraced the totality of an individual’s wellbeing, 
integrated government policy across all ministries that share responsibility for health, and 
provided a balance between provincial and local perspectives (Ontario. Ontario Health 
Review Panel, 1987: 63). 
Calling for a local health strategy, the Ontario Health Review Panel report stated that it is 
at the local level where interaction with the health system takes place. The report 
identified inequity across the different regions in terms of health status, population, and 
access to basic care. To address these inequities the report stressed the need to be able to 
meet the unique priorities and experiences of all regions of the province, be they 
northern, southern, rural or urban (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1987: 71-72). 
The report concluded, however, that no new mechanisms were required as the District 
Health Councils already reflected these basic principles. The Panel believed that, with the 
assistance of local boards of health, the District Health Councils could assume 
responsibility for local health strategies. To achieve this end, the Panel stated the need for 
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government to strengthen the capacity of the District Health Councils (Ontario. Ontario 
Health Review Panel, 1987: 72. In its concluding remarks the Panel stated, “Ontario has 
an unprecedented opportunity to open lines of communication and broaden the base of 
participation in enhancing the health of its residents” (Ontario. Ontario Health Review 
Panel, 1987: 75). 
Further calls for delegation of authority came in 1991 when the Premier’s Council on 
Health Strategy released its report on local decision-making in healthcare. The report 
recommended that government work towards devolving responsibility for the provision 
of health services to local agencies. Two models were proposed, one based on local 
government, and one based on special purpose bodies. The Council called for the 
implementation and evaluation of both models on a pilot basis (Spasoff, 1992: 130-131). 
However, the Premier’s Council on Health Strategy, which was established in 1987 under 
a Liberal government, only met once after the NDP came to power in 1990. The NDP 
replaced the Premier’s Council on Health Strategy with the Premier’s Council on Health, 
Well-Being and Social Justice, but the momentum for change was lost (Spasoff, 1992: 
132). While the NDP government in British Columbia had moved further than 
recommended and delegated authority to Type II healthcare bodies, in Ontario the NDP 
government allowed the reform process in healthcare to stall.  
In 2003, the newly elected Liberal government faced both a healthcare reform agenda as 
well as the need for major fiscal and bureaucratic reforms (Fenn, 2006: 528). With nearly 
half of the Ontario budget used to fund health expenditures, there was concern that 
continued unconstrained growth in costs would undermine other policy priorities 
including economic performance (Fenn, 2006: 529). In response to the need for changes 
in the healthcare system, the Liberal government instituted the Health Results Team 
(Fenn, 2006: 528). Among the set goals for the Health Results Team was the creation of 
an integrated healthcare system through the establishment of Local Health Integration 
Networks (Ontario. Health Results Team, 2005: 4). 
Speaking at the St Lawrence Market, then Minister of Health and Long-Term Care 
George Smitherman introduced the creation of Local Health Integration Networks to the 
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public. In the speech, Smitherman built the image of a healthcare system under strain 
from an aging population, increasing demands for access and innovation. Smitherman 
stated that to respond to pressures in health almost every other sector in government had 
been asked to make sacrifices to free up funding, but that this approach was not 
sustainable (Ontario. Minister of Health Health and Long-Term Care, 2004, 2). To make 
the changes necessary to protect Ontario’s healthcare system, Smitherman claimed that it 
was time to create “a comprehensive and integrated system of care that is shaped with the 
active leadership of communities” (Ontario. Minister of Health Health and Long-Term 
Care, 2004, 7). Local Health Integration Networks were stated to be a crucial step on the 
path to better systems integration. According to Smitherman: 
Although most healthcare is local, we are not all that effective at planning 
and responding to local health needs. We call Ontario diverse yet often 
fail to recognize the health implications of that diversity. Things like 
average age, how far you live from the nearest hospital and whether your 
area has a higher incidence of an ailment. 
That’s why we will be taking some of the authority, which currently 
resides at Queen’s Park, away from Queen’s Park, and shifting it to local 
networks, closer to real people, closer to patients (Ontario. Minister of 
Health Health and Long-Term Care, 2004: 19).   
Faced with substantial fiscal obligations and the fear that continued growth in demand 
would undermine future policy objectives Ontario had finally followed the other nine 
provinces and delegated authority in healthcare. With the introduction of Bill 36, the 
Local Health System Integration Act, 2005 Ontario had moved to a regional healthcare 
governance structure. Unlike the legislation in other provinces that abolished local 
hospital boards and other local health organizations, the Ontario legislation left the 
existing local boards in place (Ronson, 2006: 46). The District Health Councils, which 
had served in an important advisory capacity in the planning and provision of healthcare 
for the past thirty years, ceased operations and the Local Health Integration Networks 
became the primary vehicle for planning, coordinating, integrating, and funding the 
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delivery of healthcare services at the regional level (Ontario. Health Results Team, 
2005a). As laid out in the Preamble to the Local Health System Integration Act, the 
transformation in regional health integration was positioned by the Liberal government as 
a confirmation of the commitment to the Canada Health Act (Canada), a commitment to 
enabling local communities to make decisions about their local healthcare systems, and 
recognition that communities, health service providers, Local Health Integration 
Networks and the government need to work together to reduce duplication and better 
coordinate health service delivery (Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 2006).  
6.4 Discussion 
Chapter 6 reevaluated two hypotheses: H4.3 – the lower the fiscal capacity of government 
to meet governance demand the higher the rate of creation of Type II bodies; and H4.4 – 
the further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a government sits lower the rate 
of creation of Type II bodies. When assessing the effect of fiscal capacity in provincial 
healthcare there is support for H4.3 as the findings suggest that a decline in fiscal 
capacity promotes the creation of Type II bodies. The gap in time between the migration 
authority in British Columbia and Ontario, however, suggests that there is more to the 
story than just fiscal capacity. Mixed support was also found for the hypothesis H4.4. 
A summary of the healthcare governance reforms discussed above is presented in Table 
6.2. Instances that resulted in the migration of decision-making authority outside of 
traditional government structure are highlighted in grey. As shown in Table 6.2, in each 
instance of authority migration the challenges facing the healthcare system were framed 
in terms of fiscal capacity and concern over the continued ability to fund the healthcare 
system at a level that afforded the accustomed quality of care. In contrast, the results for 
political parties indicate mixed support as was found in Chapter 4. As was evident above, 
governments from both sides of the political spectrum play direct roles initiating and 
halting the process of authority migration. While the results for hypothesis H4.3 provided 
inconsistent support in Chapter 4, the results for healthcare policy were not unexpected 
based on previous research. In regard to fiscal capacity, Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia argued 
in 1994 that the combination of ever-growing expenditures and reduction of revenue 
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streams had pushed provincial governments to reevaluate their healthcare systems and 
initiate major healthcare reforms (1994: 491). Moreover, J. P. Vaughan had previously 
observed that governments across political belief systems had felt the need to reform 
healthcare by shifting authority to some degree away from central government (Vaughan, 
1990: 139).  
Table 6.2: Migration of Authority Timeline for Regional Healthcare 
Year  
1975 Ontario – PC government established District Health Councils as advisory 
boards. Creation of advisory boards framed in terms of increasing coordination 
and responsibility for planning at the local level. 
1993 British Columbia – NDP government migrates authority to Community Health 
Councils and Regional Health Authorities. Migration of authority framed in 
terms of controlling healthcare costs, increasing citizen participation at the 
local level and increased citizen responsibility for healthcare. 
1994 Alberta - PC government migrates authority to Regional Health Authorities. 
Migration of authority framed in terms of controlling healthcare costs, 
increasing citizen participation at the local level, increased citizen 
responsibility for health decisions, and the reduction of the size of central 
government. 
1996 Nova Scotia – Liberal government migrates authority to four Regional Health 
Boards. Migration of authority was framed in terms of terms of controlling 
healthcare costs, increasing citizen participation at the local level, and 
increasing coordination and integration of healthcare services. 
2000 Nova Scotia – PC government replaces existing Regional Health Boards with 
nine District Health Authorities. Restructuring framed in terms of controlling 
healthcare costs and increasing citizen participation at the local level. 
2001 British Columbia – Liberal Government replaces existing Community Health 
Council and Regional Health Authority structure with five Health Authorities. 
Restructuring framed in terms of controlling healthcare costs and increasing 
coordination in the healthcare system. 
2005 Ontario – Liberal Government replaces District Health Councils with Local 
Health Integration Networks. Restructuring framed in terms of controlling 
healthcare costs, increasing coordination in the healthcare system and keeping 
local decisions at the local level. 
2008 Alberta - PC government eliminates the remaining nine Regional Healthcare 
Authorities and created a single provincial entity, Alberta Health Services. 
Restructuring framed in terms of controlling healthcare costs and increasing 
coordination in the healthcare system. 
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Consistent with the underlying fiscal challenges the migration of authority in healthcare 
was consistently framed in terms of fiscal capacity, however, it was not framed in terms 
of fiscal capacity alone. When looking at Table 6.2, it is evident that, in addition to fiscal 
capacity, challenges facing healthcare were framed in the following manner: 1) between 
1993 to 2000 decentralization and the migration of authority is consistently framed in 
terms of the need for increased citizen participation in healthcare governance; 2) 
beginning in 1996, the framing begins to migrate toward the need to improved 
coordination within the healthcare system when recommending healthcare reform. It is 
the inclusion of the second frame that makes healthcare reform palatable to citizens. It 
makes healthcare reform not just about the reduction of healthcare spending but about 
increased citizen participation or increased coordination (better service) within the 
healthcare system. 
In addition to the larger trends, province-specific frames were also evident, such as the 
reduction of the size of government in Alberta. As discussed above, the reduction of 
government size in Alberta was associated with both new public management and a 
neoliberal ideology. 
The availability of issue frames may also account for the delay in authority migration in 
Ontario. The creation of the District Health Councils in 1975 produced healthcare bodies 
that, while not having decision-making authority, limited the increased citizen 
participation frame, as provincial, regional and local healthcare bodies already existed. 
Moreover, subsequent government task forces supported the already institutionalized 
District Health Councils. When support for devolved authority did emerge, a change in 
government allowed the initiative to stall. When authority did migrate in Ontario, 
healthcare reform was not framed in terms of citizen participation but in terms of keeping 
local decisions local and the need for increased coordination in the healthcare system. 
The government emphasized the need to work together to reduce duplication and better 
coordinate health service delivery (Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 2006). Just as the 
framing of the problem and solution within the healthcare system was different so was 
the solution. Unlike the other provinces, which eliminated the existing hospital boards, 
Ontario maintained local boards when the LHINs were created. 
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The framing of authority migration in healthcare is also relevant in the question of state –
centric or society-centric governance. Framing the decentralization of healthcare in terms 
of increased citizen participation in healthcare governance may appear consistent with a 
society-centric approach to multilevel governance. Society-centric governance advances 
the idea that actors outside of government are engaged in more self-steering and that 
government interacts with society to reach mutually acceptable decisions (Peters, 2000: 
36). When only the initial cases of decision-making authority migration are considered, 
as highlighted in Table 6.2, three of the four cases framed authority migration in terms of 
increased citizen participation. In the case of Ontario, the evidence shows the issue being 
framed in terms of keeping local decisions local, but not on specifically ‘increasing’ 
citizen participation. Ontario was also unique, however, in that it did not eliminate 
existing local hospital boards and health organizations, but instead left the existing 
structure in place (Ronson, 2006: 46). In Ontario, the creation of LHINs resulted in 
decision-making authority being divided across three levels. 
Skelcher et al. argue the creation of new governance actors does not mean a relationship 
of equals (2005: 578). The role of external actors may be more modest than society-
centred arguments presumes (Leuprecht and Lazar, 2007: 2). Still, by not removing the 
existing local boards, the creation of Local Health Integration Networks in Ontario 
presented the potential for increased citizen involvement as it left the existing pathway of 
participation intact while at the same time creating another governance body for citizens 
to engage with. Furthermore, the LHINs’ enabling legislation specified that Local Health 
Integration Networks “shall engage the community of diverse persons and entities 
involved with the local health system about that system on an ongoing basis, including 
about the integrated health service plan and while setting priorities” (Ontario. Legislative 
Assembly, 2006). In contrast, the removal of existing local boards within the other 
provinces removed venues for citizen participation at the local level while adding one at 
the regional level.  
Healthcare system reforms up until the year 2000 were largely framed in terms of the 
need to meet growing fiscal requirements and the desire to increase citizen participation –
giving the appearance that central government was guided by those two factors when 
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migrating decision-making authority. As discussed above, however, Black and Fierlbeck 
argue that despite the casting of healthcare reforms in terms of cost savings and citizen 
engagement the shift of authority from Regional Health Boards to District Health 
Authorities in Nova Scotia took place for political reasons. According to Black and 
Fierlbeck, the change in governance structure was aimed at restoring the system of elite 
representation that existed at the local level prior to the creation of Regional Health 
Boards (2006: 522-523).  
The movement toward increasing the number of regional units in Nova Scotia can be 
viewed as driven by physicians who were discontent with having their direct influence 
over local hospital boards curtailed (Black and Feirlbeck, 2006: 519-520). According to 
Lomas, Woods, and Veenstra there are three groups that grant power during the authority 
migration process: government, health professionals, and citizens. Moreover, each source 
of power has its own agenda, with government’s health system expectations, providers’ 
interests and citizens’ preferences pitted against each other (Lomas, Woods, and Veenstra 
1997: 734). Drawing on Black and Feirlbeck’s explanation of the shift from four to nine 
healthcare bodies in Nova Scotia it can be argued that the initial migration of authority to 
Regional Health Boards constituted a curtailing of the ability of health professionals to 
exercise their power to achieve their interests. In altering the health systems design, the 
government moved to ensure the health system met the government’s expectations. As 
subsequent changes were undertaken, however, the previously held power of the 
healthcare elite was somewhat restored. If this is indeed the case, the shift from Regional 
Health Boards to District Health Authorities, while framed in terms of cost containment 
and citizen, participation was in fact undertaken to restore the balance of power between 
government and healthcare professionals.  
Turning to Alberta and British Columbia, the similarities regarding the replacement of 
local boards with regional governance structure suggests the same desire to curtail the 
medical community’s ability to promote and protect their interests as initially occurred in 
Nova Scotia. By migrating authority to the regional level while at the same time 
eliminating the local level, decision-making was moved away from local decision makers 
through the same process that moved decision-making authority away from central 
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government. In doing so, the influence of medical professionals over the administration 
of the healthcare system was curtailed. While inflationary pressure in the 1970s led to 
increasingly harder lines being taken by governments in collective bargaining with 
organized medicine (Naylor, 1999: 11), the migration of authority to newly created 
regional bodies served to weaken the ability of organized medicine to negotiate. 
Davidson argues that the government’s policy to shift power over health services in 
British Columbia was an attempt to counter the power of health professional elites 
(Davidson, 1999: S35). However, the changes in governance structure provided more 
than a counteracting of the power of medical professionals - it truncated the power of the 
medical profession. 
In British Columbia the decision to restructure health services can be seen as an attempt 
to an orientation toward community wellness (Davidson, 1999: S35). A similar framing 
of healthcare restructuring was also present in Alberta and Nova Scotia. In Alberta the 
Commission report recommended greater personal responsibility and accountability for 
managing health and health resources and the need to return the power to make choices 
closer to Albertans (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for 
Albertans, 1989b: 116). In the case of Nova Scotia, there was the call for greater user 
participation in the planning of health services (Nova Scotia Royal Commission on 
Healthcare, 1990: 29).  
The removal of local boards, however, is contradictory to the stated goal of increased 
citizen participation. While aspects of decision-making may have migrated from the 
province to the region, local decisions that once occurred at local hospitals boards were 
also shifted upward. In shifting decision-making to a regional level, it is unclear how 
citizens are able to participate in the healthcare decision-making process to a greater 
extent than when decisions were made at the local level. While healthcare advocates in 
Nova Scotia may have initially embraced the regionalization of healthcare governance, 
believing that it would provide a substantial level of grassroots decision-making, they 
were in the end disappointed as community bodies were simply not strong enough to 
challenge political decisions from higher up (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 519-520). As 
stated above, the migration of authority to special purpose bodies has the potential for 
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more responsive governance than area-wide jurisdictions (Bollens, 1986: 119; Lowndes 
and Wilson, 2001: 633), however, at the same time the risk exists that the governance 
structure can become closed to public influence (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104; 
Peters, 2004: 133). 
While citizen participation played a large role in framing authority migration as a 
solution to the challenges facing healthcare, the resulting outcomes do not align with the 
stated objective. Instead, it can be argued that the underlying objective of government 
when migrating authority was to strengthen their ability to control costs in the healthcare 
system through the weakening of medical professionals. With the underlying factor 
leading to healthcare reform being the concern over the ability to meet the increasing 
fiscal demands placed upon the systems, migrating authority to Type II bodies served to 
strengthen the provincial governments’ ability to respond to this challenge by removing 
control at the local level from organized medicine. In this scenario, the creation of Type 
II healthcare bodies became a tool for altering the existing balance of power to the benefit 
of central government, consequently strengthening their ability to take action in the 
specific policy area.  
As discussed in depth in Chapter 2, the underlying assumption of multilevel governance 
is that state centralization has given way to new forms of governance. The result has been 
the dispersion of decision-making authority among new actors across multiple levels, 
rather than monopolized by state executives (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996: 346). 
Regardless of the level of autonomy of new governance actors, however, governance 
continues to occur within the shadow of hierarchy (Scharpf, 1994: 38-39). In the modern 
state, both public and private actors can be seen to operate under the shadow of hierarchy 
where government sets the legal rules of the game and intervenes to correct distortions or 
outcomes that violate public interests (Börzel, 2010: 196-197). In the case of public 
healthcare in Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario, regional health 
authorities serve to strengthen the ability of government to set the rules of the game and 
intervene to correct distortions or outcomes that are perceived to violate public interests. 
Specifically, government has become better able to step in and address fiscal distortions 
or outcomes without the unwanted interference of healthcare professionals. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
By legislating the creation of the Local Health Integration Networks in 2005, Ontario 
joined the other nine Canadian provinces that had already delegated authority in 
healthcare services to the regional level. Consistent with the hypothesis that a decline in 
fiscal capacity promotes the creation of Type II bodies, all four provinces studied in this 
chapter framed the need for healthcare reform in terms of concerns over meeting the 
ever-growing funding requirements to deliver healthcare in the face of increasing demand 
for services. The gap between the migration of authority in British Columbia and Ontario 
suggests that more than just weakened fiscal capacity is required to devolve authority. In 
Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia healthcare reform is framed in terms of both 
controlling healthcare costs and increasing citizen participation. In the Ontario case, 
healthcare reform is framed in terms of controlling healthcare costs and increasing 
coordination within the healthcare system. 
Mixed support was found for the hypothesis that parties further to the left are less likely 
to delegate authority to Type II bodies. As seen throughout the chapter, parties from both 
sides of the political spectrum migrated and ceased the migration of authority to Type II 
bodies.  
While the underlying pressures to initiate healthcare reforms can be seen to be fiscal, how 
the changes were framed for public participation appear at odds with reality. To the 
public, the framing of the healthcare restructuring included a strong element of increased 
citizen participation and local decision-making. The migration of decision-making 
authority to regional bodies, however, was used to curtail the power of local and medical 
elites within the decision-making process. The outcomes were not consistent with the 
stated goals of increased public participation or grassroots decision-making, but instead 
shifted the power balance between government and organized medicine towards 
government. Although Marks originally characterized multilevel governance as the 
dispersal of power away from the centre (Marks 1993: 401-402), the results demonstrated 
the potential for the opposite to also occur. In the case of healthcare reform, the creation 
of Type II bodies was used as a tool of central government to shift the existing balance of 
power in a policy area to its advantage. While authority did migrate from central 
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government to newly created Type II bodies, the elimination of local boards in three of 
the four provinces moved some aspects of decision-making upwards to regional bodies 
and away from local elite. In doing so the provincial governments increased their ability 
to control costs within the healthcare system by the curtailing of organized medicine’s 
control over healthcare decisions. 
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Chapter 7 
“Within the traditional political dynamics of our federal system, the issue has become: who gets 
to blame who – when funds earmarked for diagnostic equipment are used to buy a lawn-mower?” 
-Bruce Harber and Ted Ball, Redefining Accountability in the Healthcare Sector  
7 Accountability and Healthcare Reform 
With the creation of Local Health Integration Networks in Ontario in 2006 all provincial 
healthcare systems had migrated some degree of decision-making authority away from 
central government toward non-elected Type II multilevel governance bodies. Having 
explored how government framed the shift in decision-making authority in Chapter 6, 
attention is now turned to the accountability relationships that emerged when decision-
making authority in healthcare shifted to Type II jurisdictions. As in previous chapters, 
the accountability relationships between Type II bodies and both government and society 
will be assessed in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario. 
To gain a better understanding of how Type II bodies are held accountable once decision-
making authority has migrated, Chapter 7 investigates both formal accountability and 
perceived accountability. Formal accountability is evaluated based upon the mechanisms 
put in place by government through legislation and regulations. Perceived accountability 
is assessed using the interview responses of members of provincial health authorities, 
public service employees, elected representatives, and members of interest groups active 
in the healthcare field. In doing so, this chapter begins where Chapter 5 stops – the 
evaluation of the strength of accountability relationships through the existence of formal 
accountability rules – and continues on to evaluate whether the formal rules are perceived 
as adequate to exercise meaningful democratic accountability and control. Moreover, 
Chapter 7 attempts to capture which factors either advance or impede the emergence of 
effective accountability relationships.  
Returning to Chapter 5, the strength of both the accountability relationship between Type 
II bodies and government and the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and 
society were evaluated. To test the strength of accountability relationship between Type 
II bodies and government three hypotheses were put forward: 
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H5.1 - The accountability relationships between government and Type II bodies has either 
remained stable or increased in strength over time. 
H5.2 – Governing parties further to the left on the political spectrum will produce 
stronger accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government than 
governing parties further to the right. 
H5.4 – The accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will 
decrease as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. 
A summary of whether support was found for each of the three hypotheses by dataset is 
presented in Table 7.1. As shown in Table 7.1, when assessing the strength of the 
accountability relationships between government and Type II bodies, the positive effect 
of time was consistent across all datasets. Based on formal accountability rules the 
strength of the accountability relationships with government strengthened in Alberta, 
British Columbia, and Ontario and remained stable in Nova Scotia. The results for H5.2 
were mixed, with only British Columbia producing results in the expected direction. The 
results produced no support for the hypothesis that the accountability relationship 
between government and Type II bodies decreases as the geographic scale of the Type II 
body decreases.  
Table 7.1: Government Accountability Index - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset 
 H5.1 – Time H5.2 – Ideology H5.4 – Geographic  
All Provinces Support No Support No Support 
Alberta Support No Support No Support 
British Columbia Support Support No Support 
Nova Scotia Support No Support No Support 
Ontario Support No Support No Support 
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Two additional hypotheses were tested when looking at the strength of the accountability 
relationship between Type II bodies and society:  
H5.3 - The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased 
in strength over time. 
H5.5 – The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase 
as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. 
A summary of whether support was found for each of hypotheses is provided in Table 
7.2. As shown in Table 7.2, mixed support was found for both hypotheses. 
Table 7.2: Government Accountability Index - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset 
 H5.3 – Time  H5.5 – Geographic 
All Provinces Support Support 
Alberta Support No Support 
British Columbia Support Support 
Nova Scotia No Support Partial Support 
Ontario Partial Support Support 
When assessing the effect of time on the strength of the accountability relationships the 
results suggest an increase in the strength of formal rules across all datasets with the 
exception of Nova Scotia. When assessing the effect of geographic scale, the results 
suggest an increase in the strength of formal accountability rules as the size of the 
geographic scale decreased for all datasets but Alberta. 
7.1 Data and Methodology 
As stated above, this chapter explores the relationship between accountability and the 
migration of decision-making authority to Type II multilevel governance bodies in 
healthcare in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario. The 
specific cases are Alberta Health Services (AHS), British Columbia Health Authorities 
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(BCHA), Nova Scotia’s District Health Authorities (DHA), and Ontario’s Local Health 
Integration Networks (LHIN). As discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3, the four 
provinces were selected based on a combination of political regions and political 
ideology. As discussed in Chapter 6, healthcare was selected due to the high level of 
importance placed upon it by Canadian citizens and the consistency at which some 
degree of authority has migrated outside of the central provincial government across all 
Canadian provinces. The migration of authority has not been uniform across the 
provinces: not all provinces transferred the same degree of authority; provincial outcomes 
have varied; different governance models were employed; and the timing of authority 
migration has not been consistent across all provinces. Consider the four provinces under 
study: Alberta has moved from regionally distributed health authorities to one single 
province-wide health body; British Columbia has also reduced the number of health 
bodies, moving from fifty-four to nine; Nova Scotia in contrast has moved in the opposite 
direction, expanding the number of health care bodies from four to nine; and Ontario, 
unlike the other provinces, left existing hospital boards in place when migrating 
provincial authority. 
To assess accountability of Type II health care bodies both the formal accountability 
rules as stipulated in the provincial legislation and the perceptions of individuals active in 
the healthcare policy area were examined. When assessing the formal accountability 
rules, Mark Bovens’s definition of accountability, which states “Accountability is a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain 
and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the 
actor may face consequences” (2007: 450), is used. For each piece of legislation, both the 
accountability relationship with government and the accountability relationship with 
society will be evaluated against the elements present in Bovens’s definition of 
accountability: processes which force agents to explain and justify actions to their 
principals, processes which allow principals to question agents and pass judgment upon 
their actions, and processes which enable principals to sanction their agents.  
Moving beyond the existence of formal accountability rules, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted to assess how accountable the Type II healthcare jurisdictions were 
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perceived to be by key individuals. Interview participants were selected from four 
categories: elected representatives, members of Type II body boards and management 
teams, public employees from the Ministry of Health, and representatives of special 
interest groups active in the healthcare policy field. For the elected representatives 
category interviews were sought with both ministers and health critics, however, attempts 
to interview health ministers were unsuccessful across all four provinces.  
Interviews were sought with senior public employees, as the size, complexity, and 
number of functions undertaken by the government makes it impossible for elected 
officials to be involved in all aspects of how we are governed. As a result members of the 
public service perform large portions of government activities (Flynn, 2011: 43). As 
public employees perform much of the activities of government, they are attuned with the 
operational reality of accountability mechanisms. A member of the department 
responsible for health services was interviewed for each of the four provinces. 
The views of interest group representatives were sought to gain insight into how 
accountability of the Type II bodies was perceived outside of government and the 
organization. In each province, the provincial associate of the Canadian Health Coalition 
and the province’s medical association were contacted for interviews. The health 
coalitions were selected due to their position as coalitions of organizations and 
individuals who are active or interested in health care policy at the provincial level. 
Medical associations were selected as they represent an important constituency group in 
the delivery of health services.  
Similar to the need to interview both elected politicians and public service employees, 
both board members and upper management were recruited from the health authorities. In 
each province, members of both the board and management were recruited from the 
health authority responsible for the capital region. Participants from a second health 
authority – with the exception of Alberta, which has only one health authority – were 
recruited to allow for additional perspectives to be put forward. In selecting a second 
regional authority regions that include rural areas were selected to offset the largely urban 
characteristics of the capital region.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3, it would have been ideal to interview participants from each 
category and from each sub-category; unfortunately this was not the case as not all 
possible interviewees consented to being interviewed. The number of participants per 
category by province is shown in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Interview Participants by Category  
 Alberta 
British 
Columbia 
Nova 
Scotia Ontario Total 
Elected Representatives 1 1 1 2 5 
Ministry Employees 1 1 1 1 4 
Interest Groups 2 1 1 1 5 
Type II Board 0 2 1 2 5 
Type II Management 1 2 2 2 7 
Total 5 7 6 8 26 
As discussed in depth in Chapter 3, the interviews were semi-structured in design, with a 
set of predefined questions forming the general structure of the interview. A list of 
interview questions is available in Appendix D. The interview process was comprised of 
two sections. The first approached accountability from the perspective of the participant. 
Participants were asked to first define or describe what being accountable meant to him 
or her. Participants were then asked whom they believed the Type II healthcare bodies 
were most accountable to and then whom they most represented in their decision-making. 
Both questions were based on questions asked by Lomas et al. in their study of the 
motivations, attitudes and approaches of regional health authority board members 
published in 1997 (Lomas, Woods and Veenstra, 1997a: 673). For each accountability 
relationship identified by a participant, probing questions were asked to obtain a fuller 
understanding of the participant’s view of the relationship – such as the effectiveness of 
the accountability relationship. When a participant did not identify an accountability 
relationship between either Type II healthcare bodies and government or Type II 
healthcare bodies and the public, participants were asked to provide their perspective on 
each omitted accountability relationship.  
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To facilitate comparison between the formal mechanisms of accountability examined in 
the healthcare system and in Chapter 5, the second part of the interview utilizes Mark 
Bovens’s definition of accountability. As touched on above, Bovens’s definition 
identifies three parts to an accountability relationship: the obligation of the actor to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the ability for the forum to pose questions and 
pass judgement, and that the actor may face consequences (Bovens, 2007: 450). For both 
the potential accountability relationship between the Type II body and government and 
the Type II body and society each participant was asked to what extent there is an 
obligation on the part of the Type II body to explain and justify their actions; to what 
extent the ability exists to pose questions to the Type II body regarding their actions; and 
to what extent the ability exists to sanction the Type II body if their actions do not meet 
expectations. After each question unstructured follow-up questions were used to gain a 
better understanding of how successful the participant believed the Type II body was at 
fulfilling that aspect of the accountability relationship and what may have contributed to 
or hindered accountability.  
While a general framework for asking questions was employed, there were cases when 
the participant’s definition of accountability was consistent with Bovens’s. This resulted 
in questions from the second section being answered in the first. In such cases, the 
unanswered questions from the second section were asked as part of the first section of 
the interview. 
In the case of Alberta a third section dealt with the migration of Alberta’s nine regional 
health authorities into a single provincial wide health authority in 2008. Participants from 
Alberta were asked to describe the impact the shift from regional authorities to the single 
province health board had on the ability of both government and society to hold decision-
makers accountable. The question was asked to gain insight into the influence of 
geographic scale on accountability relationships between Type II healthcare bodies and 
both government and society. Only participants from Alberta were asked, as Alberta was 
the only province to move from regional health authorities to a single provincial entity – 
making it unique among the cases being studied.  
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7.2 Formal Accountability Rules 
As stated above, the formal accountability rules were first evaluated using Bovens’s 
definition of accountability. For each of the four cases, the legislation is assessed in terms 
of the requirement of Type II bodies to explain and justify their actions, the opportunity 
for government and members of society to question the Type II body and the opportunity 
for government and members of society to impose sanctions on the Type II body. 
7.2.1 Alberta Health Services 
In the Alberta case, the formal accountability rules specified in the Regional Health 
Authorities Act and the accompanying regulations suggest a strong accountability 
relationship between government and Alberta Health Services (AHS). AHS is required by 
law to submit an annual report, including both financial and performance information, to 
the Minister who must then table the report in the Legislative Assembly. In addition to 
the annual report, the Minister receives quarterly financial reports, AHS audit reports 
(including observations and recommendations), board meeting minutes and may request 
in writing any records, reports or returns deemed necessary to assess the performance of 
AHS. Beyond written reports and records, the Minster has inspection powers that 
authorize the Minister or a person delegated by the Minister to enter and inspect any 
place under the jurisdiction of the AHS and access for the purpose of examination any 
documents or records in the possession of the AHS. In combination, the above measures 
produce a legal requirement for the AHS to explain and justify actions and the right of 
government to ask questions and pass judgment. 
Beyond the capacity to ask questions, the government has substantial tools to sanction the 
AHS. The most powerful mechanism at the province’s disposal may be the dismissal of 
members of the AHS board. As stated in the Regional Health Authorities Act, if the 
Minister believes that AHS is not properly exercising its powers, carrying out its duties, 
or acting in the best interest of the public the Minister may dismiss the board and appoint 
an official administrator in the board’s place. While less dramatic, the Minister also has 
the power to not reappoint a board member upon completion of the board member’s term, 
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meaning that poor performance can be sanctioned by not renewing the member’s 
appointment. 
The accountability relationship between AHS and the public as specified in the 
legislation is centered on the obligation to explain and justify and to a lesser extent the 
ability of members of the public to ask questions. The legislation dictates that all 
meetings of the AHS board must be open to the public unless holding the meeting in 
public would result in the release of information relating to the personal interests, 
reputation or privacy of any one person, or that would impair the ability of AHS to carry 
out its responsibilities. Furthermore, when a meeting is held completely or partially in 
private, no resolution relating to the subject matter discussed may be passed without the 
meeting reverting to being public. The AHS must also make all meeting minutes 
available for inspection by the public. A limited potential for the asking of questions can 
be seen in the requirement to establish community health councils. In accordance with the 
legislation, community health councils must be established to act in an advisory capacity 
to AHS on the provision of health services. Missing from the accountability relationship 
between AHS and the public is the formal ability to sanction. While the legislation allows 
for either elected or appointed board members, the Minister appoints all AHS board 
members. 
When comparing the formal accountability between the AHS and government and the 
AHS and society the rules mirror the results found in Chapter 5. While AHS is expected 
to explain its actions to the people of Alberta and there are some rules in place that allow 
citizens to ask questions, government maintains the more comprehensive of the two 
accountability relationships. 
7.2.2 British Columbia Health Authorities 
The accountability relationship between the BC government and BC’s Health Authorities 
as specified in the BC Health Authorities Act is again strong. Each Health Authority is 
required to send to the Minister an annual report detailing the Authority’s operations and 
fiscal statements for the proceeding fiscal year. The Minister also has the authority to 
require an Authority to report on any matter deemed necessary by the Minister for the 
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purpose of monitoring the Health Authority’s performance. Each Authority is also 
required to have its books open for inspection by the Minister or a designate at all times 
and the Minister may direct the Comptroller General to examine and report to the 
treasury board on any or all financial or accounting operations of a Health Authority 
board. In terms of sanctioning power, the government appoints board members and the 
government has the power to dismiss the board and appoint a public administrator to 
undertake the functions of the board. The Minister may also issue a special directive with 
respect to the exercising of the board’s powers and performance of duties. Boards are 
legally obligated to comply with all such directives.  
Legislated accountability rules governing the relationship between BC’s Health 
Authorities and the public is comparatively sparse. While the BC Health Authorities Act 
dictates that all board meetings be open to the public, creating an obligation on the part of 
Authority boards to explain and justify decisions, there is no legislated capacity for 
members of the public to ask questions or sanction decision-makers. When comparing the 
formal accountability relationship between the government and the BC’s Health 
Authorities and society and the BC Health Authorities the relationship with government 
is, like Alberta, the more comprehensive of the two. When comparing the British 
Columbia and Alberta, the gap between the two accountability relationships appears to be 
wider in British Columbia. 
7.2.3 District Health Authorities (Nova Scotia) 
Consistent with Alberta and British Columbia, the legislated accountability rules in Nova 
Scotia provide for a strong accountability relationship between the District Health 
Authorities and government. Satisfying the obligation to explain and justify, the Nova 
Scotia Health Authorities Act requires each DHA to produce an annual report detailing 
financial statements and results achieved in respect to performance objectives over the 
previous year. The annual report is submitted to the Minister who then must table it in the 
House of Assembly. Moreover, each DHA is required to provide the Minister with 
monthly and quarterly financial statements and an audited year-end financial statement 
including any management letters issued by the auditors. The Minister may also appoint 
an individual to carry out an audit or review a District Health Authority or any program, 
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facility or service, which satisfies Bovens’s second criteria, the ability to ask questions 
and pass judgment. In terms of sanctioning power, the Minister has the power to appoint 
DHA board members and Chairs, and has the power to remove or suspend any member 
of a board of directors. 
In looking at the accountability relationship between the District Health Authorities and 
the public, DHA are required to hold a minimum of two public forums each year for the 
purpose of providing information on the operations and activities of the DHAs and seek 
input from the public. In this regard the legislation obligates the DHAs to explain and 
justify their actions and provides the opportunity for those it serves to pose questions and 
pass judgment. As in Alberta and British Columbia, the public in Nova Scotia lacks the 
capacity to sanction, meaning the formal accountability relationship between government 
and the District Health Authorities is again the more comprehensive of the two 
accountability relationships.  
7.2.4 Local Health Integration Networks (Ontario) 
In the Ontario case, the formal accountability rules set out in the Local Health System 
Integration Act suggest a strong accountability relationship between government and the 
Local Health Integration Networks. Satisfying the obligation to explain and justify, each 
LHIN is required to submit an annual report to the Minister and the Minister is required 
to table the report in the Assembly. As the LHINs are subject to the powers of the 
Auditor General there is the capacity to pose questions and pass judgment. Government is 
also capable of sanctioning LHINs through its appointment power, which includes the 
appointment, reappointment and termination of board members and board chairs and 
vice-chairs.  
Adding additional strength to the accountability relationship between the LHINs and 
government is the legislated requirement for each LHIN to have an accountability 
agreement with government. The accountability agreements set out detailed reporting 
obligations, the ability of government to request meetings to discuss performance factors, 
government inspection authority, and a performance management framework that allows 
the government to initiate performance management activities including increased 
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reporting, external reviews and changes to the governance structure. In essence, the 
accountability agreements strengthen each aspect of the accountability relationship as 
defined by Bovens. 
Turning to the formal rules governing the accountability relationship between LHINs and 
the public, all full board and committee meetings are open to the public and each LHIN 
must carry out some form of community engagement. LHINs are required to engage the 
community of diverse persons and entities involved with the health care system on an on-
going basis, and the methods of engagement may include community meetings, focus 
group meetings, or the establishment of advisory committees. Again missing from the 
formal accountability rules is the capacity to sanction. Consistent with the other three 
provinces, the lack of the public’s capacity to sanction results in the formal accountability 
relationship between government and the Local Health Accountability Networks being 
the more comprehensive of the two relationships. 
7.2.5 Overall Results 
When looking at the health authority legislation in each of the four provinces, the results 
consistently show a more comprehensive accountability relationship between government 
and the Type II healthcare body than society and the Type II healthcare body. Table 7.4 
provides a summary of which three aspects of Bovens’s definition of accountability are 
legislated into the accountability relationships between Type II healthcare bodies and 
both government and society for each of the four provinces. As shown in Table 7.4 in 
each province the relationship with government satisfies all aspects of Bovens’s 
definition of accountability, while this is not the case for the accountability relationship 
with society. When evaluating the provincial legislation, Type II healthcare bodies are 
consistently obligated to justify their actions to government, while governments are able 
to question, pass judgment and impose sanctions. Type II healthcare bodies are also 
required to explain and justify their actions to the public in all provinces. In all provinces 
but British Columbia the public was able to ask questions, however, the ability for the 
members of the public to ask questions regarding decisions made is limited in 
comparison to government. As shown in Table 7.4, the ability for the public to sanction 
Type II healthcare bodies is lacking within the legislation across all four provinces. 
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Table 7.4: Government and Society Formal Accountability Relationship by Province  
 Relationship with Government Relationship with Society 
 
Obligation 
to Justify 
Ability to 
Question 
Ability to 
Sanction 
Obligation 
to Justify 
Ability to 
Question 
Ability to 
Sanction  
Alberta Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
British 
Columbia 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Nova 
Scotia 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Ontario Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
 
7.3 Perceptions of Accountability 
As discussed above, interview questions were divided into two or three sections 
depending upon province. The first section approached accountability from the 
perspective of the interview participant. The second looked at accountability from the 
perspective of Mark Bovens’s definition of accountability. The third section sought to 
gain insight into the migration of multiple health authorities into a single authority in the 
province of Alberta. In presenting the interview results, participants’ definition of 
accountability, or what it meant for the Type II healthcare bodies to be accountable, is 
presented first, followed by the results from the remaining sections. 
7.3.1  Defining Accountability 
Accountability – as an idea – is consistently viewed in a positive light, however, what it 
means to be accountable has remained elusive, as it conjures up different images for 
different individuals (Koppell, 2005: 94; Bovens, 2007: 448). As discussed in Chapter 3, 
each interview participant was first asked to describe what accountability means to him 
or her. Of the twenty-six participants, twenty-two provided characteristics that they felt 
necessary for the existence of accountability. The remaining four participants did not 
provide a description of accountability, but instead provided examples of accountability 
relationships that existed within the provincial healthcare system. There were also 
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participants who provided both characteristics of accountability and described existing 
accountability relationships. 
When all the participant’s responses are considered, a number of themes emerge. A 
frequent theme was the need for clear and well-understood responsibilities. As stated by 
one participant, “ideally accountabilities are clear in terms of who is responsible for 
what,” and “when there isn’t clarity that’s when there are problems.” At least one 
participant from each participant category with the exception of public employees 
identified clarity in knowing who has the authority to make what decision as part of 
accountability. In fact, the theme of clarity in decision-making authority was so 
pronounced throughout the interview process, that greater attention is given to it later in 
the chapter.  
A second recurring theme when describing accountability was the obligation to report 
goals and performance to those you are accountable to. At least one participant from each 
of the five participant categories included some form of goals and performance reporting 
against those goals in their definition of accountability. Multiple participants also 
described accountability in terms of answerability. One interviewee stated that to be 
accountable you must “help people to understand what you’re are doing with the 
resources they have entrusted to your care. It’s answering for your actions.” The 
requirement to be answerable and consult with those that you are accountable to was 
again present across all five participant categories.  
Accountability was also described in terms of transparency. Accountability was described 
as having a “process in place, which allows us to have transparency in our decision-
making,” as well as “having a framework and reasoned rationale as to how we make 
decisions.” At least one member from both Type II healthcare body management and the 
public employee category included the need for transparency within the decision-making 
process when describing accountability. In addition, at least one participant from the 
Type II body board member, elected representative, and interest group member 
categories described accountability in part as the need to take ownership for decisions 
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made. Moreover, both the Type II body management and the interest group member 
categories included the ability to sanction within their definition of accountability.  
While not capturing each individual definition of accountability, the characteristics of 
accountability provided by the twenty-two participants have been compiled and presented 
by category in Table 7.5. The columns in Table 7.5 provide a consolidated accountability 
definition compiled from the varied descriptions provided by the different members of 
each group of participants.  
Table 7.5: Characteristics of Accountability Reported by Participant Group 
Type II Body 
Board Members 
Type II Body 
Management 
Elected 
Representatives 
Public 
Employees 
Interest Group 
Members 
- Need to know 
who is making 
what decision 
- Obligated to 
report goals 
and 
performance 
to those you 
are 
accountable to 
- Required to 
consult and be 
answerable to 
those you are 
accountable to 
- Taking 
ownership of 
decisions you 
make 
 
- Need to know 
who is making 
what decision 
- Obligated to 
report goals 
and 
performance 
to those you 
are 
accountable to 
- Required to 
consult and be 
answerable to 
those you are 
accountable to 
- Able to 
sanction if 
expectations 
are not met 
- Actions and 
decision-
making process 
must be 
transparent 
- Need to know 
who is making 
what decision 
- Obligated to 
report goals 
and 
performance 
to those you 
are 
accountable to 
- Required to 
consult and be 
answerable to 
those you are 
accountable to 
- Taking 
ownership of 
decisions you 
make 
 
- Obligated to 
report goals 
and 
performance 
to those you 
are 
accountable to 
- Required to 
consult and be 
answerable to 
those you are 
accountable to 
- Actions and 
decision-
making process 
must be 
transparent 
 
- Need to know 
who is making 
what decision 
- Obligated to 
report goals 
and 
performance 
to those you 
are 
accountable to 
- Required to 
consult and be 
answerable to 
those you are 
accountable to 
- Able to 
sanction if 
expectations 
are not met 
- Taking 
ownership of 
decisions you 
make 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, Bovens’s definition of accountability is a “relationship between 
an actor and a forum in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or 
her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
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consequences” (2007: 450). All three aspects of Bovens’s definition of accountability are 
evident in Table 7.5. The obligation to explain and to justify one’s conduct (while not 
identical) is similar to the notion of reporting on goals and performance against those 
goals. The ability of the forum to pose questions and pass judgement aligns well with the 
underlying tone of the requirement to consult and be answerable to those you are 
accountable to. Lastly, Bovens’s view that actors may face consequences is consistent 
with participant responses that accountability requires the ability to enact sanctions if 
expectations are not met. Of the three aspects both the obligation to report on goals and 
performance and the obligation to consult and be answerable are consistent across all 
participant categories, while the need for sanctioning is only evident in the Type II body 
management and the healthcare interest group categories.  
The inconsistent inclusion of sanctioning within even the consolidated definitions of 
accountability is interesting as it mirrors the contested perception of the need to sanction 
(Mulgan, 2000: 556) discussed in Chapter 2. On one extreme, there is the opinion that 
one cannot have accountability without liability and that accountability without fear of 
consequences is not likely to be accountability at all (Fraser, 1996: 36). Others question 
whether sanctioning is an essential element of an accountability relationship (Harlow and 
Rawlings, 2007: 545). For example, Harlow and Rawlings suggest that recommendations 
for improvement alone may be sufficient to satisfy accountability requirements (2007: 
546). In mirroring the debate over the need for sanctioning, the inconsistency of the 
inclusion of sanctioning in Table 7.5 supports asking the question of whether sanctioning 
is an essential element of accountability. 
In addition to raising questions over the necessity of sanctioning within an accountability 
relationship, the participant groups that included the ability to sanction as part of the 
definition of accountability are noteworthy. The two groups include interest group 
members and the healthcare bodies’ senior management. Interest group members are 
currently unable to sanction Type II healthcare bodies through formal means, while 
members of senior management could be sanctioned for administrative decisions.  
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Aside from the contested nature of sanctioning, what is evident across the five participant 
categories is that there exists degree of consistency regarding how accountability is 
described. The most pressing concern is a need for clarity in who is making which 
decision. Furthermore, the most consistent descriptive statements regarding what it means 
to be accountable focus on the need to provide information to and consult with those you 
are accountable to.  
7.3.2 To whom do you feel the Type II Healthcare Body is Most 
Accountable To? 
In identifying to whom the Type II healthcare bodies were most accountable to, the 
majority of respondents stated that they were most accountable to either government or to 
both government and the public. As shown in Figure 7.1, forty-six per cent of participants 
identified government as the most prominent accountability relationship, while thirty-five 
per cent of participants identified both the accountability relationship with government 
and the accountability relationship with the public. Also shown in Figure 7.1, eleven per 
cent of participants stated that the Type II healthcare bodies were most accountable to the 
public; all were from the healthcare bodies’ senior management category.  
Figure 7.1: Whom do you feel the Type II Healthcare Body is Most Accountable To? 
 !
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The number of participants who identified multiple relationships when asked to identify 
the most important accountability relationship suggests complex multifaceted 
accountability environments. In describing the complex nature of accountability, one 
participant described the existence of both a legal and a moral accountability, stating that 
there is a legal accountability to government that ties back to the community through the 
election process, and a moral accountability that is directly to the community. Other 
participants noted that the public nature of the healthcare system means that either 
through direct or indirect means that Type II healthcare bodies are ultimately accountable 
to the public. One participant described the nature of being accountable to the public in 
the following manner: 
“Being accountable to the public has the two faces to it, it is the actual 
individual person on the street that’s in their local area getting services, 
but there is also the public writ large as the group of individuals who pay 
taxes and elects a government to represent them [sic].” 
In describing the relationship between Type II healthcare bodies and the public in this 
manner the relationship expands beyond the local to the public at large. Public issues are 
no longer limited to local health service delivery but transcend the boundaries of the 
health authority when issues of fund management or more importantly mismanagement 
arise.  
Participants also commented on the potential for tension between the public nature of the 
healthcare system and professional accountability. While ultimately accountable to the 
public, healthcare professionals must also maintain their professional accountability. 
Participants identified a need to remove the ‘either/or’ mindset and encouraging 
individuals to feel accountable to the health system as a whole, while at the same time 
maintaining their professional accountability. 
The sole participant who did not identify government, the public, or a combination of the 
two as the entity to whom the Type II healthcare body is ultimately most accountable 
instead suggested that there are four possible entities to which the healthcare body could 
be most accountable. Specifically, the Type II healthcare body was stated as being most 
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accountable to one of the four entities depending upon the issue at hand: government as 
its funding agency, elected officials at all levels of government as the peoples’ elected 
representatives; the public as the recipients of health services; and internal staff and 
volunteers and providers of those services.  
Lastly, as shown in Figure 7.1, one participant did not indicate whom they believed the 
Type II healthcare body was most accountable to. In this instance, the participant 
continued to cite the specifics of legislation and regulations and was careful not to convey 
their opinion on how the legislation and regulation was working in practice.  
In addition to responses that highlighted the duality of accountability, there were 
responses that were aligned with conclusions drawn in Chapter 6. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, how changes to the healthcare system were framed were not always 
consistent with the form changes to the system took once implemented. Restructuring 
was framed in terms of increased citizen participation. Outcomes, however, were not 
consistent with the stated goals of increased participation or grassroots decision-making, 
but instead shifted the power towards government. Consistent with this position, both 
elected representatives from the opposition parties and members of interest groups 
responded that Type II healthcare bodies should be most accountable to the public but 
were most accountable to the government. In total, five, out of the ten participants from 
the elected representatives and members of interest groups categories stated that Type II 
healthcare bodies are most accountable to government in their current form, but should be 
most accountable to the public.  
7.3.3 Whose interests do you feel the decisions of the Type II 
healthcare body most represent? 
When assessing whose interests the decisions of the Type II healthcare bodies most 
represented, the most frequent answer was government. The most common responses to 
whose interest do the decisions of Type II healthcare bodies most represent are presented 
in Figure 7.2. As shown in Figure 7.2, thirty-eight per cent of participants believed that 
the decisions of the Type II healthcare bodies most represented the interests of 
government, while thirty-one per cent of believed that decisions most represented the 
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interests of the public. One participant felt that the decisions represented the interests of 
both government and the public. 
In addition to the participants who believed that decisions made by Type II healthcare 
bodies represented the interests of the public, government or a combination of the two, 
five participants provided an alterative account. Two participants stated that decisions 
most represented the interests of both public and staff. One participant stated that 
decisions surrounding the actions of Type II healthcare bodies were most frequently 
made based on the interests of the stakeholder group that was most impacted by the 
decision. Another participant felt that the decisions most represented the interests of the 
CEO and staff. Finally, two participants were unsure whose interests the decisions made 
by the Type II healthcare body most represented. One participant did not provide an 
answer to the question, “Whose interests do you feel the decisions of the Type II 
healthcare body most represent?”  
Figure 7.2: Whose Interests do you feel the Decisions of the Type II Healthcare body 
Most Represent? 
 !
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While Figure 7.2 presents a fairly even divide between the number of participants who 
felt that the Type II healthcare bodies acted in the interest of the public and in the interest 
of government, a different picture emerges when the results are broken down by 
participant category. When asked who the decisions of Type II healthcare bodies most 
represented, all seven members of the senior management category included the public in 
some form. Five of the Type II healthcare body management participants stated that 
decisions represented the interests of the public. One participant provided a particularly 
nuanced perspective stating, who decisions should most represent, “is something that we 
struggle with, we toil with everyday.” The constant struggle stems from a feeling of 
obligation to all stakeholders. The participant believed that the Type II healthcare body 
attempted to orient itself depending “on the scale and the magnitude and the impact of the 
decision in the sense of who is likely to be most negatively impacted by the decision.” 
From the participant’s perspective, all stakeholders are important within the healthcare 
system and all need to be treated as such. The final participant from the Type II body 
management category believed that decisions represented the interests of both the public 
and staff. 
In contrast to Type II healthcare body senior management, the views put forward by both 
elected representatives and the members of interest groups placed the interests of 
government closer to the center of the decision-making process of Type II healthcare 
bodies. Two main accounts were put forward as the reasoning behind government’s 
interest being dominant over the interests of other parties in the decision-making 
processes. First, members from both elected representatives and interest groups stated 
that governments interests must come first as they have the entire health system to 
consider. Drawing on the words of one of the participants, decisions must first represent 
the “broader framework strategic priorities and structure,” then they are to “carry out that 
mandate on behalf of the people in their local area.” The second account, again put 
forward by both elected representatives from the opposition parties and members of 
interest groups, states that the fiscal power held by government places Type II healthcare 
bodies in a position where they must adhere to the wishes of provincial government. 
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Participants from both the public employee and board member categories demonstrated 
more diverse opinions. Of the five board members interviewed, two stated that decisions 
ultimately represented government, while three stated that decisions represented the will 
of the public. In the case of public employees, the responses were even more diverse, 
with each of the four participants providing a different answer. One participant stated that 
decisions represented the interests of the government, a second stated the public and 
government, a third stated the public and the staff, while the final participant declined to 
provide an answer. 
A couple of observations can be made in comparing the responses to the following 
questions: To whom do you feel the Type II healthcare body is most accountable to?; and 
Whose interests do you feel the decisions of the Type II healthcare body most represent? 
First, in terms of accountability the vast majority of participants believe that Type II 
healthcare bodies are most accountable to government, either solely or jointly with the 
public. Second, there is no agreement as to whom the decisions of Type II healthcare 
bodies most represent. Moreover, given the general agreement that Type II healthcare 
bodies are accountable to government it would seem logical that a similar consensus 
would exist surrounding who Type II healthcare body decisions most represent. 
However, in contrast to definitions of accountability which suggest A is obligated to act 
in someway on behalf of B, the results indicate that perceptions of who decisions most 
represent are highly dependent upon the participant group the interviewee belongs to. 
7.3.4 Explain, Question, and Sanction – Accountability to 
Government  
When asked to assess the accountability relationship between the provincial Type II 
healthcare bodies and government using Bovens’s definition of accountability (2007: 
450), participant results closely resembled the formal accountability rules dictated in the 
legislation and regulations. For the most part, participants believed that Type II 
healthcare bodies are obligated to explain and justify their actions to government. That 
government is able to ask questions and pass judgment and government has the capacity 
to sanction healthcare bodies if the healthcare bodies are not fulfilling their obligations as 
set forth by government. 
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When asked about the need for Type II healthcare bodies to explain and justify their 
actions to government, all participants stated that there was an obligation on the part of 
the healthcare bodies to report back to government and keep government apprised of the 
activities of the healthcare body regarding either healthcare outcomes, how they were 
meeting their fiscal obligations, or both. Participants from all provinces but Ontario, 
however, raised concerns that while an obligation to explain and justify decisions existed, 
shortcomings existed within the current structure. As reflected in their observations, 
concerns were raised by public employees, healthcare body management and members of 
interest groups that a focus on financial reporting overshadowed reporting on health 
outcomes. Participants argued that the time had come to expand reporting requirements 
beyond issues of healthcare costs and procedure time requirements to issues of health 
system sustainability and the delivery of better health outcomes. 
In assessing the ability of government to question and pass judgement on the Type II 
healthcare bodies, respondents from all four provinces and across all five participant 
groups felt that government was able to question and pass judgement on Type II 
healthcare bodies. As discussed above, formal mechanisms are made available to 
government through the enabling legislation, however, an evenly distributed numbers of 
participants identified formal and informal mechanisms. As presented in Figure 7.3, 
twenty-four per cent of participants identified formal means, thirty-one identified 
informal means and thirty-five per cent of participants identified both formal and 
informal methods. Three of the participants did not provide an indication of whether the 
accountability relationship with government includes the ability to pose questions and 
judgement. Two participants from the interest group member category focused on the 
ability of societal members to pose questions, while an elected representative provided an 
account of the inability of members of the opposition to effectively pose questions, but 
did not touch directly upon the ability of the government to pose questions.  
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Figure 7.3: Participant Description of Methods used by Government to Question 
Actions of Type II Healthcare Bodies  
 
The formal mechanisms described by participants included: standing meetings at various 
organizational levels that allow government officials to question the actions of the 
healthcare body; monthly meetings between Minister and board chair and CEO; the 
creation of formal joint government and Type II healthcare body committees; quarterly 
healthcare body performance reviews; and annual budget and planning processes. From 
an informal perspective a great deal of emphasis was placed upon the ability of the 
Minister as well as department officials to pick up the phone when it was felt necessary to 
question the actions of the Type II healthcare body. Of the eighteen participants 
interviewed from the healthcare board and management as well as public employee 
groups, fifteen commented on the informal ability of government officials to ask 
questions of Type II healthcare bodies. Multiple participants described communication as 
being bi-directional and daily between the healthcare body and government. It was 
mentioned, however, that there is a hierarchy to communication: the board communicates 
with the Minister, the CEO communicates with the Deputy Minister, and so on.  
When asked about the capacity to sanction, no participant denied government held 
political authority. Not all participants believed, however, that the sanctioning 
capabilities provided to government through legislation were effectively used. Concerns 
!
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were raised that poor performance was only met with either “a slap on the wrist” or 
prolonged discussion without repercussions for poor performance. Concerns over the 
effectiveness of sanctions were raised in all provinces with the exception of Ontario, and 
concerns came from participants both internal and external to the healthcare bodies. In 
contrast, however, to concerns over government’s unwillingness to utilize the tools 
available to deal with underperformance, others warned of government’s unwarranted use 
of the same mechanisms. There were claims that government had used the available tools 
not to sanction underperformance, but to remove board members who had publically 
criticized the actions of government.  
Just as dictated in the legislation, the responses of the participants suggest that all three 
elements of Bovens’s definition of accountability are present in the accountability 
relationship between government and Type II healthcare bodies. Their existence, 
however, does not mean that challenges in fulfilling the requirements do not exist. Of the 
three elements, the ability for government to question and pass judgement is the least 
fragile. As evident from the survey responses, government has both formal and informal 
methods of questioning the actions of the Type II healthcare bodies. Both the requirement 
to explain and justify and the ability to sanction, however, were called into question. 
Questions were raised about whether the current reporting regime was sufficient as well 
as whether government was utilizing its sanction power to address issues of performance. 
7.3.5 Explain, Question, and Sanction – Accountability to the 
Public  
As discussed above, participant results provide a picture of the accountability relationship 
between Type II healthcare bodies and government that closely resembled the 
relationship mandated by the provincial legislation that migrated decision-making 
authority. When looking at the accountability relationship between the healthcare bodies 
and the public, however, the results show a greater degree of difference between the 
formal accountability rules as laid out in the legislation and perceptions brought forward 
by the participants.  
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Using the three components of Bovens’s definition of accountability (2007: 450), Table 
7.6 presents the formal accountability relationship as legislated by the provinces. As 
discussed above, in each of the four provinces the Type II health care bodies are 
obligated to explain and justify their actions to the public. In all cases, with the exception 
of BC’s Health Authorities, there is an obligation on the part of the healthcare bodies to 
provide a venue for members of the community to question their actions within the 
legislation. In the accountability relationship with society, however, no formal 
mechanism exists by which to sanction a Type II healthcare body in any of the four 
provinces.   
Table 7.6: Relationship with Society – Meeting Formal Accountability Criteria by 
Province 
 
Obligation to 
Justify 
Ability to 
Question 
Ability to 
Sanction 
Alberta Yes Yes No 
British Columbia Yes No No 
Nova Scotia Yes Yes No 
Ontario Yes Yes No 
Continuing to use Bovens’s definition of accountability, Figure 7.4 captures how 
participants perceive the accountability relationship between Type II healthcare bodies 
and society. As shown in Figure 7.4, consistent with the formal accountability rules, 
eighty-eight per cent of participants believed that healthcare bodies are obligated to 
explain and justify their actions, while twelve per cent believed they have no such 
obligation. In regard to the ability to ask questions, fifty per cent of participants 
responded in the positive, thirty-five responded in the negative, while fifteen did not 
provide an answer. If we consider only the participants from British Columbia, the sole 
province in the study where the ability to ask questions is not legislated, fifty-seven per 
cent responded in the positive, twenty-nine in the negative and fourteen did not provide 
an answer. The BC results suggest that even though not required by legislation, there are 
efforts being made to engage the public and provide forums through which the public can 
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question the actions the Type II healthcare bodies. Returning to the full sample, when 
asked about the ability to sanction Type II healthcare bodies, forty-two per cent of 
participants stated that society was able to sanction healthcare bodies, thirty-one per cent 
stated it was not and twenty-seven per cent did not provide an answer.  
Figure 7.4: Participant Perception of Accountability Relationship with Society 
 
While the majority of participants believed that Type II healthcare bodies had an 
obligation to justify their actions to society, concern was raised by a number of interest 
group members and elected representatives from opposition parties that the obligation to 
fully explain and justify the actions of the healthcare body was either absent or not 
adhered to. In responding to the ability of members of the public to question and pass 
judgment, responses indicated that while there is a lot of work done to engage the 
community prior to decisions being made, there is limited capacity for members of the 
public to pose questions afterwards. In two cases, once by an elected representative, and 
once by a board member, freedom of information requests were listed as a mechanism by 
which members of the public could question and access information on how decisions 
were made after the fact. On a positive note, in three instances the participants’ responses 
!
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suggest that the legal requirements were treated as minimal requirements with members 
of the public either able to speak and pose questions at board meetings or other 
formalized proceedings. In responding to the ability to sanction, forty-two per cent of the 
respondents indicated that while no formal sanctioning capacity existed, the public has 
the means to informally sanction the healthcare bodies through the use of the media, 
demonstrations, complaints to elected officials, or any other venues that would bring the 
issue to the forefront. 
When describing the overall effectiveness of the accountability relationships three themes 
emerged: a lack of role clarity within the healthcare system; a lack of knowledge at the 
citizen level; and concerns over the type of information provided to the public. Concern 
over a lack of role clarity was raised by at least one participant from each of the four 
provinces. While such concerns came mostly from interest group representatives, at least 
one public servant and an elected representative also brought the issue forward. Perhaps 
not surprising due to their familiarity with the system, no individual working within a 
Type II healthcare body raised clarity of roles within the healthcare system as a concern. 
When describing role clarity as a problem, participants suggested that an inability to 
clearly delineate the role of the Type II healthcare bodies in relation to other actors in the 
healthcare field limited the ability of the public to hold the correct actor accountable for 
decisions made. 
Participants from each of the four provinces also expressed the issue of low levels of 
citizen knowledge. Just less than two-thirds of interviewees, comprised of participants 
from all categories, expressed the belief that citizens held a limited understanding of the 
role of the Type II healthcare body in their region, the decision-making process, or the 
work that their healthcare body is undertaking. In regard to accountability the concern 
was concisely put by one participant who stated that “you cannot hold someone to 
account if you do not know who they are or what they are doing.” While a number of 
participants did state that public knowledge around the role and activities undertaken by 
healthcare bodies is increasing, the same respondents frequently acknowledged that in 
terms of public education there is still “a ways to go”. On a positive note, multiple 
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healthcare body representatives, from both the executives and the boards, spoke of the 
need for healthcare bodies to continue to educate the public. 
Closely tied to citizen knowledge is the type of information provided by the healthcare 
bodies to the public. At least one participant from each province called into question the 
type of information provided to the public. The most prevalent concern was that the 
information provided to the public was the same information produced for government 
consumption. While meeting the informational demands of government, the information 
is described as overly technical and bureaucratic and not accessible to a majority of the 
public. To a lesser extent, concerns were raised over the likelihood of a citizen knowing 
where to look for the information that is available to him/her. 
Overall, participant perceptions of the accountability relationship between Type II 
healthcare bodies and society, while weaker than the relationship with government, may 
be stronger than the relationship that appears on paper. While challenges of role clarity, 
citizen knowledge, and information distribution must be met, participant responses 
indicate that there are those within the healthcare system that view the legal requirements 
as minimal requirements. Furthermore, there is a belief that while no legal means to 
sanction Type II healthcare bodies exists, the public is able use informal channels to 
sanction Type II healthcare bodies when performance does not meet with expectations. 
7.3.6 And then there was One: From Nine Regional Authorities to 
a Single Provincial Board in Alberta 
In Alberta nine regional health authorities, the Cancer Board, the Mental Health Board 
and the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission, were dissolved and rolled into Alberta 
Health Services (Liepert, 2009). As a result of this dramatic change in the Alberta 
healthcare system, participants were asked to describe the effect of moving from nine 
regional authorities to a single province wide health board on the ability to hold decision-
makers accountable. Out of the five participants from Alberta, four provided insight into 
the impact of the change in direction undertaken by the province.  
When comparing the responses on the effect of moving from regional to a provincial 
healthcare body three themes were identified. The most commonly shared belief was that 
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in moving from regional health authorities to a provincial authority, there was a loss of 
connection between the decision-makers and the community. All four participants 
expressed a degree of concern over the loss of local connection within the decision-
making process. Moreover, two of the four respondents commented on the loss of 
connection between the people and decision-makers that previously occurred when the 
regional healthcare bodies where implemented. At each step, from local hospital boards 
to Regional Health Authorities to AHS, there has been a “loss of connection between the 
people of Alberta and healthcare decisions.” One participant also noted that with shifting 
to one large provincial body there is the impression that “Calgary and Edmonton make all 
the decisions”. While four participants expressed a degree of concern over the weakening 
of the connection between citizens and healthcare decisions, one participant (from outside 
of AHS) expressed this as a known problem that Alberta Health Services is actively 
working to overcome.  
In contrast to concerns over the loss of connection between Alberta Health Services and 
the public, two participants suggested that the shift from nine regional health authorities 
to one provincial body has strengthened government control over decisions made in the 
healthcare system. One participant speculated that the shift from regional authorities to a 
single health authority was based on the perceived need of government to obtain greater 
control than that which existed under the regional system. Lastly, one participant noted 
that the change has made it increasingly difficult to distinguish where Alberta Health 
ends and Alberta Health Services begins. 
While not asked about the effect of the shift from nine regional bodies to one provincial 
wide healthcare authority in Alberta, at least one participant in each of the other three 
provinces specifically commented on the institutional change made in Alberta. Two 
participants believed that the current number of Type II healthcare bodies in his/her 
province was too many and resulted in inefficiencies, by moving to a single provincial 
body, as was done in Alberta, the system would lose sight of local differences. Another 
participant, however, viewed a move to a single Type II healthcare body as potentially 
being in her/his province’s best interest. One participant did not speculate on whether 
his/her province would benefit from following the same path as Alberta but simply stated 
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that it appeared that the shift from nine regional authorities to one provincial bodies had 
left little room for local decision-making and that the change could be seen as a move by 
the provincial government to retake control of decision-making in the healthcare system.  
7.4 Discussion: Direct and Indirect Accountability in 
Healthcare 
When looking at the migration of authority in healthcare for the provinces of Alberta, 
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario the results suggest a strong accountability 
relationship between provincial governments and Type II healthcare bodies alongside a 
weaker accountability relationship between healthcare bodies and the public. The 
difference in capacity between the two relationships is evident in both the formal 
accountability rules as described in the legislation and the perception of accountability 
provided by interview participants. As discussed in Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 7.5, 
the relationships can be considered direct and indirect accountability relationships 
between the public and the Type II healthcare bodies.  
Figure 7.5: Type II Healthcare Bodies Accountability Pathways in Healthcare 
 
While the direct accountability relationship with government is stronger, society is 
intended to remain the benefactor of the relationship. Within each of the four provinces, 
the ability to hold the Type II healthcare bodies to account is rooted in the democratic 
institution of parliament. Within each provincial parliament or legislative assembly, 
provincial power is executed in accordance with the requirements of ministerial 
Type	  II	  Healthcare	  Bodies	  Government	  
Society	  
  
217 
responsibility and parliamentary accountability. Ministers are answerable to Parliament 
for the actions of government and Parliament may hold to account all those who exercise 
the power of the state, be they elected or non-elected (D’Ombrian, 2007: 198-199).  
Despite the potential for both a direct and indirect accountability relationship through 
government, however, both pathways may be undermined by limited clarity and lack of 
citizen knowledge surrounding the decision-making in the healthcare system. In a 
representative democracy, accountability is the principal mechanism through which mass 
publics exert control over their elected officials (Rudolph, 2006: 99), but for public 
responsiveness to be effective an accurate signal of what government is doing is required 
(Soroka and Wlezien, 2004: 552; 2011: 33). As stated in Chapter 2, the dispersion of 
decision-making authority vertically to an increasing number of government levels 
lessens the ability of citizens to accurately attribute which decision-making authority 
belongs to which level of government (Anderson, 2006; Brzinski, Lancaster and 
Tuschloff, 1999; Schneider, Jacoby and Lewis, 2011). In the case of authority migration 
in healthcare, interview results suggest that the migration of decision-making authority 
horizontally to Type II multilevel governance bodies has clouded citizens’ perceptions of 
who is responsible for policy decisions.  
Within the provincial healthcare systems the shifting of decision-making power 
horizontally increased both the length and number of accountability chains. This can be 
seen as the result of the growing number of institutions involved in the decision-making 
process. In a parliamentary democracy, four steps in an accountability chain can be 
identified: 1) voters to their elected representatives; 2) elected representatives to the 
executive branch; 3) from the head of government (prime minister or premier) to 
executive departmental heads (ministers); and 4) from the heads of executive departments 
to the civil servants (Strøm 2000: 267). As each of the four provincial governments being 
studied added a Type II multilevel governance body to the provincial health care system, 
a second accountability chain was created. Both of the accountability chains are 
presented in Figure 7.6. In each of the four provinces a portion of the healthcare decisions 
remained within the purview of the provincial government. As a result, Strøm’s 
accountability chain remained in place, while at the same time the new accountability 
  218 
chain was brought into existence. The new accountability chain includes the following 
additional accountability steps: from the head of the ministry responsible for healthcare to 
the boards of the Type II healthcare bodies; from the board of the Type II healthcare body 
to the CEO; and from the CEOs of the healthcare bodies the healthcare body 
bureaucracies.  
In migrating decision-making authority horizontally, the provincial governments 
increased the number of actors in the provincial healthcare systems and in doing so 
created a second accountability chain. Interview responses suggest that the result has 
compromised the ability of citizens to accurately attribute decision-making authority. As 
Papadopoulos would predict (2007: 479), the interworking of the healthcare policy 
process is most clear to those working within the system. Participants from each of the 
four provinces raised concerns regarding the ability of citizens to clearly attribute the 
roles and responsibilities of actors within the provincial healthcare system. The majority 
of such concerns came from members of the special interest group category who are 
furthest from the centre of the healthcare system. The issue was also brought forward, 
however, by at least one public employee and elected representative. Supporting 
Papadopoulos’ argument, not one participant working within the four Type II healthcare 
bodies raised the ability of citizens to accurately attribute responsibilities as a concern. 
The results suggest that as healthcare policy processes have become increasingly 
obscured to all but the most closely involved it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
citizens to accurately attribute responsibility for policy actions. 
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Figure 7.6: Parliamentary and Type II Healthcare Body Accountability Chains 
 
The fear that democratic accountability will be lost as the number of players within the 
policy process increases is not new. As stated by Alexander Hamilton in 1788, “one of 
the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against 
the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility” 
(Hamilton, 1788). Much more recently, Cameron Anderson argued that governances 
could create incentives for governments within the multilevel system to camouflage their 
responsibility for decisions and outcomes (2006: 450). Looking specifically at health 
policy, Jonathan Lomas claimed that devolved authorities make an easy way to shift 
blame and place a buffer between provincial governments and the discontent that comes 
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with unpopular decisions (1997:821). Harber and Ball observe that an unintended 
consequence of healthcare systems, structures and processes is blame-avoidance at the 
cost of true accountability (2004: 41). 
At risk within the healthcare system is the loss of public input and democratic 
accountability. Delegation of authority threatens to weaken democratic accountability, as 
citizens are unable to accurately attribute responsibilities across the healthcare system. 
While mechanisms of accountability may exist within the legislation and regulation, 
democratic accountability may not exist. If a citizen is unable to accurately attribute the 
responsibilities and actions of the various policy actors within the healthcare system they 
cannot effectively hold policy actors to account. For example, consider the capacity to 
sanction. Dunn states that it is unlikely that a decision-maker will be rationally sanctioned 
without sufficient public knowledge and understanding (1999: 335). Based on 
participants’ remarks, in the public sphere there exists a weak understanding of the roles 
and responsibilities of actors involved in the governance of the healthcare system. 
Without the background knowledge, citizens do not have the necessary tools to make 
rational conclusions about the effectiveness or appropriateness of a Type II healthcare 
body’s actions, let alone sanction them. Moreover, within an accountability chain, the 
policy process is most visible to those who are most closely involved in the decision-
making process, and in multilevel environments actors are more likely to be subject to 
administrative rather than democratic accountability (Papadopoulos, 2007: 479). As such, 
accountability mechanisms may exist within each province’s legislation and regulations, 
but a lack of role clarity within the healthcare system may limit the effectiveness of such 
mechanisms to the detriment of democratic accountability.  
7.5 Discussion: Accountability and the Quality of 
Information in Healthcare 
The previous section focused on how a lack of clarity surrounding the roles and 
responsibilities of policy actors in healthcare policy poses a risk to democratic 
accountability. Attention is now turned to the ability of citizens to accurately assess the 
desirability of actions taken by actors within the policy process. To accurately assess the 
actions of policy actors, citizens must have access to a sufficient quality and quantity of 
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information. As presented above in Chart 7.5, while eighty-eight per cent of participants 
stated that Type II healthcare bodies are obligated to explain and justify their actions to 
the public, participants also brought forward a number of concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of the information provided.  
The most prevalent concern voiced by participants was the format of the information 
provided to the public. One issue was that the reports produced to fulfill government 
reporting requirements and specifications where repurposed to fulfill obligations to report 
to citizens. While government officials assessing the information have the required 
expertise to accurately interpret the information, concerns were raised that most citizens 
lack the prerequisite knowledge to determine the appropriateness of actions. The 
technical nature of reports is visible in Alberta Health Services’ reporting of performance 
measures as seen in their 2013-2014 annual report (provided in Appendix G). Concerns 
were also raised regarding the time constraints faced by most citizens if they wished to 
acquire the necessary knowledge to understand and accurately interpret the information 
provided to the public by Type II healthcare bodies. As argued by Abelson et al., public 
deliberation efforts in health policy are constrained by the time and commitment it takes 
for participants to learn about the issues and work through their implications (Abelson et 
al., 2012: 27). According to Tomblin the rhetoric for the need for civic engagement in the 
healthcare system is at odds with the findings that civic literacy and political knowledge  
are decreasing. Most citizens operate at the margins of politics and their lack of 
knowledge promotes attachment to existing institutions (Tomblin, 2004: 285). 
Furthermore, as Julie Simmons states, most citizens remain largely unaware of public 
reporting exercises and even Legislatures and parliaments that mandate the collection of 
data make little use of it when holding decision-makers to account (2011:156). 
From the above discussion five factors can be identified that limit the ability of members 
of the public to hold Type II healthcare bodies to account: 
1. Many citizens lack the level of political engagement required to seek out existing 
public reports. 
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2. Existing public reports/information are presented in a technical format that requires 
a high degree of background knowledge to understand. 
3. Many citizens lack the technical expertise required to accurately assess the reported 
information. 
4. Many citizens lack the time necessary to acquire the expertise necessary to 
accurately assess the reported information. 
5. Many citizens lack the level of political engagement required to seek out the 
expertise necessary to accurately assess the reported information. 
While each of the five factors can be viewed as interrelated, they can also be broken 
down into two distinct sets of problems: the first being a lack of political engagement and 
the second being the nature of the data provided to the public. The first problem falls 
outside the scope of this project, however, multiple participants claimed that citizens do 
become more politically engaged in health policy once either they or a loved one requires 
treatment for either a serious/life threatening disease or injury.  
With the first problem outside the scope of the project, further consideration will be given 
to the second. In compiling participant responses, results show concerns were raised in 
each of the four provinces that the reports made available to the public were in a format 
that did not aid the public in assessing the performance of the Type II healthcare bodies. 
One participant, however, stated that when citizens were provided with the information 
available, they reached similar conclusions as the Type II healthcare body regarding 
health system decisions.  
“If you provide the public with the same information that I have, I find 
that they often can reach much the same conclusions around services or 
proposed models of delivery and do so in a matter that is very practical 
and very pragmatic [sic].” 
If this is true, the problem and the solution are inherent in the two accountability 
relationships and by extension the two accountability chains discussed above.  
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In responding to the problem, what require consideration are the accountability 
relationships, and the actors that exist at each link in the accountability chain. First 
consider that healthcare professionals are recognized as having greater knowledge of 
what constitutes good healthcare, while citizens are recognized as being in a better 
position to understand local needs and the relation to health (Frankish et al. 2002: 1474). 
Second, lay participants who serve on health boards have little basis on which to make 
health care decisions and typically accept the recommendations of the healthcare 
professionals on staff (Björkman, 1985: 415-416). Now, within the two accountability 
chains healthcare professionals are located in both the Type II Multilevel Governance 
Bureaucracies and the ranks of Public Employees. Accordingly, it is logical that the 
reports provided by the Type II healthcare bodies would be technical in nature. If, as one 
participant suggested, you can provide the public with sufficient information to have 
them reach practical and pragmatic conclusions regarding the operation of the healthcare 
system it would appear a second set of reporting mechanisms is required. While none of 
the four provinces included in the study had mandated reporting that focuses on the 
unique informational needs of the citizen, participants from two of the four provinces 
discussed measures being taken to produce citizen-focused reports. In both cases the 
initiatives appear to have been initiated from within Type II healthcare bodies 
themselves.  
Aside from modifying report outputs, the media was identified by fifty per cent of 
participants as having a role to play in holding Type II healthcare bodies accountable to 
the public. As one participant noted, the media acts as a filter for citizen knowledge, with 
health policy being filtered through the media for the majority of citizens. Another 
participant stated that the media brought benefits to both the Type II healthcare bodies 
and citizens. When working well, the media serves to both distribute pertinent 
information as well as ask the questions that people are seeking answers to. Participant 
data on the media’s role in holding Type II healthcare bodies to account is presented in 
Figure 7.7.  
  224 
Figure 7.7: The Media’s Role in Holding Type II Healthcare Bodies Accountable 
 
While strong overall support existed for the media as an accountability mechanism, 
concerns were raised in regard to specific perceived shortcomings when reporting on 
healthcare. Specifically participants raised concerns regarding a disproportionally high 
focus on negative in comparison to positive news stories, a lack of depth when reporting 
on healthcare policy issues and a limited number of reporters with sufficient healthcare 
knowledge to be able to look into and keep track of health care policy information. 
Participant data on perceived media shortcomings in reporting on healthcare is presented 
in Figure 7.8. The results are consistent with the results of a 1996 study examining citizen 
participation in volunteer-based health-system governance in British Columbia. The 
study suggests the possibility of a larger role for the media in promoting a better 
understanding at the level of the citizen; however, this would require a fuller account of 
healthcare reform including a balance of positive and negative stories (Frankish et al., 
2002a: 144). 
!
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Figure 7.8: Perceived Media Shortcomings in Reporting on Healthcare 
 
The results presented in Figure 7.8 suggest that the potential of the media to promote a 
better understanding of healthcare policy to citizens has not been fully realized. The 
media however, continues to play an important role as they allow an issue to penetrate the 
public interest. As stated by one participant, it is amazing how accountable an 
organization or individual can become once there is media attention. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The findings above suggest that the legislated accountability relationships between Type 
II healthcare bodies and both government and society include sufficient accountability 
mechanisms for the public to hold Type II healthcare bodies to account. Participant 
responses, however, suggest that challenges, including a lack of role clarity in decision-
making and citizen knowledge, lend credence to accountability concerns. Overall the 
accountability story that emerges is one in which sufficient accountability mechanisms 
exist, but the sufficient knowledge on the part of the citizen to utilize the mechanisms 
may not. 
In looking at the accountability relationships between Type II healthcare bodies and both 
government and society, the results from Chapter 7 support the conclusions made in 
Chapter 5. First, citizens are able to hold Type II bodies either directly or indirectly 
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accountable. Second, of the two accountability relationships the accountability 
relationship between government and Type II healthcare bodies is the stronger. Moving 
from working strictly with formal legislation to participant perceptions, however, Chapter 
7 provides interesting contradictions between formal rules and what is believed to occur. 
In the case of the ability to sanction, all provincial governments had the legislated ability 
to sanction, while the public did not. A common perception, however, was that 
government was unwilling to use its sanctioning power to ensure accountability while 
members of the public could employ informal sanctioning mechanisms to hold Type II 
healthcare bodies to account. In regard to the ability to ask questions and pass judgment, 
interview results suggested that governments had significantly greater ability to ask 
questions than what was legislated, while it was felt by some participants that the public 
was often unable to ask questions once decisions had been made. So while the 
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies may be stronger, 
participant perceptions of how each accountability relationship works in practice suggest 
practical accountability benefits exist in each relationship. 
More important than the existence and strength of an accountability relationship is its 
successful functioning. In shifting authority to new governance bodies it is not sufficient 
to build accountability rules into the system; sufficient knowledge must also exist to 
make the accountability mechanisms meaningful. While the results suggest that 
government is fully capable of holding healthcare bodies to account, a gap exists between 
the power to hold healthcare bodies to account and public knowledge. The shifting of 
decision-making authority horizontally has resulted in the camouflaging of responsibility, 
which coupled with insufficient knowledge at the citizen level continues to present 
challenges for democratic input and accountability. Fortunately in the field of healthcare, 
the responses from both board members and senior management suggest an obligation to 
act in the best interests of the public they serve. The challenge in healthcare is to ensure a 
clear delineation of roles, adequate public information, and a venue for public input that 
ensures the standards of democratic input and accountability are met. 
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Chapter 8 
8 Authority Migration and Type II Multilevel Governance: 
Conclusions 
An overarching challenge is that governance is complex. It brings together multiple 
actors, of whom not all are working to achieving the same objective at any given time. 
Furthermore, as governance patterns have altered, decision-making authority has 
migrated both vertically and horizontally away from the traditional political centre. New 
governance arrangements have emerged that no longer align with conventional 
government hierarchies. New governance actors are operating with autonomy from the 
dictates of legislatures and public agencies (Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 316). In 1999, the 
Auditor General of Canada observed changes in how Canadians are being governed, 
stating that some policy initiatives had moved beyond the traditional forms of governance 
to entities outside of government (Auditor General of Canada, 1999: 23-27). In 2002, the 
Auditor General of Canada observed that accountability relationships had become 
increasing complex as public objectives had become increasingly achieved through non-
hierarchic relationships (2002: 4-5).  
Shifts in decision-making authority have moved governance models away from a single 
agency model toward a multi-actor system and increased the complexity of accountability 
relationships. The preceding chapters focused on: 1) the extent to which Canadian 
provinces have opted to migrate decision-making authority horizontally in response to 
policy issues and what factors explain the migration of authority; and 2) the existence and 
relative strength of the accountability relationships that emerge once authority has been 
migrated, especially the accountability relationship between the new governance actors 
and both government and society. This final chapter will focus on reviewing the findings 
of the previous chapters and discuss the implications. 
8.1 Review of Findings 
Beginning in Chapter 4, a number of hypotheses have been evaluated regarding the 
migration of authority and the effect of this migration on public input and democratic 
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authority. Chapter 4 evaluated the historical rate of authority migration as well as the 
effect of fiscal capacity and political ideology on the annual rate of authority migration. 
These results showed that the cumulative number of Type II bodies have been increasing 
over time, while the annual rate of Type II body creation has remained consistent over the 
past sixty years. This suggests that the use of Type II bodies by government is not a 
recent phenomenon. Instead the evidence indicates that provincial governments in 
Canada have been using Type II bodies as a policy option consistently over the past sixty 
years. Chapter 4 yielded inconsistent support for the hypothesis that the lower the fiscal 
capacity of government the higher the rate of creation of Type II bodies with support 
being found largely in Alberta which exhibited a unique period of debt reduction. Support 
for the hypothesis that the further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a 
government sits the fewer the number of Type II bodies created was also inconsistent 
between provinces. 
Building upon the results from Chapter 4, Chapter 6 looked again at the effect of fiscal 
capacity and political ideology on the use of authority migration to Type II bodies as a 
policy option by government. While Chapter 4 employed a quantitative methodology 
using a custom built dataset, Chapter 6 focused specifically on healthcare policy. The 
findings in Chapter 6 support the hypothesis that the lower the fiscal capacity of 
government the higher the rate higher rate of Type II body creation. In the case of 
healthcare reform, limited fiscal capacity to fulfill a growing demand for services was the 
underlying factor in each of the four provinces. How changes in healthcare were framed 
for the public, however, did not always align with the underlying fiscal challenges. 
Healthcare restructuring was frequently framed in terms of increased citizen participation 
and local decision-making. There is disagreement, however, as to whether greater citizen 
participation in decision-making has been realized (Collier, 2010: 331). As with Chapter 
4, Chapter 6 yielded inconsistent support for the hypothesis that the further to the left-of-
centre on the political spectrum a government sits the fewer the number of Type II bodies 
created.  
While Chapters 4 and 6 focused on the migration of authority to Type II bodies, Chapters 
5 and 7 explored the resulting accountability relationships that emerged. In Chapter 5, the 
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strength of the accountability relationship between the Type II bodies and both 
government and society were investigated. The results in Chapter 5 showed consistent 
support across all datasets for the hypothesis that the strength of the accountability 
relationship between government and Type II bodies has either increased or remained 
stable over time. Inconsistent support was found for the hypothesis that governing parties 
further to the left on the political spectrum produce stronger accountability relationships 
between Type II bodies and government than governing parties further to the right. No 
support was found for the hypothesis that the strength of the accountability relationship 
between government and Type II bodies will decrease as the geographic scale of the Type 
II body decreases. When looking at the direct accountability relationship between Type II 
bodies and society in Chapter 5 two hypotheses were tested: the accountability 
relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased in strength over time; and 
the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as the 
geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. The results for each hypothesis were 
inconsistent.  
Beyond evaluating the five hypotheses, the results in Chapter 5 revealed that of the two 
relationships, the accountability relationship between the government and Type II bodies 
has been and continues to be the dominant one. Based on the strength of each 
accountability relationship the results suggest that while there are increasing levels of 
societal-steering, the state remains the dominant actor in the governance structure. 
Like Chapter 5, Chapter 7 evaluated the accountability relationships between Type II 
bodies and both government and society. Consistent with Chapter 5, the results from 
Chapter 7 show accountability relationships between Type II healthcare bodies and 
government to be the stronger of the two relationships. When interview responses are 
taken into account, however, the results suggest that practical accountability benefits can 
be gained from each accountability relationship. Results from Chapter 7 also suggest that 
while sufficient legislation and regulations exist to hold Type II healthcare bodies to 
account, concerns over a lack of role clarity and limited citizen knowledge caused 
participants to question the ability of the public to hold Type II healthcare bodies to 
account. In shifting authority to new governance bodies it is insufficient to build 
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accountability rules into the system; sufficient knowledge must also exist to make the 
accountability mechanisms meaningful. While the results suggest that government has 
the legislated tools to hold healthcare bodies to account, a gap exists between the powers 
to do so and public knowledge.   
When the results of the previous four chapters are considered as a whole, we see that the 
use of Type II bodies in response to policy issues is not new, nor is it likely to change. 
Moreover, when faced with financial challenges, as in the case of healthcare policy, the 
horizontal migration of decision-making responsibility to Type II bodies remains a policy 
option for government. Given the continued use of Type II bodies as a policy option, 
public input and democratic accountability concerns must be taken seriously. The results 
from Chapter 5 suggest an overall strengthening of the indirect accountability 
relationship between the public and Type II bodies through government. When looking at 
the direct accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies, however, the 
Ontario case showed how possible accountability gains could be lost. Also, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, the existence of sufficient accountability mechanisms, either 
formal or informal, does not fully alleviate accountability concerns. Interview results 
from Chapter 7 show role clarity among the actors involved in healthcare as challenges to 
accountability. As decision-making authority shifts horizontally, there is the risk of 
camouflaging responsibility, which, coupled with insufficient knowledge at the citizen 
level, presents a challenge to public input and democratic accountability.  
8.2 Implications 
The first implication of the thesis findings is that the use of horizontal authority migration 
as a policy tool is not new. While the rate of increase has remained stable, the cumulative 
number Type II bodies have been increasing in Canadian provinces over the past 60 
years.  
In Chapter 1 the argument put forward was that the demand for governance had expanded 
beyond the capacity of the state to the point where governance requirements cannot be 
fulfilled without widespread delegation (Flinders, 2006: 223). As a result the modern 
state no longer monopolizes the governance process, and governments are subject to 
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negotiations with a wide range of public, semi-public, and private actors when engaged in 
policy formation (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007: 3-4). The consistent use of authority 
migration over the past sixty years, however, suggests that such concerns, if not 
misplaced, are not the reason behind the use of Type II bodies by provincial 
governments. 
The second implication of the findings is that while the number of Type II bodies created 
by the provinces has increased, the rate of increase has not expanded under the weight of 
increased governance demand as predicted in the literature. Instead, the provinces of 
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario have used Type II bodies 
consistently as a policy tool over the past 60 years. This suggests that the reason why 
governments continue to the use Type II bodies may need to be reconsidered. Because 
government alone holds the legislative ability to set the rules of governance (Bartle and 
Vass, 2007: 895; Rhodes, 2007: 1244; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 13) government also 
holds a unique level of control over Type II bodies. It may yield more interesting results 
to look at the policy environment from which Type II bodies emerged. For instance, 
perhaps the creation of Type II bodies by Canadian provinces are a mechanism through 
which governments of all political stripes are able to deflect some of the direct attention 
of the public in respect to certain policy issues.  
In addition to increased governance demand, Chapter 1 also raised concerns that the 
dispersal of authority had reshaped the governance landscape and brought into question 
democratic input and accountability within the governance process (Peters and Pierre, 
2006: 209). While the concern remains valid, the consistent use of authority migration 
over the past sixty years reminds us that threats to public input and democratic 
accountability are themselves not a modern phenomenon. 
The third implication to be taken away from the quantitative results is that while the 
cumulative number of Type II bodies involved in public governance continues to expand, 
the increased strength of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and 
government and Type II bodies and society has positive implications for public input and 
democratic accountability. As discussed in Chapter 2, three different accountability 
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arrangements may exist by which citizens can hold Type II bodies to account. First, 
society may act as principals with Type II bodies as agents where Type II bodies are 
directly accountable to society. Second, citizens may act as principals with 
democratically elected government as agents, who in turn act as principals of Type II 
bodies, making Type II bodies indirectly accountable to the citizens. Lastly, both 
accountability arrangements may exist. The results indicate the existence of both 
accountability arrangements, with citizens increasingly able to hold Type II bodies both 
directly and indirectly to account. 
The quantitative results also show, however, that while overall there has been a trend 
toward the strengthening of both accountability relationships the potential exists for the 
accountability relationship to weaken. The Ontario case, where an increase in the strength 
of the society accountability relationship index emerged only to dissipate a decade later, 
reminds us that the current levels of public input and democratic accountability are not 
certain going forward. In addition to the lesson learned from Ontario, the mean 
government and society accountability index scores demonstrate the limitations in the 
existing legislated accountability relationships. For both indexes, the 1996 to 2005 time 
period provide the highest mean scores: 2.46 for the government accountability index and 
1.50 the society accountability index. Both are well below the maximum accountability 
score of 3, suggesting that while the strength of the accountability relationships may be 
improving a full accountability relationship with both government and society is not 
legislated for a large number of Type II bodies.  
In healthcare, while sufficient legislated rules exist to hold Type II healthcare bodies fully 
accountable to government in each of the four provinces studied, concerns over pubic 
input and democratic accountability were still raised by interview participants. Moreover, 
while no legal sanction mechanism exists, close to half the participants interviewed felt 
that society, through the use of informal sanctioning techniques, had the potential to hold 
Type II healthcare bodies to account. The larger implications, however, are that in 
shifting authority to new governance bodies it is not sufficient to build accountability 
rules into the system, or that citizens have access to informal mechanisms of 
accountability. Within the new governance environment sufficient knowledge must also 
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exist to ensure the accountability mechanisms are accessible, understandable, and 
meaningful to those who are impacted by decisions. In the case of healthcare, the results 
suggest a gap exists between availability of accountability mechanisms by which citizens 
could hold Type II healthcare bodies to account and the public knowledge required by 
citizens to make use of those mechanisms.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 vertical multilevel governance can create difficulties for 
citizens in attributing policy decisions to policy actors. Such information challenges can 
be exacerbated by the actions of governments who engage in blame shifting and credit 
taking for policy outcomes as authority migrated vertically from one level of elected 
government to another (Anderson, 2006: 450; Cutler, 2004: 19; Hamilton, 1788). The 
informational challenges of citizens are further clouded as authority is migrated both 
horizontally and vertically. The risk to public input and democratic accountability is far 
greater as authority migrates horizontally. As the number of non-hierarchical governance 
relationships increase the greater the complexity of the accountability relationship 
between society and public decision-makers.  
8.3 Future Directions 
The focus of this work has been on the extent to which Canadian provinces have opted to 
migrate decision-making authority horizontally in response to policy issues and the effect 
of horizontal authority migration on public input and democratic authority migration. 
From the four provinces studied, the results suggest that governments have been relying 
upon the use of Type II governance bodies as solutions to policy challenges for more than 
the past sixty years. The findings also show that differences exist across the four 
provinces. Contextual differences between provinces resulted in differences in outcome. 
Given that the work to date has only looked at Canada, it may prove useful to incorporate 
additional countries within the same research framework. In doing so further 
consistencies and differences would be explored and a fuller picture of the use of Type II 
bodies beyond the Canadian context would be made available.  
Beyond expanding upon the scope of the existing project a further line of inquiry is the 
explanation behind the expectation put forward in Chapter 3 that the rate of horizontal 
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authority migrating is increasing while the evidence shows that it has remained constant. 
The question as to why the difference between the expected and actual rates of Type II 
body creation remains unanswered. Multiple reasons for the disjuncture are possible 
including: the increased use of Type II bodies in policy areas that are of high importance 
to citizens and traditionally viewed as the sole jurisdiction of the state; the more visible 
use of private actors in service delivery; and/or the result of government stepping aside so 
that new areas of what may have been considered public life are now regulated by market 
mechanisms which have stepped in to fill the void. Regardless of the exact explanation, 
there is the opportunity to further explore the emerging governance arrangements and 
why reality has not played out as expected.  
While understanding governance arrangements remains important, the consistent usage of 
horizontal authority migration as a public policy tool combined with the challenges 
associated with the existing accountability relationships lead to additional research 
questions. The results from Chapter 5 suggest that in a great number of instances the 
legislated accountability obligations do not fulfill all three elements of an accountability 
relationship as defined by Bovens: the obligation of the accountable party to explain and 
to justify his or her conduct; the ability to pose questions and pass judgement on the 
accountable party; and to sanction the accountable party (Bovens, 2007: 450). Moreover, 
even when sufficient accountability rules are legislated, as was the case in the 
relationship between government and Type II healthcare bodies as presented in Chapter 
7, concerns exist over the ability to hold such bodies accountable. Given such 
accountability challenges, future research can be directed toward identifying factors that 
promote meaningful accountability. As outlined above, when decision-making authority 
migrates to new governance bodies it is not sufficient to build formal accountability rules 
within the legislative framework. An effort must be made to ensure that sufficient 
knowledge and capacity exist to make the accountability mechanisms workable.  
In researching the knowledge required to hold Type II bodies to account, two paths of 
inquiry may be taken. One area to explore is what and how information is transmitted 
from Type II bodies to the public. For example, when researching healthcare there was 
concern that the information provided to the public was produced to fulfill government 
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reporting requirements and was of a technical nature. The underlying questions are 
whether there are sufficient communication obligations and whether the information 
provided by the Type II body to the public is in an accessible format. 
A second area of exploration is the role of the media. Strong support existed for the 
media as an accountability mechanism, however, the results from Chapter 7 showed 
concern that the media was unable to live up to its idealized role when reporting on 
complex policy issues. In the case of healthcare, interview participants stated that there 
was a lack of depth when reporting on healthcare policy issues, a limited number of 
reporters with sufficient healthcare knowledge, and a disproportionally high focus on the 
negative in comparison to positive news stories. 
8.4 Closing Thoughts 
Regardless of whether the practice is old or new, the dispersal of decision-making 
authority horizontally to actors that exist beyond the reach of the ballot box challenges 
public input and accountability norms within the democratic governance process. 
Democratic theory holds elections as a vital mechanism of accountability, through which 
the policy preferences of the people can influence government action (Fearon, 1999: 57). 
If, in a representative democracy, accountability is the principal mechanism through 
which mass publics exert control over their elected officials (Rudolph, 2006: 99), thought 
must go into how we hold to account public decision-makers that are not elected. 
Schattschneider hypothesized that the result of political contests is determined by the 
scope of public involvement in conflicts (1975: 5). Schattschneider further asked if 
decisions made by government empowered external bodies are as public as those that 
occur within elected legislatures (1975: 65). The results from Chapter 7 suggest that they 
are not.  
With the migration of authority outside of government making decision-making less 
public, how do we continue to make decision-makers accountable for acts of public 
governance? Two accountability relationships have been considered throughout the 
duration of this work - the relationship with government and the relationship with society. 
Of the two, results from Chapters 5 and 7 suggest that the indirect accountability 
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relationship through government has remained the stronger of the two. Overall, while 
citizens have gained capacity to directly hold Type II decision-makers to account, our 
elected representatives are able to exercise a unique accountability mechanism on our 
behalf, the ability to legislate. The question remains, however, how are we to ensure that 
actors are held to account. The answer to this seems to be tied to how public the decision-
making process continues to be once authority has migrated. The more public the 
decision-making process, the wider the scope of the political contest and the stronger the 
democratic accountability. 
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Appendix A: Accountability Mechanism Coding – Government/Society Relationship 
with Type II Bodies 
Accountability Mechanism  Relationship Accountability Component 
Provincial government appoints board 
members 
Government Sanction 
Provincial government can terminate 
board members 
Government Sanction 
Provincial government appoints board 
chair 
Government Sanction 
Provincial members of government 
named to the board 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Provincial members of government 
named to board as ex officio members 
 Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Members of provincial legislature 
named to the board 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Provincial public service positions 
named to the board 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Provincial public service positions 
named to board as ex officio members 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Other level of government appoints 
board members 
Government Sanction 
Other level of government can 
terminate board members 
Government Sanction 
Other level of government appoints 
board chair 
Government  Sanction 
Member of other level of government 
named to the board 
Government  Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Member of other level of government 
named to board as ex officio member 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Special interest actor appoints or 
elects board members 
Special Interest Sanction 
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Accountability Mechanism  Relationship Accountability Component 
Special interest actor can terminate 
board members 
Special Interest Sanction 
Special interest actor appoints board 
chair 
Special Interest Sanction 
Public elects board members Society Sanction 
Public can terminate board members Society Sanction 
Public appoints board chair Society Sanction 
Board members have a fixed 
appointment time 
N/A N/A 
Provincial government is able to 
reappoint board members after term is 
completed 
Government Sanction 
Type II body must submit an annual 
report to the provincial government 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Type II body must submit an annual 
report to the provincial legislature 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Government can request ad hoc 
reports from the Type II body 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Type II body must submit an annual 
report to municipal government(s) 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Type II body subject to having its 
accounts audited by provincial auditor 
or external auditor appointed by 
provincial auditor 
Government Questioning/Judgment 
Type II body subject to having its 
accounts audited by a municipal 
auditor 
Government Questioning/Judgment 
Type II body subject to having its 
accounts audited by the Auditor 
General of Canada 
Government Questioning/Judgment 
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Accountability Mechanism  Relationship Accountability Component 
Type II body subject to audit by 
ministry officials or ministry approved 
auditor 
Government Questioning/Judgment 
Audited financial reports sent to 
provincial government 
Government Questioning/Judgment 
Audited financial reports submitted to 
provincial legislature 
Government Questioning/Judgment 
Audited financial reports sent to 
municipal government 
Government Questioning/Judgment 
Provincial government funds Type II 
body based on performance standards 
Government Sanction 
Provincial government appoints 
members of an overseeing or review 
body 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Provincial government has the power 
to transfer Type II bodies power to an 
alternate entity 
Government Sanction 
Mechanism by which public 
complaints against actors under 
jurisdiction of the Type II body are 
heard and investigated 
Society Questioning/Judgment 
Formal process by which the public 
can appeal the decisions of the Type II 
body 
Society Questioning/Judgment 
Formal process by which provincial 
government can appeal the decisions 
of the Type II body 
Government Questioning/Judgment 
Type II body required to hold public 
consultations prior to making policy 
decisions 
Society Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Public may force the dissolution of a 
Type II body by petition or other 
action 
Society Sanction 
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Accountability Mechanism  Relationship Accountability Component 
Municipal government may withdraw 
from a Type II body 
Government Sanction 
Type II body reports must be 
publically read or published 
Society Explanation/Justification 
Type II body must hold an annual 
ratepayers meeting 
Society Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Annual general meeting (members 
only) 
Special Interest Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Public meeting can be initiated by the 
public 
Society Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Type II body committee members are 
elected by the public 
Society Sanction 
Type II body or government appoints 
citizens committee positions 
Society Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Type II body board meetings are open 
to the public 
Society Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Type II body board meeting minutes 
are open to the public 
Society Explanation/Justification 
Type II body board meeting minutes 
are sent to the provincial government 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Type II body accountability 
agreement required by government 
Government Sanction 
Type II body budget (or aspects of it) 
must be approved by government 
Government Sanction 
Formal process exists by which 
government may block decisions 
made by the Type II body 
Government Sanction 
A service plan or memorandum of 
understanding is required between 
Type II body and government 
Government Explanation/Justification 
Questioning/Judgment 
Sanction 
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Appendix B: Type II Bodies 
Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta ABC Benefits 
Corporation 
ABC Benefits 
Corporation Act 
1996  
Alberta Agricultural Products 
Marketing Council 
The Marketing of 
Agricultural Products 
Act 
1965  
Alberta Agricultural Relief 
Adjustment Board 
Municipal Government 
Act 
 1994 
Alberta Agriculture Financial 
Services Corporation 
Agriculture Financial 
Services Act 
1963  
Alberta Alberta Agricultural 
Research Institute 
Alberta Science and 
Research Authority Act 
1970 2000 
Alberta Alberta Alcoholism and 
Drug Abuse Commission 
Alberta Alcoholism and 
Drug Abuse Commission 
1970  
Alberta Alberta Apprenticeship 
and Industry Training 
Board 
Apprenticeship and 
Industry Training 
1991  
Alberta Alberta Art Foundation Alberta Foundation for 
the Arts 
1972 1991 
Alberta Alberta Assessment 
Equalization Board 
The Municipalities 
Assessment and 
Equalization Act 
1957 1994 
Alberta Alberta Association of 
Architects 
The Alberta Architects 
Act 
  
Alberta Alberta Association of 
Dental Technicians 
Health Professionals Act 1961  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta Alberta Association of 
Midwives 
Health Professionals Act 2001  
Alberta Alberta Association of 
Registered Nurses 
Health Professionals Act   
Alberta Alberta Association of 
Registered Occupational 
Therapists 
Health Professionals Act 1987  
Alberta Alberta Association of 
Registered Social 
Workers 
Health Professionals Act 1969  
Alberta Alberta Cancer 
Foundation 
Alberta Cancer 
Foundation Act 
1984  
Alberta Alberta Chiropractic 
Association 
Health Professionals Act   
Alberta Alberta Colleges 
Commission 
The College Act 1969 1973 
Alberta Alberta Cultural Heritage 
Foundation 
Alberta Cultural Heritage 
Act 
1984 1987 
Alberta Alberta Dairy Control 
Board (Formerly Milk 
Control Board) 
The Dairy Industry Act 1969 1999 
Alberta Alberta Dental 
Association 
Health Professionals Act   
Alberta Alberta Drama Board The Cultural 
Development Act 
1946 1966 
Alberta The Alberta Educational 
Communications 
Corporation 
Alberta Educational 
Communications 
Corporation Act 
1973 1996 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta Alberta Electric Energy 
Marketing Agency 
Electric Energy 
Marketing Act 
1981 1997 
Alberta Alberta Energy and 
Utilities Board 
Alberta Energy and 
Utilities Board Act 
1994  
Alberta Alberta Environmental 
Research Trust 
Alberta Environmental 
Research Trust Act 
1971 1995 
Alberta Alberta Foundation for 
the Arts 
Alberta Foundation for 
the Arts Act 
1991  
Alberta Alberta Foundation for 
University Research and 
Education in Alcoholism 
and Drug Abuse 
Alcoholism and Drug 
Abuse Foundation Act 
1972 1993 
Alberta Alberta Gaming and 
Liquor Commission 
Gaming and Liquor Act   
Alberta The Alberta Hail and 
Crop Insurance 
Corporation 
Agriculture Financial 
Services Act 
 1993 
Alberta Alberta Handicraft Board The Cultural 
Development Act 
1946 1966 
Alberta Alberta Health Care 
Insurance Commission 
Department of Hospitals 
and Medicare Act 
1969 1977 
Alberta Alberta Heritage 
Foundation for Medical 
Research 
Alberta Heritage 
Foundation For Medical 
Research Act 
1979  
Alberta Alberta Heritage 
Foundation for Science 
and Engineering 
Research 
Alberta Heritage 
Foundation for Science 
and Engineering 
Research Act 
2000  
Alberta Alberta Hospital Districts Hospitals Act  1996 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta Alberta Industrial 
Corporation 
Business Development 1946 1972 
Alberta Alberta Institute of 
Agrologists 
The Agrologists Act 1947  
Alberta Alberta Land Survivors' 
Association 
Land Surveyors Act   
Alberta Alberta Library Board The Cultural 
Development Act 
1946 1966 
Alberta Alberta Library Board Libraries Act 1983 1998 
Alberta Alberta Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation 
Alberta Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation Act 
1970 1984 
Alberta Alberta Motor 
Transportation Safety 
Board 
Traffic Safety Act 1977  
Alberta Alberta Municipal 
Financing Corporation 
The Alberta Municipal 
Financing Corporation 
Act 
1956  
Alberta Alberta Music Board The Cultural 
Development Act 
1946 1966 
Alberta Alberta Oil Sands 
Technology and 
Research Authority 
Alberta Science and 
Research Authority Act 
1974 2000 
Alberta Alberta Opportunity 
Company 
Agriculture Financial 
Services Act 
 2002 
Alberta Alberta Opticians 
Association 
Health Professionals Act 1965  
Alberta The Alberta Optometric 
Association 
Health Professionals Act   
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta Alberta Petroleum 
Marketing Commission 
Petroleum Marketing Act 1973  
Alberta Alberta Pharmaceutical 
Association 
Health Professionals Act   
Alberta Alberta Physical 
Recreation Board 
The Cultural 
Development Act 
1946 1966 
Alberta Alberta Podiatry 
Association  
The Podiatry Act 1952  
Alberta Alberta Power 
Commission 
Hydro and Electric 
Energy Act 
 1971 
Alberta Alberta Racing 
Corporation 
Horse Racing 
Commission Act 
1962  
Alberta The Alberta Registered 
Dietitians Association 
Health Professionals Act 1959  
Alberta Alberta Registered 
Professional Foresters 
Association 
Forest Professionals Act 1985  
Alberta Alberta Science and 
Research Authority 
Alberta Science, 
Research and 
Technology Authority 
Act 
  
Alberta Alberta Securities 
Commission 
Securities Act 1967  
Alberta Alberta Teachers' 
Association 
The Teaching Profession 
Act 
  
Alberta Alberta Tourism 
Education Council 
Tourism Education 
Council Act 
1988 1996 
Alberta The Alberta Veterinary 
Medical Association 
Veterinary Profession 
Act 
1953  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta Alberta Visual Arts 
Board 
The Cultural 
Development Act 
1946 1966 
Alberta Ambulance Advisory and 
Appeal Board 
Ambulance Services Act 1990  
Alberta The Association of 
Professional Engineers, 
Geologists and 
Geophysicists of Alberta 
The Engineering, 
Geological & 
Geophysical Professions 
Ac 
1955  
Alberta Board of Administrators 
of the Teachers 
Retirement Fund 
Teachers' Pension Plans 
Act 
  
Alberta Board of Reference School Act 1988  
Alberta Board of Trustees for 
each school district 
The School Act   
Alberta Calgary Municipal 
Heritage Property 
Authority 
Calgary Municipal 
Heritage Property 
Authority 
1984  
Alberta The Calgary Research 
and Development 
Authority 
The Calgary Research 
and Development 
Authority Act 
1981  
Alberta Certified General 
Accountant Association 
of Alberta 
Regulated Accounting 
Profession Act 
1984  
Alberta Child and Family 
Services Authority 
Child and Family 
Services Authorities 
1996  
Alberta College Boards (Public 
Colleges) 
The College Act 1969 1973 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta College of 
Acupuncturists of 
Alberta 
Health Professionals Act 1999  
Alberta College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of the 
Province of Alberta 
The Medical Profession 
Act 
  
Alberta Combined Laboratory 
and X-ray Technicians 
Health Professionals Act 2005  
Alberta Community Library 
Boards 
Libraries Act 1948  
Alberta Consulting Engineers of 
Alberta 
Consulting Engineers of 
Alberta Act 
1992  
Alberta Council of the Society of 
the Management 
Accountants of Alberta 
Regulated Accounting 
Profession Act 
  
Alberta The Crimes 
Compensation Board 
The Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Act 
1969 1996 
Alberta Debtors' Assistance 
Board 
The Debtors' Assistance 
Act 
  
Alberta Dental Assistants 
Association 
Health Professionals Act 1990  
Alberta Dental Hygienist 
Association 
Health Professionals Act 1990  
Alberta The Disabled Persons 
Act (Creation of body 
specified in legislation 
Assured Income for the 
Severely Handicapped 
Act 
1955 1979 
Alberta The Disabled Persons' 
Pension Act (Creation of 
Board Specified) 
Assured Income for the 
Severely Handicapped 
Act 
1952 1979 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta District Ambulance 
Boards 
Ambulance Services Act 1990  
Alberta Drainage District Boards The Drainage Districts 
Act 
  
Alberta Eastern Rockies Forest 
Conservation Board 
The Forest Reserves Act 1955 1976 
Alberta Edmonton Convention 
and Tourism Authority 
Edmonton Convention 
and Tourism Authority 
1982 1993 
Alberta Edmonton Economic 
Development Authority 
Edmonton Economic 
Development Authority 
1982  
Alberta Edmonton Research and 
Development Park 
Authority 
Edmonton Research and 
Development Park 
Authority Act 
1980  
Alberta The Education of Service 
Men's Children  
The Education of Service 
Men's Children Act 
1946 1997 
Alberta Energy Resources 
Conservation Board 
Energy Resources 
Conservation Act 
Hydro and Electric 
Energy Act 
  
Alberta Geographic Board of 
Alberta 
The Alberta Heritage 
Amendment Act 
1949 1974 
Alberta Hazardous Chemical 
Advisory Committee 
Environmental Protection 
Act 
1978 1992 
Alberta Health Occupations 
Board 
Health Occupations Act 1980 1986 
Alberta Health Unit Board Public Health Act 1951 1994 
Alberta Hearing Aid Practitioners Health Professionals Act 2002  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta Horse Racing Appeal 
Tribunal 
Horse Racing 
Commission Act 
2002  
Alberta Institute of the Chartered 
Accountants of Alberta 
Regulated Accounting 
Profession Act 
  
Alberta Irrigation Council Irrigation Districts Act   
British 
Columbia 
Labour Relations Board Labour Relations Code 1947  
Alberta Land Compensation 
Board 
Expropriation Act 1974  
Albert Law Enforcement 
Review Board 
Police Act 1973  
Alberta Law Society of Alberta The Legal Profession Act   
Alberta Library System Boards Libraries Act 1948  
Alberta Licensed Practical 
Nurses Profession 
Health Professionals Act 2003  
Alberta The Local Authorities 
Board 
The Local Authorities 
Board Act 
1961 1994 
Alberta M.S.I. Foundation M.S.I. Foundation Act 1970  
Alberta Medical Laboratory 
Technologists 
Health Professionals Act 2001  
Alberta Medical Radiological 
Technicians Board 
Radiation Protection Act 1963 1985 
Alberta Municipal Government 
Board 
Municipal Government 
Act 
1994 
 
 
Alberta Municipal Library 
Boards 
Libraries Act 1948  
Alberta Municipal Police Police Act 1973  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Commission 
Alberta Natural Resources 
Conservation Board 
Natural Resources 
Conservation Board Act 
1990  
Alberta Naturopathic Association 
of Alberta 
The Naturopathy Repeal 
Act 
1948 1986 
Alberta Persons with 
Developmental 
Disabilities Foundation 
Persons with 
Developmental 
Disabilities Foundation 
Act 
1996  
Alberta Physical Therapy 
Profession Act 
College of Physical 
Therapists of Alberta 
  
Alberta Private Colleges 
Accreditation Board 
Post-Secondary Learning 
Act 
1983 2003 
Alberta Profession of Denturists Health Professionals Act 1961  
Alberta Provincial Cancer 
Hospitals Board 
Cancer Programs Act 1967  
Alberta Provincial General 
Hospital Boards 
The Provincial General 
Hospitals Act 
1959 1995 
Alberta Provincial Universities.  
Board of Governors 
The Universities Act  1973 
Alberta Psychiatric Nurses 
Association 
The Psychiatric Nurses 
Association Act 
1963 1986 
Alberta Psychologists 
Association of Alberta 
Health Professionals Act 1967  
Alberta Public Health Advisory 
and Appeal Board 
Public Health Act 1984  
Alberta Public Utilities Board The Public Utilities 
Board Act 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta Real Estate Council of 
Alberta 
Alberta Real Estate Act 1995  
Alberta The Recreation, Parks 
and Wildlife Foundation 
Recreation, Parks and 
Wildlife Foundation Act 
1976  
Alberta Regional Airport 
Authorities 
Regional Airport 
Authorities Act 
1989  
Alberta Regional Health 
Authorities 
Regional Health 
Authorities Act 
1994  
Alberta Regional Health 
Foundations 
Regional Health 
Foundations Act 
1996 2003 
Alberta Regional Service 
Commissions 
Municipal Government 
Act 
1994  
Alberta Registered Music 
Teachers' Association 
Repeal Act 
The Alberta Registered 
Music Teachers 
Association 
1947 1983 
Alberta School Buildings Board The School Act 1952 2001 
Alberta Small Producers 
Assistance Commission 
Small Producers 
Assistance Commission 
1987 1989 
Alberta Speech-Language 
Pathologists 
Health Professionals Act 2002  
Alberta Students Finance Board Students Finance Act 1953 1998 
Alberta Surface Reclamation 
Council 
Land Surface 
Conservation and 
Reclamation Act 
1963 1973 
Alberta Surface Rights Board Surface Rights Act 1952  
Alberta The Assessment Appeal 
Board 
Municipal Government 
Act 
 1994 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Alberta The Old Age Assistance 
Act (Board not named in 
the Act) 
The Old Age Assistance 
Act 
1952 1976 
Alberta Sexual Sterilization Act 
(Board appointed under 
the Act) 
The Sexual Sterilization 
Act 
 1972 
Alberta Universities Co-
ordinating Council 
The Universities Act 1964  
Alberta Universities Commission The Universities Act 1964 1973 
Alberta Widows' Pension Act 
(Board not named in Act) 
The Widows' Pension 
Act 
1952 1967 
Alberta Wild Rose Foundation Wild Rose Foundation 
Act 
1984  
Alberta Workman's 
Compensation Board 
The Workman's 
Compensation Act 
  
British 
Columbia 
Alcohol and Drug 
Commission 
Alcohol and Drug 
Commission Act 
1973  
British 
Columbia 
Applied Science 
Technologists and 
Technicians of British 
Columbia 
Applied Science 
Technologists and 
Technicians Act 
1985  
British 
Columbia 
Architectural Institute of 
British Columbia 
British Columbia   
British 
Columbia 
Arts Council of British 
Columbia 
Arts Council Act 1995  
British 
Columbia 
Association of British 
Columbia Foresters 
Foresters Act 1947  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
British 
Columbia 
The Association of 
Professional Engineers 
and Geoscientists of the 
Province of British 
Columbia 
Engineers and 
Geoscientists Act 
  
British 
Columbia 
The Barbers Association 
of British Columbia 
Barbers Act  2003 
British 
Columbia 
BC Ferry Authority Coastal Ferry Act 1976  
British 
Columbia 
Blind Persons' 
Allowance Board 
Blind Persons' 
Allowances Act 
1951 1980 
British 
Columbia 
Board of Brand 
Commissioners 
Livestock Brands Act 
(1979) 
 1997 
British 
Columbia 
Board of Eugenics Sexual Sterilization Act  1973 
British 
Columbia 
Board of Governors University Act   
British 
Columbia 
Board of Hearing Aid 
Dealers and Consultants 
Hearing Aid Act 1971 2002 
British 
Columbia 
Board of Industrial 
Relations 
Male Minimum Wage 
Act (Employment 
Standards Act) 
 1983 
British 
Columbia 
Board of School Trustees School Act   
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Assessment Authority 
Assessment Authority 
Act 
1974  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Broiler 
Hatching Egg 
Commission 
Natural Products 
Marketing (British 
Columbia) Act 
2004  
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British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Buildings Corporation 
Public Agency 
Accommodation Act 
1976 2006 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Chicken Marketing 
Board 
Natural Products 
Marketing (British 
Columbia) Act 
1961  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia College 
of Social Workers 
Social Workers Act 1968  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Cranberry Marketing 
Commission 
Natural Products 
Marketing (British 
Columbia) Act 
1968  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Dyking 
Authority 
Dyking Authority Act 1965 1999 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Egg 
Marketing Board 
Natural Products 
Marketing (British 
Columbia) Act 
1967  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Energy 
Commission 
Energy Act 1973 1980 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Harbours Board 
Harbour Board Act 1967 1983 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Heritage Trust 
Heritage Conservation 
Act 
1977  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Human 
Rights Tribunal 
Human Rights Act 1984  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Hydro 
and Power Authority 
Hydro and Power 
Authority Act 
  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Institute of Argologists 
Agrologists Act 1947  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Milk 
Marketing Board 
Natural Products Act   
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blank)  
End 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Petroleum Corporation 
Petroleum Corporation 
Act 
1973 1994 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Police 
Commission 
Police Act 1974 1997 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Racing 
Commission 
Gaming Control Act 1959 2003 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Safety 
Authority 
Safety Authority Act 2003  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Society 
of Landscape Architects 
Architects (Landscape) 
Act 
1968  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Systems Corporation 
System Act 1977 1998 
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia Turkey 
Marketing Board 
Natural Products 
Marketing (British 
Columbia) Act 
1966  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Utilities Commission 
British Columbia 
Utilities Commission 
1980  
British 
Columbia 
British Columbia 
Vegetable Marketing 
Commission 
Natural Products 
Marketing (British 
Columbia) Act 
1980  
British 
Columbia 
Building Officials 
Association 
Building Officials 
Association Act 
1997  
British 
Columbia 
Bull Control Committee Animals Act   
British 
Columbia 
Business Practice and 
Consumer Protection 
Authority 
Business Practice and 
Consumer Protection 
Authority Act 
2004  
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(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
British 
Columbia 
Cattle Industry 
Development Council 
Farming and Fishing 
Industries Development 
Act 
1973  
British 
Columbia 
Certified General 
Accountants' Association 
of British Columbia 
Certified General 
Accountants Act 
1951  
British 
Columbia 
Child and Family Review 
Board 
Child, Family and 
Community Services Act 
1994  
British 
Columbia 
Children's Aid Societies Child, Family and 
Community Services 
1943 1994 
British 
Columbia 
Coal and Petroleum 
Products Control Board 
Coal and Petroleum 
Products Control Board 
 1953 
British 
Columbia 
College of Applied 
Biology 
College of Applied 
Biology Act 
2002  
British 
Columbia 
College of Chiropractors 
of British Columbia 
Health Professions Act   
British 
Columbia 
College of Dental 
Hygienists of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1994  
British 
Columbia 
College of Dental 
Surgeons 
Health Professions Act   
British 
Columbia 
College of Dental 
Technicians of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1958  
British 
Columbia 
College of Denturists of 
British Columbia 
Health Professions Act 2000  
British 
Columbia 
College of Dietitians of 
British Columbia 
Health Professions Act 2002  
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(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
British 
Columbia 
College of Message 
Therapists of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1994  
British 
Columbia 
College of Midwives of 
British Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1995  
British 
Columbia 
College of Naturopathic 
Physicians 
Health Professions Act   
British 
Columbia 
College of Occupational 
Therapists of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1998  
British 
Columbia 
College of Opticians Health Professions Act 1994  
British 
Columbia 
College of Optometrists 
of British Columbia 
Health Professions Act   
British 
Columbia 
College of Pharmacists Health Professions Act   
British 
Columbia 
College of Physical 
Therapists of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1946  
Nova 
Scotia 
College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of Nova 
Scotia 
Medical Act   
British 
Columbia 
College of Podiatric 
Surgeons of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act   
British 
Columbia 
College of Practical 
Nurses of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1951  
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British 
Columbia 
College of Psychologists 
of British Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1977  
British 
Columbia 
College of Registered 
Nurses of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act   
British 
Columbia 
College of Registered 
Psychiatric Nurses of 
British Columbia 
Health Professions Act 1951  
British 
Columbia 
College of Speech and 
Hearing Health 
Professionals of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act 2008  
British 
Columbia 
College of Teachers Teaching Professionals 
Act 
1987  
British 
Columbia 
College of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine 
Practitioners and 
Acupuncturists of British 
Columbia 
Health Professions Act 2000  
British 
Columbia 
Columbia Basin Trust Columbia Basin Trust 
Act 
1995  
British 
Columbia 
Commission for the 
Education of Soldiers' 
Dependent Children 
Education of Soldiers 
Dependent Children Act 
 1973 
British 
Columbia 
Community Living 
Authority 
Community Living 
Authority Act 
2004  
British 
Columbia 
Community Resources 
Board 
BC Benefits (Income 
Assistance) Act 
1974 1996 
British 
Columbia 
Corporation of Land 
Surveyors 
Land Surveyors Act   
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blank)  
End 
British 
Columbia 
Disabled Persons' 
Allowance Board 
Disabled Persons' 
Allowance Act 
1954 1980 
British 
Columbia 
Drainage and Dyking 
Districts 
Drainage, Dyking and 
Development Act 
  
British 
Columbia 
Emergency Health 
Services Commission 
Emergency and Health 
Services Act 
1974  
British 
Columbia 
Emergency Medical 
Assistants Licensing 
Board 
Emergency and Health 
Services Act 
1974  
British 
Columbia 
Employment Standards 
Tribunal 
Employment Standards 
Act 
1995  
British 
Columbia 
Environmental Appeal 
Board 
Environmental 
Management Act 
1981  
British 
Columbia 
Farm Industry Review 
Board 
Natural Products 
Marketing (British 
Columbia) Act 
  
British 
Columbia 
Fence Viewers Line Fences Act  1971 
British 
Columbia 
Financial Institutions 
Commission 
Financial Institutions Act 1989  
British 
Columbia 
Forest Appeals 
Commission 
Forest Practices Code of 
British Columbia Act 
1994  
British 
Columbia 
Gaming Control Act Lottery Corporation Act 1985  
British 
Columbia 
Grasshopper-control 
Committees 
Grasshopper-control Act  1998 
British 
Columbia 
The Hairdressers 
Association of British 
Columbia 
Hairdressers Act  2003 
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British 
Columbia 
Health Insurance 
Commission 
Health Insurance Act  1973 
British 
Columbia 
Health Professionals 
Review Board 
Health Professions Act 1990  
British 
Columbia 
Improvement District Water Act   
British 
Columbia 
Industry Training 
Authority 
Industry Training 
Authority Act 
1977  
British 
Columbia 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of British 
Columbia 
Chartered Accountants 
Act 
  
British 
Columbia 
Insurance Corporation of 
British Columbia 
Insurance Corporation 
Act 
1973  
British 
Columbia 
Insurance Council of 
British Columbia 
Financial Institution Act 1969  
British 
Columbia 
Land Settlement Board Land Settlement and 
Development Act 
 1968 
British 
Columbia 
Land Title and Survey 
Authority of British 
Columbia 
Land Title and Survey 
Authority Act 
2004  
British 
Columbia 
Law Society of British 
Columbia 
Legal Professions Act   
British 
Columbia 
Legal Services Society Legal Services Society 
Act 
1975  
British 
Columbia 
Liquor Control Board Liquor Control and 
Licensing Act 
 1977 
British 
Columbia 
Medical Services 
Commission 
Medical Protection Act 1967  
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Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
British 
Columbia 
Municipal Finance 
Authority 
Municipal Finance 
Authority Act 
1970  
British 
Columbia 
Municipal Police Boards Police Act 1974  
British 
Columbia 
Municipal Public 
Libraries' Public Library 
Board 
Libraries Act   
British 
Columbia 
Ocean Falls Corporation Ocean Falls Corporation 
Act 
1973 1986 
British 
Columbia 
Oil and Gas Commission Oil and Gas Commission 
Act 
1998  
British 
Columbia 
Old-age Assistance 
Board 
Old-Age Assistance Act 1951 1980 
British 
Columbia 
Passenger Transportation 
Board 
Passenger Transportation 
Act 
2004  
British 
Columbia 
Pesticide Control Appeal 
Board 
Integrated Pest 
Management Act 
1977 2003 
British 
Columbia 
Pollution Control Board Pollution Control Board 1956 1981 
British 
Columbia 
Property Assessment 
Appeal Board 
Assessment Act 1953  
British 
Columbia 
Provincial Adult Care 
Facilities Licensing 
Board 
Community Care and 
Assisted Living Act 
1969 2002 
British 
Columbia 
Provincial Agricultural 
Land Commission 
Agricultural Land 
Commission Act 
1973  
British 
Columbia 
Provincial Capital 
Commission 
Capital Commission Act 1956  
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(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
British 
Columbia 
Provincial Child Care 
Facilities Licensing 
Board 
Community Care and 
Assisted Living Act 
1969 2002 
British 
Columbia 
Provincial Council of 
British Columbia Music 
Teachers Association 
Registered Music 
Teachers Act 
1947  
British 
Columbia 
Public Library 
Associations 
Public Libraries Act   
British 
Columbia 
Public Library 
Commission 
Public Libraries Act  1978 
British 
Columbia 
Public Utilities 
Commission 
Public Utilities Act  1973 
British 
Columbia 
Real Estate Council Real Estate Services Act 1958  
British 
Columbia 
Real Estate Foundation Real Estate Act 1985  
British 
Columbia 
Regional Health Boards Health Authorities Act 1993  
British 
Columbia 
Rent Review 
Commission 
Residential Tenancy Act 1977 1984 
British 
Columbia 
Royal British Columbia 
Museum 
Museum Act 2003  
British 
Columbia 
Securities Commission Securities Act 1962  
British 
Columbia 
Seed-control Committee Seed-growers' Protection 
Act 
 2003 
British 
Columbia 
Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals 
Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Act 
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Body Name  
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blank)  
End 
British 
Columbia 
Society of Management 
Accountants 
Accountants 
(Management) Act 
  
British 
Columbia 
South Cost British 
Columbia Transportation 
Authority 
South Coast British 
Columbia Transportation 
Authority 
1998  
British 
Columbia 
Steam-boiler Inspection 
Committee 
Boiler and Pressure 
Vessel Act 
 1949 
British 
Columbia 
Surface Rights Board Petroleum and Natural 
Gas Act 
1954  
British 
Columbia 
Trade and Development 
Corporation 
Development 
Corporation Act 
1973 2007 
British 
Columbia 
Travel Assurance Board Business Practice and 
Consumer Protection 
Authority Act 
1977 2004 
British 
Columbia 
Universities Council University Act 1974 1987 
British 
Columbia 
Urban Transit Authority 
of British Columbia 
British Columbia Transit 
Act 
1979  
British 
Columbia 
Veterinary Association 
of British Columbia 
Veterinary Act   
British 
Columbia 
Workmen's 
Compensation Board 
Workmen's 
Compensation Act 
  
Nova 
Scotia 
Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women 
Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women Act 
1977  
Nova 
Scotia 
Agricultural Marshland 
Conservation 
Commission 
The Agricultural 
Marshlands Conservation 
Act 
2000  
Nova 
Scotia 
Art Council of Nova 
Scotia 
Art Council Act 1995  
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(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Nova 
Scotia 
Art Gallery of Nova 
Scotia 
Art Gallery of Nova 
Scotia Act 
1775  
Nova 
Scotia 
Association of Interior 
Designers of Nova Scotia 
Interior Designers Act 1990  
Nova 
Scotia 
Association of Nova 
Scotia Land Surveyors 
Land Surveyors Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Association of 
Professional Engineers of 
the Province of Nova 
Scotia 
Engineering Profession 
Act 
  
Nova 
Scotia 
Association of 
Professional 
Geoscientists of Nova 
Scotia 
Geoscience Profession 
Act 
2002  
Nova 
Scotia 
Atlantic Institute of 
Education 
Atlantic Institute of 
Education Act 
1969  
Nova 
Scotia 
Atlantic Provinces 
Special Education 
Authority 
Handicapped Persons' 
Education Ac 
1960  
Nova 
Scotia 
Bedford Waterfront 
Development 
Corporation 
Bedford Waterfront 
Development 
Corporation Act 
1983  
Nova 
Scotia 
Board of Commissioners 
of Public Utilities 
Public Utilities Act  1992 
Nova 
Scotia 
Board of Dispensing 
Opticians 
Dispensing Opticians Act 1968  
Nova 
Scotia 
Board of Examiners for 
Scalers 
Scalers Act   
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Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Nova 
Scotia 
Board of Examiners for 
Stationary Engineers 
Stationary Engineers Act 1980  
Nova 
Scotia 
Boards of Health Health Act  2004 
Nova 
Scotia 
Board of Registration of 
Embalmers and Funeral 
Directors 
Embalmers and Funeral 
Directors Act 
1955  
Nova 
Scotia 
Canada-Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum 
Board 
Canada-Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum 
Resources Accord 
Implementation Act 
1987  
Nova 
Scotia 
Canadian Information 
Processing Society of 
Nova Scotia 
Canadian Information 
Processing Society of 
Nova Scotia Act 
2002  
Nova 
Scotia 
Cancer Treatment and 
Research Foundation of 
Nova Scotia 
Cancer Treatment and 
Research Foundation 
1980  
Nova 
Scotia 
Certified Engineering 
Technicians and 
Technologists of Nova 
Scotia 
Applied Science 
Technology Act 
1999  
Nova 
Scotia 
Certified General 
Accountants 
Certified General 
Accountants Act 
1998  
Nova 
Scotia 
Clean Nova Scotia 
Foundation 
Clean Nova Scotia 
Foundation Act 
1988  
Nova 
Scotia 
College of Licensed 
Practical Nurses of Nova 
Scotia 
Licensed Practical 
Nurses Act 
1988  
Nova 
Scotia 
College of Paramedics of 
Nova Scotia 
Paramedics Act 2005  
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(before 1946 
blank)  
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Nova 
Scotia 
College of Registered 
Nurses of Nova Scotia 
Registered Nurses Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Cosmetology Association 
of Nova Scotia 
Cosmetology Act 1962  
Nova 
Scotia 
County Health Boards Public Health Act  1962 
Nova 
Scotia 
Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board 
Compensation for 
Victims of Crime Act 
1975  
Nova 
Scotia 
Cultural Foundation Cultural Foundation Act 1978  
Nova 
Scotia 
Cumberland 
Development Authority 
Regional Community 
Development Act 
1988 1996 
Nova 
Scotia 
Denturist Licensing 
Board 
Denturist Act 1973  
Nova 
Scotia 
District Health 
Authorities 
Health Authorities Act 2000  
Nova 
Scotia 
Drug Dependency 
Foundation 
Drug Dependency 
Foundation Act 
1959  
Nova 
Scotia 
Energy and Mineral 
Recourses Conservation 
Board 
Energy Conservation Act 1980 2001 
Nova 
Scotia 
Family Benefits Review 
Board 
Family Benefits Act 1977 2000 
Nova 
Scotia 
Farm Practices Board Farm Practices Act 2000  
Nova 
Scotia 
Film Nova Scotia Film Nova Scotia 1990  
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blank)  
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Nova 
Scotia 
Fire Protection Districts Rural Fire Districts Act 1963  
Nova 
Scotia 
Forest Practice 
Improvement Board 
Forest Enhancement Act 1965 1986 
Nova 
Scotia 
Foresters Association Foresters Association 
Act 
1999  
Nova 
Scotia 
Halifax-Dartmouth Port 
Development 
Commission 
Halifax-Dartmouth Port 
Development 
Commission 
1984  
Nova 
Scotia 
Health Research 
Foundation 
Health Research 
Foundation Act 
1998  
Nova 
Scotia 
Health Services and 
Insurance Commission 
Health Services 
Insurance Act 
1958  
Nova 
Scotia 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nova 
Scotia 
Chartered Accountants 
Act 
  
Nova 
Scotia 
Labour Relations Board 
of Nova Scotia 
Trade Union Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Licensed Professional 
Planners Association of 
Nova Scotia 
Professional Planners 
Act 
2005  
Nova 
Scotia 
Liquor License Board Liquor Control Act 1961 2001 
Nova 
Scotia 
Louisbourg District 
Planning and 
Development 
Commission 
Louisbourg District 
Planning and 
Development 
Commission 
1963  
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Nova 
Scotia 
Maritime Provinces 
Harness Racing 
Commission 
Maritime Provinces 
Harness Racing 
Commission Act 
1946  
Nova 
Scotia 
Maritime Provinces 
Higher Education 
Commission 
Maritime Provinces 
Higher Education 
Commission Act 
2004  
Nova 
Scotia 
Marsh Body The Agricultural 
Marshlands Conservation 
Act 
1949  
Nova 
Scotia 
Marshland Reclamation 
Commission 
The Agricultural 
Marshlands Conservation 
Act 
1949 2000 
Nova 
Scotia 
Municipal Board of 
Police Commissioners 
Police Act 1974  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Association 
of Architects 
Architects Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Association 
of Occupational 
Therapists 
Occupational Therapists 
Act 
1970  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Association 
of Physiotherapists 
Physiotherapy Act 1958  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Association 
of Real Estate Appraisers 
Real Estate Appraisers 
Act 
1998  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Association 
of Social Workers 
Social Workers Act 1963  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Barristers' 
Society 
Legal Profession Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Board of 
Censors 
Theatres and 
Amusements Act 
 2000 
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Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Board of 
Examiners in Psychology 
Psychologists Act 1980  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Boxing 
Authority 
Boxing Authority Act 1973  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Business 
Incorporated 
Nova Scotia Business 
Incorporated Act 
1986 2000 
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Chiropractic 
Association 
Chiropractic Act 1972  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia College of 
Medical Laboratory 
Technologists 
Medical Laboratory 
Technologists Act 
2000  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Crop and 
Livestock Insurance 
Commission 
Crop and Livestock 
Insurance Act 
1968  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Dairy 
Commission 
Dairy Industry Act 1967 2000 
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Dental 
Technicians Association 
Dental Technicians Act 1965  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Dietitian 
Association 
Professional Dietitians 
Act 
1973  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Economic 
Council 
Economic Council Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia 
Environmental 
Assessment Board 
Environment Act 1994  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Farm Loans 
Board 
Agriculture and Rural 
Credit Act 
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Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Loan 
Board 
Fisheries and Coastal 
Resources Act 
  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Gaming 
Control Commission 
Gaming Control Act 1994  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Gaming 
Corporation 
Gaming Control Act 1994  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Housing 
Commission 
Housing Act  1983 
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Human 
Rights Commission 
Human Rights 
Commission Act 
1967  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Innovation 
Corporation 
Innovation Corporation 
Act 
1994  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Institute of 
Agrologists 
Agrologists Act 1953  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Legal Aid 
Commission 
Legal Aid Act 1977  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Liquor 
Corporation 
Liquor Control Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Lottery 
Commission 
Gaming Control Act 1976 1994 
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Municipal 
Board 
Utility and Review Board 
Act 
1981 1992 
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Municipal 
Finance Corporation 
Municipal Finance 
Corporation Act 
1979  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Museum of 
Science 
Nova Scotia Museum 
Act 
1947  
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Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia 
Optometrical Association 
Optometry Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia 
Pharmaceutical Society 
Pharmacy Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Police 
Commission 
Police Act 1974 2004 
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Police 
Review Board 
Police Act 1985  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Power 
Finance Corporation Act 
Nova Scotia Power 
Finance Corporation Act 
  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Primary 
Forest Products 
Marketing Board 
Primary Forest Products 
Marketing 
1972  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Registered 
Barbers Association 
Registered Barbers Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Resources 
Development Board 
Business Capital 
Corporation Act 
1971 1986 
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Securities 
Commission 
Securities Act 1987  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Society of 
Radiological Technicians 
Medical Radiological 
Technicians Act 
1965  
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Veterinary 
Association 
Veterinary Medical Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Nova Scotia Water 
Authority 
Water Act 1963 1972 
Nova 
Scotia 
Pay Equity Commission Pay Equity Act 1988  
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(before 1946 
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Nova 
Scotia 
Prescription Monitoring 
Board 
Prescription Monitoring 
Act 
2004  
Nova 
Scotia 
Provincial 
Apprenticeship Board 
Apprenticeship and 
Trades Qualifications 
Act 
1988  
Nova 
Scotia 
Provincial Community 
Pastures Board 
Agriculture and 
Marketing Act 
1957 2004 
Nova 
Scotia 
Provincial Dental Board Dental Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Provincial Grain 
Commission 
Provincial Grain 
Commission Act 
1977  
Nova 
Scotia 
Public Accountants 
Board of Nova Scotia 
Public Accountants Act 1952  
Nova 
Scotia 
Regional Health Boards  Regional Health Boards 1993 2000 
Nova 
Scotia 
Regional Library Boards Libraries Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Rent Review 
Commission 
Rent Review Act 1975  
Nova 
Scotia 
Research Foundation of 
Nova Scotia 
Research Foundation Act 1946  
Nova 
Scotia 
School Boards Education Act   
Nova 
Scotia 
Shipbuilding 
Commission 
Shipbuilding 
Commission Act 
 1967 
Nova 
Scotia 
Small Business 
Development 
Corporation 
Small Business 
Development Act 
1981 2001 
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Nova 
Scotia 
Society of Management 
Accountants of Nova 
Scotia 
Certified Management 
Accountants of Nova 
Scotia Act 
1950  
Nova 
Scotia 
Sydney Steel 
Corporation 
Sydney Steel 
Corporation Act 
1967  
Nova 
Scotia 
Sydney Waterfront 
Development 
Corporation 
Sydney Waterfront 
Development 
Corporation 
1988 1994 
Nova 
Scotia 
Tidal Power Corporation Government 
Restructuring Act 
1971 2001 
Nova 
Scotia 
Utility and Review Board Utility and Review Board 
Act 
1992  
Nova 
Scotia 
Workmen's 
Compensation Board of 
Nova Scotia 
Workmen's 
Compensation Act 
  
Ontario AgriCorp AgriCorp Act 1996  
Ontario Agricultural Research 
Institute of Ontario 
The Agricultural 
Research Institute of 
Ontario Act` 
1961  
Ontario Agricultural Societies  Agricultural Societies 
Act 
 1988 
Ontario Alcohol and Gaming 
Commission 
Alcohol and Gaming 
Regulation and Public 
Protection Act 
1996  
Ontario Alcoholism and Drug 
Addiction Research 
Foundation 
The Alcoholism and 
Drug Addiction Research 
Foundation Act 
1965  
Ontario Algonquin Forest 
Authority Act 
Algonquin Forestry 
Authority Act 
1974  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Art Gallery of Ontario The Art Gallery of 
Ontario Act 
1966  
Ontario Association of Ontario 
Land Surveyors 
Surveyors Act   
Ontario Association of 
Professional Engineers of 
Ontario 
The Professional 
Engineers Act 
  
Ontario Board of Funeral 
Services 
Funeral Directors & 
Establishments 
1947  
Ontario Board of Parole Department of 
Correctional Services 
  
Ontario Boards of School 
Trustees 
Education Act   
Ontario Burlington Beach 
Commission 
The Burlington Beach 
Act 
 1956 
Ontario Centennial Centre of 
Science and Technology 
The Centennial Centre of 
Science and Technology 
Act 
1965  
Ontario Child and Family 
Services Review Board 
Child and Family 
Services Act 
1978  
Ontario Children's Aid Societies Child and Family 
Services Act 
  
Ontario Co-operative Loans 
Board of Ontario 
Co-operative Loans Act 1956 1994 
Ontario College of Audiologists 
and Speech-Language 
Pathologists of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act  
1991  
Ontario College of Chiropractors 
of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario College of Dental 
Hygienists of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
Ontario College of Dietitians of 
Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
Ontario College of Medical 
Laboratory Technologists 
of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
Ontario College of Message 
Therapists of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
Ontario College of Midwives of 
Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
Ontario College of Occupational 
Therapists of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
Ontario College of Medical 
Radiation Technologists 
of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1962  
Ontario College of Nurses of 
Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1951  
Ontario College of Opticians of 
Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1960  
Ontario College of Optometrists 
of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
  
Ontario College of 
Psychotherapists and 
Registered Mental Health 
Therapists of Ontario 
The Psychologists 
Registration Act 
1960  
Ontario College of 
Physiotherapists of 
Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario College of Respiratory 
Therapists of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1991  
Ontario Collision Repair 
Advisory Board 
Collision Repair 
Standards Act 
2002  
Ontario Commercial Registration 
Appeal Tribunal 
Ministry of Consumer 
and Commercial 
Relations 
1968 1999 
Ontario Commission for the 
Investigation of Cancer 
Remedies 
The Cancer Remedies 
Act 
 1997 
Ontario Community Care Access 
Corporations 
Community Care Access 
Corporation Act 
2001  
Ontario Consent and Capacity 
Board 
Health Care Consent Act 1996  
Ontario Conservation Authorities Conservation Authorities 
Act 
1946  
Ontario Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board 
Compensation for 
Victims of Crime Act 
1967  
Ontario Crop Insurance 
Commission of Ontario 
AgriCorp Act 1966 1996 
Ontario Custody Review Board Child and Family 
Services Act 
1984  
Ontario Deposit Insurance 
Corporation of Ontario 
Credit Unions and 
Caisses Populaires Act 
1994  
Ontario District Social Services 
Administration Boards 
District Social Services 
Administration Boards 
Act 
1962  
Ontario Drugless Practitioners 
Board of Regents 
The Drugless 
Practitioners Act 
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Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Eastern Ontario 
Development 
Corporation 
Development 
Corporations Act 
1973  
Ontario Education Quality and 
Accountability Office 
Education Quality and 
Accountability Office 
Act 
1996  
Ontario Electrical Safety 
Authority 
Electricity Act 1998  
Ontario Environmental Review 
Tribunal 
Environmental 
Assessment Act 
1975 2000 
Ontario Environmental Appeal 
Board 
Environmental Protection 
Act 
1975 2000 
Ontario Farm Income 
Stabilization 
Commission 
Farm Income 
Stabilization Act 
1976 1996 
Ontario Farm Practices 
Protection Commission 
Farm Practices 
Protection Act 
1988 1998 
Ontario Farm Products Appeal 
Tribunal 
Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Act 
1978  
Ontario Farm Products Payment 
Boards 
Farm Products Payments 
Act 
1967  
Ontario Governing Board of 
Dental Technicians 
The Dental Technicians 
Act 
1946  
Ontario Health Disciplines Board Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
1974 1991 
Ontario Health Facilities Appeal 
Board 
Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care Appeal 
and Review Boards Act 
1974 1998 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Health Protection Appeal 
Board 
Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care Appeal 
and Review Boards Act 
1983 1998 
Ontario Health Professions 
Appeal and Review 
Board 
Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care Appeal 
and Review Boards Act 
1998  
Ontario Health Services Appeal 
Board 
Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care Appeal 
and Review Boards Act 
1972 1998 
Ontario Hospital Services 
Commission of Ontario 
Health Insurance Act 1957 1972 
Ontario Hydro One Inc. Electricity Act 1998  
Ontario Independent Electricity 
System Operator 
Electricity Act 1998  
Ontario Land Compensation 
Board (Board of 
Negotiation) 
Expropriations Act 1968  
Ontario License Appeal Tribunal License Appeal Tribunal 
Act 
1999  
Ontario License Suspension 
Appeal Board 
Highway Traffic Act 1973 1999 
Ontario Liquor License Appeal 
Tribunal 
The Liquor License Act 1975 1990 
Ontario Liquor Control Board of 
Ontario 
The Liquor Control Act   
Ontario Liquor License Board of 
Ontario 
Alcohol and Gaming 
Regulation and Public 
Protection Act (and 
Liquor License Act) 
1946 1996 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Local Boards of Health Health Protection and 
Promotion Act 
  
Ontario Local Roads Area Board The Local Roads Boards 
Act 
1964  
Ontario Local Services Boards Northern Services Board 
Acts 
1979  
Ontario Long Point Park 
Commission 
Long Point Park Act  1954 
Ontario Metro Toronto 
Convention Centre 
Metropolitan Toronto 
Convention Centre 
Corporation Act 
1988  
Ontario Milk Industry Board of 
Ontario 
The Milk Act  1965 
Ontario Milk Commission of 
Ontario 
The Milk Act 1965 1988 
Ontario Milk Industry 
Commission of Ontario 
Milk Industry Act 1954 1957 
Ontario Milk Products Board of 
Ontario 
Milk Industry Act 1954 1957 
Ontario Milk Products Producers' 
Co-ordinating Board 
The Milk Act 1954 1965 
Ontario Moosonee Development 
Area Board 
Town of Moosonee Act 1966  
Ontario Municipal Police 
Services Boards 
Police Services Act 1964  
Ontario New Homes Warranty 
Plan Corporation 
Ontario New Home 
Warranties Act 
1976  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Niagara Escarpment 
Commission 
Niagara Escarpment 
Planning and 
Development Act 
1973  
Ontario Niagara Parks 
Commission 
The Niagara Parks Act   
Ontario Northern Ontario 
Development 
Corporation 
Development 
Corporations Act 
1970  
Ontario Northern Ontario Grow 
Bonds Corporation 
Northern Ontario Grow 
Bonds Corporation Act 
2004  
Ontario Northern Ontario 
Heritage Fund 
Corporation 
Northern Ontario 
Heritage Fund Act 
1988  
Ontario Nursing Homes Review 
Board 
Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care Appeal 
and Review Boards Act 
1972 1998 
Ontario Old Age Pension 
Commission 
Old Age Pension Act 1948 1951 
Ontario Ontario Association of 
Architects 
The Architects Act   
 Ontario Ontario Cancer 
Treatment and Research 
Foundation 
The Cancer Act 1957  
Ontario Ontario Certified General 
Accountants Association 
Certified General 
Accountant Act 
1983  
Ontario Ontario Civilian 
Commission on Police 
Services 
Police Services Act 1961  
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Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
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Ontario Ontario Clean Water 
Agency 
Capital Investment Plan 
Act 
1993  
Ontario Ontario College of 
Pharmacy 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
  
Ontario Ontario College of Social 
Workers and Social 
Services Workers 
Social Work and Social 
Services Act 
1998  
Ontario Ontario Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
The Ontario Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
Act 
1967 1997 
Ontario Ontario Development 
Corporation 
Development 
Corporations Act 
1966  
Ontario Ontario Education 
Communications 
Authority 
The Ontario Education 
Communications 
Authority Act 
1970  
Ontario Ontario Energy Board 
Act 
Ontario Energy Board 
Act 
1960  
Ontario Ontario Energy 
Corporation 
Ontario Energy 
Corporation Act 
1974 1998 
Ontario Ontario Farm Products 
and Marketing 
Commission 
The Farm Products 
Marketing Act 
1946  
Ontario Ontario Film Review 
Board 
Film Classifications Act   
Ontario Ontario Financing 
Authority 
Capital Investment Plan 
Act 
1955  
Ontario Ontario Food Terminal 
Board 
The Ontario Food 
Terminal Act 
1946  
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Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Ontario Heritage 
Foundation 
Ontario Heritage Act 1967  
Ontario Ontario Highway 
Transportation Board 
The Ontario Highway 
Transportation Board Act 
1956  
Ontario Ontario Housing 
Corporation 
The Ontario Housing 
Corporation Act 
1964  
Ontario Ontario Human Rights 
Commission 
Human Rights Code 1958  
Ontario Ontario Hydro Electricity Act  1998 
Ontario Ontario Labour-
Management Arbitration 
Commission 
Labour Relations Act 1968 1979 
Ontario Ontario Labour Relations 
Board 
Labour Relations Act   
Ontario Ontario Land 
Corporation 
Capital Investment Plan 
Act 
1974 1993 
Ontario Ontario Library Services 
Board 
Public Libraries Act 1984  
Ontario Ontario Lottery 
Corporation 
Ontario Lottery and 
Gaming Corporation Act 
1974  
Ontario Ontario Municipal Board Ontario Municipal Board 
Act 
  
Ontario Ontario Municipal 
Health Services Board 
Municipal Health 
Services Act 
  
Ontario Ontario Northland 
Transpiration 
Commission 
Ontario Northland 
Transpiration 
Commission Act 
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Ontario Parks Integration 
Board 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources Act 
1956 1972 
Ontario Ontario Place 
Corporation 
Ontario Place 
Corporation Act 
1972  
Ontario Ontario Power Authority Electricity Act 1998  
Ontario Ontario Power 
Generation Inc. 
Electricity Act 1998  
Ontario Ontario Racing 
Commission 
Racing Commission Act 1950  
Ontario Ontario Rental Housing 
Tribunal 
Tenant Protection Act 1997  
Ontario Ontario Securities 
Commission 
Securities Act   
Ontario Ontario Stock Yards 
Board 
Stock Yards Act  1999 
Ontario Ontario Teachers' 
Federation 
Teaching Profession Act   
Ontario Ontario Telephone 
Development 
Corporation 
Ontario Telephone 
Development 
Corporation Act 
1955 1999 
Ontario Ontario Transportation 
Capital Corporation 
Capital Investment Plan 
Act 
1993  
Ontario Ontario Veterinary 
Association 
Veterinarians Act 1958  
Ontario Ontario Waste 
Management Corporation 
Ontario Waste 
Management Corporation 
Act 
1981  
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Province Most Recent Type II 
Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Ontario Water Resources 
Commission 
Government 
Reorganization Act 
1957 1972 
Ontario Operating Engineers 
Board of Examiners 
The Operating Engineers 
Act 
 1965 
Ontario Ottawa Congress Centre Ottawa Congress Centre 
Act 
1988  
Ontario Pay Equity Commission 
of Ontario 
Pay Equity Act 1987  
Ontario Pension Commission of 
Ontario 
Financial Services 
Commission of Ontario 
1965 1997 
Ontario Planning and 
Implementation 
Commission 
Education Act 1986 1997 
Ontario The Presqu'lle Parks Act The Presqu'ile Park Act  1954 
Ontario Professional 
Geoscientists of Ontario 
Professional 
Geoscientists Act 
2000  
Ontario Province of Ontario Arts 
Council 
The Arts Council Act 1962  
Ontario Public Accountants 
Council for the Province 
of Ontario 
The Public Accountancy 
Act 
  
Ontario Public Library Boards Public Libraries Act   
Ontario Public Library 
Associations 
Public Libraries Act  1966 
Ontario Public Utility 
Commission 
Public Utilities Act  2001 
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Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Regional Growth 
Councils 
The Regional 
Development Councils 
Act 
1966 1973 
Ontario Registered Insurance 
Brokers of Ontario 
Registered Insurance 
Brokers 
1980  
Ontario Rent Review Hearings 
Board 
Ontario Rent Control Act 1986 1992 
Ontario Research Foundation Research Foundation Act   
Ontario Residential Rental 
Standards Board 
Ontario Rent Control Act 1986 1992 
Ontario Roads Commissioners Statute Labour Act   
Ontario Royal College of Dental 
Surgeons of Ontario 
Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
  
Ontario Royal Ontario Museum The Royal Ontario 
Museum Act 
1968  
Ontario Sheridan Park 
Corporation 
The Sheridan Park 
Corporation Act 
1964 1979 
Ontario Social Assistance 
Review Board 
Ministry of Community 
and Social Services Act 
1975  
Ontario Social Benefits Tribunal Ontario Works Act 1997  
Ontario Soldiers Aid 
Commission 
Soldiers Aid 
Commission 
  
Ontario St. Clair Parkway 
Commission 
St. Clair Parks 
Commission Act 
1966  
Ontario St. Lawrence 
Development 
Commission 
St. Lawrence 
Development 
Commission Act 
1958  
Ontario Stallion Enrolment Board The Stallions Act  1966 
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Body Name  
Most Recent Act Creation 
(before 1946 
blank)  
End 
Ontario Suburban Service Board Suburban Area 
Development Act 
 1952 
Ontario Technical Standards and 
Safety Authority 
Technical Standards and 
Safety Ac 
2000  
Ontario Technology Centres Technology Centres Act 1982 1999 
Ontario The Financial 
Corporation 
Electricity Act 1998  
Ontario The Law Society of 
Upper Canada 
The Law Society Act   
Ontario Toronto Area Transit 
Operating Authority Act 
Toronto Area Transit 
Operating Authority Act 
1974 2011 
Ontario Toronto Futures 
Exchange 
Toronto Futures 
Exchange Act 
1983 2009 
Ontario Toronto Stock Exchange The Toronto Stock 
Exchange Act 
  
Ontario Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization 
Corporation 
Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization 
Corporation Act 
2002  
Ontario Wine Authority Vintners Quality 
Alliance Act 
1999  
Ontario Workplace Safety and 
Insurance Appeals 
Tribunal 
Workplace Safety and 
Insurance Act 
1997  
Ontario Workplace Safety and 
Insurance Board 
Workplace Safety and 
Insurance Act 
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Appendix C: Government Healthcare Document Collection  
Province Document Name Alberta	   1989.	  Premier's	  Commission	  on	  Future	  of	  Health	  Care	  for	  Albertans.	  The	  
Rainbow	  Report:	  Our	  Vision	  of	  Health,	  Volume	  1.	  Government,	  Edmonton:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Alberta.	  Alberta	   1989.	  Premiers's	  Commission	  on	  Future	  Health	  Care	  for	  Albertans.	  The	  
Rainbow	  Report:	  Our	  Vision	  of	  Health,	  Volume	  2.	  Government,	  Edmonton:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Alberta.	  
Alberta 2000.	  Legislative	  Assembly.	  “Regional	  Health	  Authorities	  Act,	  Revised	  Statutes	  of	  Alberta	  2000,	  Chapter	  R-­‐10.”	  Edmonton,	  AB:	  Queen's	  Publisher	  for	  Alberta. Alberta	   2001.	  Premier's	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  Health.	  A	  Framework	  for	  Reform:	  
Report	  of	  the	  Premier's	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  Health.	  Government,	  Edmonton:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Alberta.	  Alberta	   2004.	  Alberta	  Health	  and	  Wellness.	  Tracking	  Health	  Refrom	  in	  Alberta:	  
Alberta	  Health	  Reform	  Implementation	  Team	  Final	  Report	  January	  2004.	  Government,	  Edmonton:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Alberta.	  Alberta	   2005.	  Alberta	  Health	  and	  Wellness.	  Guide	  to	  Health	  Authority	  
Accountability	  Documents.	  Government,	  Edmonton:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Alberta.	  Alberta	   2006.	  Alberta	  Health	  and	  Wellness.	  Health	  Authority	  Accountability	  in	  
Alberta’s	  Health	  System.	  Government,	  Edmonton:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  Alberta.	  Alberta	   2007.	  Alberta	  Health	  and	  Wellness.	  Aligning	  Health	  Authority	  
Accountability	  in	  Alberta’s	  Health	  System.	  Government,	  Edmonton:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  Alberta.	  Alberta	   2008.	  Alberta	  Health	  and	  Wellness.	  Provincial	  Service	  Optimization	  
Review:	  Final	  Report.	  Government,	  Edmonton:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Alberta	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Province Document Name British	  Columbia	   1991.	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Health	  Care	  and	  Costs.	  	  Closer	  to	  Home:	  The	  Report	  of	  the	  British	  Columbia	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Health	  Care	  ad	  Costs	  
Volume	  2.	  Government,	  Victoria:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  British	  Columbia.	  British	  Columbia	   1993.	  Ministry	  of	  Health.	  New	  Directions	  for	  a	  Healthy	  British	  Columbia.	  Government,	  Victoria:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  British	  Columbia.	  British	  Columbia	   1996.	  Legislative	  Assembly.	  “Health	  Authorities	  Act,	  Revisesed	  Statutes	  of	  British	  Columbia	  1996,	  Chapter	  180.”	  Victoria,	  BC:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  British	  Columbia.	  British	  Columbia	   2001.	  A	  new	  Era	  for	  Patient-­‐Centred	  Health	  Care:	  Building	  a	  Sustainable,	  Accountable	  Structure	  for	  Delivery	  of	  High-­‐Quality	  Patient	  Services.	  Government,	  Victoria:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  British	  Columbia.	  British	  Columbia	   2001.	  Office	  of	  the	  Provincial	  Health	  Officer,	  Policy	  and	  Practice:	  A	  Report	  on	  the	  Use	  of	  British	  Columbia’s	  Health	  Goals.	  Government,	  Victoria:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  British	  Columbia.	  British	  Columbia	   2008.	  Office	  of	  the	  Auditor	  General	  of	  British	  Columbia.	  Public	  Sector	  Governance:	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  Principles	  of	  Good	  Practice.	  How	  are	  We	  
Doing?	  The	  Public	  Reporting	  of	  Performance	  Measures	  in	  British	  
Columbia.	  Government,	  Victoria:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  British	  Columbia.	  British	  Columbia	   2012.	  Ministry	  of	  Health.	  Safe	  Reporting/Whistleblowing	  Policy	  Standards.	  Government,	  Victoria:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  British	  Columbia.	  British	  Columbia	   2012.	  Office	  of	  the	  Auditor	  General	  of	  British	  Columbia.	  Crown	  Agency	  Board	  Governance.	  Government,	  Victoria:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  British	  Columbia.	  Nova	  Scotia	   1990.	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Health	  Care.	  Health	  Strategies	  for	  the	  Nineties:	  Managies	  Better	  Health.	  Government,	  Halifaz:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Nova	  Scotia.	  Nova	  Scotia	   1999.	  Minister's	  Task	  on	  Regionalized	  Health	  Care	  in	  Nova	  Scotia.	  Final	  Report	  and	  Recommendations.	  Government,	  Halifax:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Nova	  Scotia.	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Province Document Name Nova	  Scotia	   2000.	  Legislative	  Assembly.	  “District	  Health	  Authorities	  Act,	  Chapter	  6	  of	  the	  Acts	  of	  2000.”	  Halifax,	  NS:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Nova	  Scotia.	  Nova	  Scotia	   2003.	  Report	  of	  the	  Nova	  Scotia	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Primary	  Health	  Care	  Renewal.	  Primary	  Health	  Care	  Renewal	  Action	  for	  Healthier	  Nova	  
Scotians.	  Government,	  Halifax:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  Nova	  Scotia.	  Nova	  Scotia	   2006.	  Department	  of	  Health.	  A	  Primary	  Health	  Care	  Evaluation	  System	  System	  for	  Nova	  Scotia.	  Government,	  Halifax:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  Nova	  Scotia.	  Nova	  Scotia	   2012.	  Health	  and	  Wellness.	  2012-­‐13	  Statement	  of	  Mandate	  between	  Health	  and	  Wellness	  and	  the	  District	  Health	  Authorities.	  	  Nova	  Scotia	   2012.	  Health	  and	  Wellness.	  Annual	  Accountability	  Report	  for	  the	  Fiscal	  Year	  2011-­‐2012.	  Government,	  Halifax:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  Nova	  Scotia.	  Ontario	   1974.	  Ontario	  Health	  Planning	  Task	  Force.	  	  Report	  of	  the	  Health	  Planning	  
Task	  Force.	  Government,	  Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Ontario,	  Toronto.	  Ontario	   1975.	  Ministry	  of	  Health.	  Report,	  Reactions	  Response:	  The	  Health	  Care	  
System	  in	  Ontario.	  Government,	  Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Ontario.	  Ontario	   1987.	  Health	  Review	  Panel.	  Toward	  a	  Shared	  Direction	  for	  Health	  in	  
Ontario:	  Report	  of	  the	  Ontario	  Health	  Review	  Panel,	  June	  1987.	  Government,	  Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Ontario.	  Ontario	   2004.	  Minister	  of	  Health	  Health	  and	  Long-­‐Term	  Care.	  “Ontario's	  Health	  
Transformation	  Plan	  Purpose	  and	  Progress.	  Speaking	  Notes	  for:	  The	  
Honourable	  Minister	  of	  Health	  and	  Long-­‐Term	  Care	  September	  9,	  2004.”	  Government,	  Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Ontario.	  Ontario	   2005.	  Health	  Results	  Team.	  Health	  Reslths	  Team	  First	  Annual	  Report	  
2004-­‐05.	  Government,	  Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Ontario.	  Ontario	   2005.	  Health	  Results	  Team.	  “Bulletin	  No.	  6.”	  Local	  Health	  Integration	  
Networks:	  Building	  a	  True	  System.	  Toronto,	  ON:	  Queen's	  Printers	  for	  Ontario.	  
  
307 
Province Document Name Ontario	   2006.	  Legislative	  Assembly.	  2006.	  “Local	  Health	  System	  Integration	  Act,	  
Statutes	  of	  Ontario,	  2006,	  Chapter	  4.”	  Toronto,	  ON:	  Queen's	  Printers	  for	  Ontario.	  Ontario	   2009.	  Minister	  of	  Health	  Health	  and	  Long-­‐Term	  Care.	  2007-­‐2010	  
Accountability	  Agreement	  between	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Long-­‐Term	  
Care	  and	  the	  Local	  Heath	  Integration	  Networks.	  Government.	  Ontario	   2010.	  Ombudsman	  of	  Ontario.	  The	  LHIN	  Spin:	  Investigation	  into	  the	  
Hamilton	  Niagara	  Integration	  Network’s	  Local	  Health	  Integration	  
Network’s	  use	  of	  community	  engagement	  in	  its	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Government,	  Toronto:	  Queen’s	  Printer	  for	  Ontario.	  
 
  
  308 
Appendix D: Interview Questions 
Health Care System Case Study: Interview Question Guide 
The Interview process will combine standardized questions as well as unstructured 
questions. This semi-structured approach is intended to allow for elaboration on 
responses to standardized questions and to allow for interviewees to express opinions that 
may not have been captured by the standardized questions. Standardized questions are 
number, while possible probes are listed in the bullet points below each question. Not all 
standard questions may be applicable to each interviewee or may be superseded by 
answers to previous questions.  
Interview Topic Areas: 
• What it means to be accountable and the role of the non-governmental organization, 
government, and society in ensuring accountability 
• The nature of the accountability relationship between the non-governmental 
organization and government 
• The nature of the accountability relationship between the non-governmental 
organization and society.  
Interview Script 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed. The focus of the research project is on how 
organizations that have been given the authority to make policy decisions, but sit outside 
the structure of traditional government are held accountable. The questions that I will be 
asking you today deal with your perception of the accountability of <organization name>. 
Before we get started, do you have any questions for me? 
Are you okay with me recording our conversation? 
In cases where either the role of the organization or individual is not know one or both of 
the following questions may be asked prior to proceeding with the standardized questions 
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6. In what capacity are or were you would you describe the role of your organization 
within the health care system?  
7. How would you describe the part you play or played in helping your organization 
fulfill its role? 
Section 1: Accountability (as defined by the interviewee) 
1.1 The focus of this research is to gain an understanding of how organizations like 
the <organization name> are held accountable. As accountability can mean different 
things to different people I would like to start with how you would define or describe 
accountability. 
• What do you think it means for <organization name> to be accountable? 
1.2 Based on your definition of accountability, to whom do you feel <organization 
name> is most accountable to? 
• How do you feel <organization name> is held accountable by <insert 
response>? 
• Are there specific accountability requirements that must be met? 
• What are they? 
• How effective do you feel them to be? 
1.3 Whose interests do you feel the decisions of <organization name> most represent? 
• How do you feel <organization name> is held accountable by <insert 
response>? 
• Are there specific accountability requirements that must be met? 
• What are they? 
• How effective do you feel them to be? 
  310 
If the provincial government is not mentioned then ask question 1.4. 
1.4 How would you describe the accountability relationship between <organization 
name> and government? 
If the general public not mentioned then ask question 1.5. 
1.5 How would you describe the accountability relationship between <organization 
name> and members of the public? 
Section 2: Accountability (as defined by Mark Bovens) 
One way to look at accountability is to break it down into three components:  
1) The obligation the organization to explain and justify action 
2) The ability of those outside the organization to question and pass judgment 
3) The ability for those outside the organization to impose sanctions  
For each of the three aspects of accountability I am interested in your perception of the 
relationship between the < organization name > and both government and society. 
To start lets focus on the accountability relationship with government.  
2.1 To what extent do you feel that the <organization name> has an obligation to 
explain and justify its actions to government? 
• How successful do you believe the <organization name> has been at explaining 
and justifying its actions?  
• What more if anything could or should be done to make <organization name> 
explain and justify its actions?  
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2.2 To what extent do you feel the provincial government is able to question and pass 
judgment on the decisions and actions of <organization name>? 
• How successful do you believe the provincial government has been at asking 
questions and passing judgment in relation to the actions of <organization 
name>? 
• What more if anything could or should be done to allow for the province to 
question the <organization name> and pass judgment.  
2.3 To what extend do you believe the provincial government is able to sanction 
<organization name> for actions that it does not approve of?  
• When, or if, required, how successful has the provincial government been at 
sanctioning <organization name>?  
• What more if anything could or should be done to allow the provincial 
government to sanction <organization name> more effectively? 
Now lets focus on the accountability relationship with society. 
2.4 To what extent do you feel that the <organization name> has an obligation to 
explain and justify its actions to society? 
• How successful do you believe the <organization name> has been at explaining 
and justifying its actions?  
• What more if anything could or should be done to make <organization name> 
explain and justify its actions?  
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2.5 To what extent do you feel society is able to question and pass judgment on the 
decisions and actions of <organization name>? 
• How successful do you believe society has been at asking questions and passing 
judgment in relation to the actions of <organization name>? 
• What more if anything could or should be done to allow for society to question 
the <organization name> and pass judgment.  
2.6 To what extend do you believe society is able to sanction <organization name> 
for actions that it does not approve of?  
• When, or if, required, how successful has society been at sanctioning 
<organization name>?  
• What more if anything could or should be done to allow society to sanction 
<organization name> more effectively? 
Section 3: Alberta Only 
Alberta moved multiple regional authorities to one single organization. I am interested in 
what, if any, impact this change has had in your view on the accountability relationships 
for both government and society. 
3.1 From your perspective, what impact has the shift from regional authorities to a 
single provincial health board had on the ability to hold decision-makers accountable? 
Wrap up 
Is there anything else you would like to add in regard to <organization name> how it is 
accountable for its decisions? 
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Appendix E: Introductory E-mail Script 
Dear ____________________, 
 
I am a Doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at The University of 
Western Ontario working under the supervision of Dr. Cameron Anderson.  
The purpose of this e-mail is to invite you to participate in a research study that looks to 
better understand how organizations external to the traditional structure of government 
that have been delegated the authority to make public policy decisions are held 
accountable. 
Case studies across four provinces have been selected for study including insert their 
specific organization name here. You are being contacted because of your role as insert 
their role here. For each case I would like to interview people from the organization 
being studied, the public service, elected officials and interest groups. All interviews are 
confidential and no information that discloses the identity of the interviewee will be 
released or published without their specific consent.  
Participation would entail an interview of no longer than one hour in length that would 
cover the following topic areas:  
1. The function or purpose of the organization and the role government and society play 
in the organization fulfilling that purpose 
2. What it means to be accountable and the role of the organization, government, and 
society in ensuring accountability 
3. The nature of the accountability relationship between the organization and 
government 
4. The nature of the accountability relationship between the organization and society 
Thank you for considering this request. I look forward to hearing from you. 
Robert  
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Appendix F: Interview Consent Form 
 
 
Participants Initials:     
 
 
The University of Western Ontario 
Faculty of Social Science • Department of Political Science  
Room 4154, Social Science Centre • London, Ontario • CANADA – N6A 5C2 
Telephone: 519-661-3266 • Fax: 519-661-3904 • www.uwo.ca 
1 
 
 
Research Consent Form 
 
Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making  
in Multi-level Governance 
 
Title of Research: Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making in Multi-level 
Governance 
Investigator: Robert W. Waterman 
Supervisor: Dr Cameron D. Anderson 
Introduction: 
I am a Doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at The University of Western 
Ontario working under the supervision of Dr. Cameron Anderson.  
You are being invited to participate in a research study that looks at the accountability of non-
governmental organizations that have been authorized or created by government to make public 
policy decisions. The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information you require to 
make an informed decision on participating in this research.  
Purpose of Research and Interviews: 
The purpose of the research project is to better understand how organizations external to the 
traditional structure of government that have been delegated the authority to make public policy 
decisions are held accountable. In addressing this question the project includes four case 
studies selected across four provinces. Each case study includes interviews used to obtain the 
insights of individuals within the non-governmental organization, government, and society.  
Interview Procedure and Questions:  
Interviews will last a maximum of 1 hour. Interviews will be completed over the phone, with the 
interviewer calling you at the number specified by you, or over the internet through Skype or an 
alternative software package.  With your permission an audio recording of the interview will be 
made. Declining to have an audio recording of your interview created does not disqualify you 
from participation in the study.  
The interview process is divided into 5 topic areas: 1) How you associated with the organization; 
2) The function or purpose of the organization and the role government and society play in the 
organization fulfilling that purpose; 3) What it means to be accountable and the role of the 
organization, government, and society in ensuring accountability; 4) The nature of the 
accountability relationship between the organization and government; and 5) The nature of the 
accountability relationship between the organization and society.  
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Participants Initials:     
 
 
The University of Western Ontario 
Faculty of Social Science • Department of Political Science  
Room 4154, Social Science Centre • London, Ontario • CANADA – N6A 5C2 
Telephone: 519-661-3266 • Fax: 519-661-3904 • www.uwo.ca 
2 
 
 
Research Consent Form 
 
Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making  
in Multi-level Governance 
 
After the interview has been completed you will be given the opportunity to review the material 
collected. At your request a copy of the material transcribed from your interview and review of 
available audio recordings will be provided.  You will have the opportunity to provide corrections 
or clarifications to the information, as well as the opportunity to withdraw from the study at this 
time.  
Participants interviewed as society representatives must have no previous employment with 
either the non-governmental organization or government. 
Possible Risks and Benefits: 
The risks of the proposed research are minimal. You may feel some psychological or emotional 
discomfort answering questions about the organization’s level of accountability if you have 
concerns over how the organization or those working for or with the organization will be 
perceived.  
The direct benefit to you, as a participant, is the opportunity to put forward your view of the 
accountability of non-governmental decision-makers. Broader benefits to society include 
developing an understanding of the use of non-governmental actors in public decision-making 
and how such actors are held accountable. 
Withdrawing From the Study or Omitting Certain Questions: 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any 
question or withdraw from the study at any time. You have the right to be given important 
information about the study and what will be asked of you. You should only agree to take part if 
you feel confident that enough information has been given.  Participation is voluntary; you do not 
have to take part in the study if you do not want to. 
Confidentiality and Storage of Personal Records 
You do not waive any legal rights by signing the consent form. Your confidentiality will be 
respected. No information that discloses your identity will be released or published without your 
specific consent to the disclosure. It is importing to note, however, that due to the small sample 
size and the inclusion of organization names, speculation on the identity of participants may 
occur and it may be possible for individual participants to be identified. If you are not comfortable 
with this possibility then you should not participate. 
Your research records will be encrypted and stored digitally.  Copies of the encrypted audio 
recording and associated transcripts will be stored on the investigator’s personal computer, 
backup device, and CD. Audio recordings will be destroyed 5 years after the completion of the 
research.  Transcripts of your interview will be kept indefinitely. 
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Participants Initials:     
 
 
The University of Western Ontario 
Faculty of Social Science • Department of Political Science  
Room 4154, Social Science Centre • London, Ontario • CANADA – N6A 5C2 
Telephone: 519-661-3266 • Fax: 519-661-3904 • www.uwo.ca 
4 
 
 
Research Consent Form 
 
Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making  
in Multi-level Governance 
 
 
Title of Research: Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making in Multi-level 
Governance 
 
I consent to having an audio recording of my interview created: 
 
    Accept    Decline  
 
I have read the Letter of Information (or Information/Consent document), have had the nature of 
the study explained to me and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 
 
 
Name of Participant (Printed) Contact Phone Number or Skype Address of 
Participant       
 
 
Signature of Participant    Date 
 
 
 
Signature of Investigator Reviewing  Date 
Research Consent Form     
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Appendix G: Performance Measures Reporting Example (From AHS Annual 
Report 2013-1014) 
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